AFR 110-14
USAF AIRCRAFT
ACCIDENT
INVESTIGATION
BOARD

24 JUNE 94 FAIRCHILD AFB, WA

B-52H AIRCRAFT S/N 61-0026 VOL 1

92 BW 325 BS

INVESTIGATION OFFICER
MICHAEL G. MCCONNELL, COL, USAF

HQ 12TH AIR FORCE

COPY NUMBER 30 OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH AIR FORCE (ACC) DAVIS-MONTHAN AIR FORCE BASE, ARIZONA

MEMORANDUM FOR 12 AF/JA

32 SEP 1994

FROM:

HQ 12 AF/CC

5430 E. Gafford Way, STE 132

Davis-Monthan AFB AZ 85707-4250

SUBJ:

Aircraft Accident Investigation: 24 Jun 94, B-52H, SN61-0026, 92BW (325BS),


Fairchild AFB WA

Subject aircraft accident investigation is approved.

THOMAS R. GRIFFI

Lieutenant General, USAF

Commander



On 24 June 1994, Czar 52, a B-52H assigned to the 325th Bomb Squadron, 92d Bomb Wing, Fairchild AFB, WA, launched at approximately 1358 hours Pacific Daylight Time (PDT), to practice air show maneuvers for the upcoming 26 June 1994 Fairchild AFB, WA airshow. The aircrew flew a planned profile that exceeded authorized flight maneuvers. At the end, the aircraft rolled out on a short final approach for landing. The crew executed a missed approach because an aircraft was on the runway executing a touch-and-go landing. At mid-field, the B-52 began a tight 360° turn around the airfield tower at about 250 feet AGL, with over 60° of bank, replicating one of the profile turns. Regulations authorized 30° of bank. Approximately three-quarters of the way through the turn the aircraft reached 90° of bank, stalled, lost altitude, and impacted the ground. Impact occurred at 1416 hours PDT at approximately a 95° bank angle and 150 knots indicated air speed (KIAS.)

Aircraft maintenance, weather and aircrew medical condition were not factors in this accident. The board focused on the airmanship and historical flying behavior of the crew. Several senior officers described the pilot as a professional, knowledgeable aviator. Some crew members related their belief that the pilot was the most experienced and knowledgeable pilot in the wing. However, many of the same individuals gave the board examples of the pilot's airmanship that they characterized as excessively aggressive and often in violation of existing regulations. Some crew members refused to fly with the pilot because of his lack of air discipline. In its investigation of a more than three year period, the board found several instances of the pilot flying in violation of USAF, ACC, and FAA regulations. In spite of performance characterized by poor airmanship, wing leaders took no significant corrective action. During this three year period there were four wing commanders, three vice wing commanders, three operations group commanders (or equivalents) and five squadron commanders.

Testimony to the board on the airmanship of the other crew members revealed no adverse comments.

After extensive witness interviews and analysis of video data, tower tapes and other records, the board concluded there was clear and convincing evidence of multiple causes for this accident.

The board determined that pilot error was a cause. The pilot violated regulatory provisions, flight manual guidance and guidance from the wing commander placing the aircraft outside established flight parameters at an attitude and altitude where recovery was not possible. Furthermore, the accident crew, not recognizing the developing dangerous situation, allowed the pilot to enter into a stalled condition.

The board also determined that "leadership and supervision" was a cause. The pilot had a history of excessively aggressive flying and poor airmanship. The frequently changed wing leadership did not recognize this pattern of behavior. The 92d Wing Commander and his staff lacked an adequate understanding of regulations concerning air shows and maneuvering angles permitted in the traffic pattern. The 92d Operations Group Commander (OG/CC) recommended, and the wing commander approved, airshow maneuvers not complying with the Pilot's Flight Manual and USAF, ACC, and FAA regulations. The 92d OG/CC flew the airshow profile with the mishap pilot previously, did not recognize it was contrary to regulations and air discipline, and did not direct a profile change to bring it into compliance. The maneuver resulting in the accident was a direct extension of that exceedingly aggressive profile.

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION FORMAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

Fairchild AFB, WA B-52H Aircraft 24 June 1994 S/N 61-0026

31 August 1994

1. AUTHORITY AND PURPOSE:

The Commander, Twelfth Air Force, Air Combat Command (ACC), appointed Colonel Michael G. McConnell, Commander, 93 Operations Group, Castle AFB, CA, under Air Force Regulation 110-14, to investigate and determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the aircraft accident involving B-52H aircraft, S/N 61-0026, which occurred on 24 June 1994 at Fairchild AFB, WA. Lieutenant Colonel Kevin J. Nehring, Chief of Aeromedical Services, 93d Medical Group, Castle AFB, CA, was appointed as medical technical advisor. Major Warren A. Montgomery, Operations Officer, 93d Operations Support Squadron, Castle AFB, CA, was appointed as operations technical advisor; Captain Thomas L. Wall, Sortie Generation Flight Commander, 99th Reconnaissance Squadron, Beale AFB, CA, and Master Sergeant Randolph J. Smith, Specialist Flight Superintendent, 2 Support Squadron, Fairchild AFB, WA, were appointed as maintenance technical advisors. Master Sergeant Loren G. St. Hilaire, NCOIC, Egress Element, 2nd Support Squadron, and Sergeant Luis M. Pineiro, Aircrew Life Support Technician, 2nd Support Squadron, Fairchild AFB, WA, were appointed as egress and life support technical advisors: Lieutenant Colonel Michael Colopy, Staff Judge Advocate, 92nd Air Refueling Wing, Fairchild AFB, WA, and Major Donald G. Tyson, Assistant Staff Judge Advocate, 12th Air Force, Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ, were appointed as legal advisors. (Tab Y-1 to Y-8)

The purpose of the investigation was to obtain and preserve all available evidence for claims, litigation, disciplinary and administrative actions, and for all other purposes deemed appropriate by competent authority.

The Commander of Air Combat Command also forwarded a letter, by Mr. Kenneth C. Pearce, through the convening authority, to this aircraft accident board, (Tab AA-12.1 to 12.3) and asked the board to consider the allegations and facts recited in the letter. Mr Pearce wrote that earlier in 1994, Lt Col Mark C. McGeehan, Commander, 325th Bomb Squadron, had asked Col William E. Pellerin, the 92nd Operations Group Commander, to remove Lt Col Arthur A. "Bud" Holland, Chief, 92nd OG Standardization and Evaluation division, from flying status prior to unit inactivation due to his overly aggressive flying style. Recited by Mr Pearce were complaints by 325th Bomb Squadron aircrews of pressure applied by Lt Col Holland to "fly the airplane beyond the scope of training regulations" and "highly questionable" maneuvers being practiced by Lt Col Holland for the 1994 Fairchild AFB air show. Also questioned by Mr Pearce, was the failure of the 92nd Bomb Wing leadership to examine Lt Col Holland's flying record in order to "ensure against any repeat of unsafe, unwarranted flying maneuvers."

2. SUMMARY OF FACTS:

a. History of the Flight.

(1) Summary of the Flight. A B-52H Stratofortress aircraft, call sign Czar 52, the Accident Aircraft (AA), launched at approximately 1358 hours Pacific Daylight Time (PDT) on 24 June 1994 to practice air show maneuvers for an upcoming local air show on 26 June 1994. (Tab K-1 and N-14) This was the second of two practice air show training flights. A practice mission similar to the 24 June 1994 mission was flown on 17 June 1994. (Tab V-8.12 and V-8.13)

At the end of the air show exhibition practice, the crew began a visual approach to runway 23. After rolling out on a short final approach for landing, the crew began a missed approach because a KC-135R tanker aircraft (Earl 01) was on the runway executing a touch-and-go landing. At approximately mid-field, the AA began a 360 degree turn around the airfield tower. Approximately three-quarters of the way through the turn the aircraft impacted the ground after reaching a 95 degree bank angle. (Tab A-1 and J-2) A detailed aircraft flight profile is at paragraph 2d below.

(2) Media Coverage. The accident generated national and local media coverage. News releases were provided to the public by the 92nd Bomb Wing Public Affairs office, Fairchild AFB, WA. (Tab AA-11.1 to 11.3) Pictures of the crash and crash site were broadcast by national and local television stations. National news wire services also carried news of the crash.

(3) Significant Facts Preceding the Accident Mission.

(a) <u>Crew members</u>. Lt Col Arthur A. "Bud" Holland, Chief of Standardization and Evaluation, was the pilot and aircraft commander. Lt Col Holland was attached to the 325th Bomb Squadron for flying purposes. Lt Col Mark C. McGeehan, Commander, 325th Bomb Squadron, was the copilot and Lt Col Kenneth S. Huston, Operations Officer, 325th Bomb Squadron, was the radar navigator. Col Robert E. Wolff, Vice Commander, 92nd Bomb Wing, was sitting in the instructor pilot seat performing observer duties. Col Wolff was also attached to the 325th Bomb Squadron for flying purposes. (Tab K-1, V-8.6, V-8.11, and X-1 to X-5)

Col Wolff did not fly on the 17 June 1994 practice mission. (Tab AA-16.1) He was added to the 24 June 1994 flight mid-morning of the mission day by Col (Brig Gen select) William C. Brooks, the 92nd Bomb Wing Commander. (Tab V-2.30) Col Wolff was asked to give the B-52 exhibition a last review prior to the formal air show on 26 June 1994. (Tab V-2.31 and V-8.18) At the conclusion of the mission, Col Wolff was to be recognized for his extensive service in B-52s by wing personnel. (Tab V-2.30)

(b) <u>Fairchild AFB Air Show</u>. The Fairchild AFB air show is an annual event. The 92nd Bomb Wing, in recent years, included flight exhibitions by aircraft that were assigned to the base. The 1994 air show, the last for assigned B-52 aircraft, was scheduled to be held 26 June 1994. The B-52 exhibition profile scheduled to be flown on 26 June 1994 was similar to that of

previous years. This year's B-52 exhibition included one new maneuver, however, it was a climbing 360 degree turn around the airport control tower immediately after takeoff.

- (c) <u>Leadership History</u>. The 92nd Bomb Wing experienced numerous changes to its senior wing leadership over the previous three years. The changes included four wing commanders, three vice wing commanders, three deputy commanders for operations/operations group commanders. Three assistant deputy commanders for operations/deputy operations group commanders were replaced. The 325th Bomb Squadron had five squadron commanders in the same time period. A leadership timeline is located at Tab AA-24.1.
- (d) <u>Unit Inactivation</u>. On 1 July 1994, the 92nd Bomb Wing transferred to Air Mobility Command and became the 92nd Air Refueling Wing. Simultaneously, the 325th Bomb Squadron was inactivated. The base had one B-52H remaining on-station, the accident aircraft. The wing was no longer attempting to maintain combat readiness of the remaining aircrew personnel. The aircraft was used to keep basic pilot proficiency in traffic pattern operations and for weapons load training.

As of 24 June 1994, most bomber operations and maintenance personnel had drawn down and departed the base. Additionally, the 92nd Bomb Wing Commander, the vice commander, and the 92nd Operations Group Commander were preparing to depart the base for new assignments. The 92nd Deputy Operations Group Commander was being reassigned to the 92nd Medical Group. The 453d Operations Group Commander and his deputy were redesignated as commander and deputy of the 92nd Operations Group. The 92nd Bomb Wing Chief of Safety was moved to a new job on-base. Remaining 92nd Bomb Wing operations and maintenance personnel were reassigned to a new tenant unit at Fairchild, the 2nd Support Squadron. The 2nd Support Squadron's parent unit is the 2nd Logistics Group at Barksdale AFB, LA.

(e) History of the Accident Crew. The airmanship and historical flying behavior of the crew were examined by the board. Several past and present members of the wing expressed their belief to the board that Lt Col Arthur A. Holland pushed too close to the limits of his experience and the aircraft's design capability. (Tab V-21.3, V-25.11, V-26.33, V-28.3, V-32.3, and V-32.16) Some crew members related their belief that Lt Col Holland was the most experienced and knowledgeable pilot in the 92nd Bomb Wing. However, the same individuals gave the board examples of Lt Col Holland's airmanship which they characterized as overly aggressive and often at variance with existing regulations. (Tab V-21.4, V-26.5, and V-28.3) Also, several witnesses claimed that some crew members tried not to fly with Lt Col Holland because of his airmanship. (Tab V-21.6, V-28.4, V-40.10, and V-40.11) Senior wing leadership perceptions of Lt Col Holland were very favorable. He was described by several senior officers as a professional, knowledgeable aviator. (Tab V-1.4, V-2.7 to V-2.8, V-3.3, and V-8.5) Testimony to the board on the airmanship of the other crew members on the flight surfaced no adverse comments. The remaining three crew members were generally considered by the witnesses to be excellent. professional aviators. Lt Col McGeehan and Lt Col Huston were particularly praised. Col Wolff did not fly frequently and was less well-known by the witnesses.

Nine events since 1991 were cited as demonstrating the concern over Lt Col Holland's airmanship. Summaries of the events follow below:

(1) 19 May 1991. Lt Col Holland piloted the B-52 exhibition in the 1991 Fairchild AFB air show. (Tab V-6.5, V-7.4, V-8.5, and V-8.6) The profile consisted of several high-banked turns (greater than 30 degrees of bank) and a high pitch angle climb to altitude, estimated at over 45 degrees pitch. (Tab AA-25.1) The exhibition also included a loose visual formation with a KC-135 tanker aircraft. (Tab AA-25.1) Both aircraft pitched out from the formation with the KC-135 turning left and the B-52 turning right. (Tab AA-25.1) A pitch out maneuver is one where an aircraft makes an approach to the runway, at a higher altitude than if it were going to land, and makes a descending turn to landing.

The B-52 flew directly over a part of the crowd in a high banked turn. (Tab AA-25.1) The large banked turns seen in a video of the exhibition were not in accordance with guidance listed in the Pilots' Flight Manual, T.O. 1B-52G-1-11 (Dash 11). The Dash 11 specifies the maximum bank angle permitted during a circling or visual approach in the pattern to be 30 degrees. (Tab AA-2.2, AA-2.3, and AA-9.2)

The commander of 92nd Bomb Wing during the 1991 air show was Col Arnold L. Weinman. The 92nd Bomb Wing Deputy Commander for Operations was Col Arnold L. Julich. (Tab AA-24.1) There is no evidence that Col Weinman or Col Julich were aware that the profile may have ignored MAJCOM regulations or the Dash 11.

(2) 12 July 1991. Lt Col Holland piloted a fly over for a 325th Bomb Squadron change of command ceremony. (Tab V-3.5 and V-7.6) During the event, Lt Col Holland passed over the change of command ceremony formation at a height estimated at less than 500 feet Above Ground Level (AGL). (Tab V-5.6, V-27.7, and V-37.8) Col David Capotosti, 92nd Bomb Wing Assistant Deputy Commander for Operations, attended the ceremony and estimated this pass to be as low as 100-200 feet AGL. (Tab V-3.5)

Lt Col Holland also made several practice passes earlier in the day, prior to the change of command ceremony. (Tab V-37.8) These practice passes appear to have been at altitudes less than 500 feet. One of the passes included a steep banked turn (over 45 degrees of bank). On another pass, there was a high pitch angle climb followed by a wingover. (Tab AA-25.2) A wingover is a maneuver in which the pilot rolls the aircraft on its side while in a climb and allows the nose of the aircraft to fall below the horizon to increase airspeed.

The Dash 11 specifies that aircraft bank angles in the traffic pattern for circling or visual approaches will be limited to a maximum of 30 degrees of bank. (Tab AA-2.2 and AA-2.3) The Dash 11 also recommends against wingover type maneuvers as the side slip may cause structural damage to the aircraft. (Tab AA-2.7) Additionally, scheduling a fly over at a change of command ceremony required Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force approval. (Tab AA-4.12A) The passes over the parade formation required a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) waiver to accomplish a fly over at less than 500 feet. (Tab AA-3.3) The board could not determine if a

waiver was requested or granted. The FAA representative with jurisdiction over Fairchild AFB does not recall granting a waiver for such a maneuver, but cannot be sure due to the time elapsed since the event took place. (Tab AA-3.6)

The 92nd Bomb Wing Commander during July 1991 was Col Arnold L. Weinman. The 92nd Bomb Wing Deputy Commander for Operations was Col Arnold L. Julich. The new 325th Bomb Squadron Commander was Lt Col George G. Schmidt. (Tab AA-24.1) Testimony indicated that Col Weinman did not approve of the low altitude passes flown and verbally reprimanded Lt Col Holland for the action. (Tab V-1.3, V-3.7, and V-5.6) Col Julich was in attendance at the change of command. There was no evidence found by the board to document any further actions, such as an annotation in his permanent training or qualification folder.

Col Capotosti, after the 12 July 1991 change of command, compiled a quick-reference file on fly-overs and air shows. He gave the file to his deputy, Lt Col Harper. (Tab V-3.14) The board is unaware if the file contained other information on personnel.

(3) 17 May 1992. Lt Col Holland flew the B-52 exhibition at the 1992 Fairchild AFB, Wa, air show. (Tab V-3.10 and V-11.3) The flight profile included low altitude steep turns (greater than 45 degrees of bank) and a high speed pass down the runway. (Tab AA-25.3) At approximately the midfield point of his high speed pass, Lt Col Holland completed a high pitch angle climb, estimated at 60 degrees nose high. At the top of the high pitch climb, Lt Col Holland then executed a wingover. (Tab AA-25.3)

The Dash 11 restricts bank angles during visual and circling approaches to 30 degrees. (Tab AA-2.2 and AA-2.3) The Dash 11 also cautions against sideslip maneuvers (including wingovers) because structural failure or damage may occur. (Tab AA-2.7) This profile would have required Strategic Air Command (SAC) headquarters approval. (Tab AA-9.2) This board was unable to determine if such approval had been given due to the time elapsed from the event and the inactivation of SAC.

The 92nd Bomb Wing Commander during the May 1992 air show was Col Michael G. Ruotsala and the Deputy Commander for Operations was Col Arnold L. Julich. Col Julich was overseas on temporary duty during the January through April 1992 time frame and then moved to a new position during May 1992. (Tab V-7.3 and V-7.4) The Assistant Deputy Commander for Operations, Col David Capotosti did not take part in any of the air show planning due to a family emergency. (Tab V-3.9) However, he did see the 17 May 1992 air show and was concerned with Lt Col Holland's B-52 exhibition profile. (Tab V-3.9) Col Ruotsala remembers seeing a portion of the 1992 air show. Col Ruotsala does not remember any specific discussion in staff meetings about whether or not the maneuvers were in accordance with the regulations. (Tab V-6.6) He believed the B-52 exhibition to be in compliance with MAJCOM policies. (Tab V-6.6)

Approximately seven days after the air show, Col David Capotosti, became the 92nd Operations Group Commander and subsequently called Lt Col Holland into his office. (Tab V-3.10) At this meeting, Col Capotosti told Lt Col Holland that he was never going to fly another

air show as long as he (Col Capotosti) was the operations group commander. Col Capotosti also said that if he ever found out that Lt Col Holland violated flying regulations that he would permanently ground Lt Col Holland. Col Capotosti did not communicate this decision to the 92nd Bomb Wing commander. (Tab V-3.11) There is no evidence found by the board showing documentation of Lt Col Holland's actions in his permanent training or qualification folder.

(4) 14-15 April 1993. Lt Col Holland was the mission commander of a two ship Global Power mission to the bombing range located in the Medina De Farallons, a small island chain off the coast of Guam, in the Pacific Ocean. During the mission, Lt Col Holland flew a close, visual formation with another B-52 to take pictures. (Tab V-26.18) This type of formation was prohibited by ACC for B-52s. (Tab V-17.1, AA-10.1, and AA-10.2) Later in the same mission, Lt Col Holland permitted a crew member to leave the main crew compartment and work his way back to the bomb bay access door to take a video of the bomb bay while live munitions were being released on a target. (Tab V-5.7, V-26.20, and V-26.21)

The 92nd Bomb Wing commander in April 1993 was Brig Gen James S. Richards. (Tab AA-24.1) Gen Richards was never informed of the actions that occurred on the flight. (Tab V-1.4 and V-1.5) Col Capotosti, the 92nd Operations Group Commander, does not recall being made aware of the events on the flight. (Tab V-3.12) Col Stephen D. Harper, 92nd Deputy Operations Group Commander during this period, became aware of the flight's events sometime afterwards and believes he discussed them with Col Capotosti. (Tab V-5.8) The 325 Bomb Squadron Commander, Lt Col David E. Bullock remembers there being some discussion of improper flight activity; however, no one told him specifically that they had seen the events happen, or knew who did it. (Tab V-11.7) The board could not determine if any actions were taken. There is no evidence found by the board to document Lt Col Holland's actions in his permanent training or qualification folder.

In May 1993, Col Capotosti was reassigned and left the base and the new 92nd Operations Group Commander, Col William E. Pellerin, arrived on station in June 1993. (Tab AA-24.1) Col Capotosti and Col Pellerin were never able to meet to discuss personnel in the group. (Tab V-3.14 and V-8.27) Lt Col Harper, the deputy group commander, remained in his position to provide continuity. (Tab AA-24.1)

(5) 8 August 1993. Lt Col Holland flew the B-52 exhibition for the 1993 Fairchild AFB air show. (Tab V-1.7, V-8.5, V-8.6, V-14.7, V-25.9, V-26.10, and V-37.11) Lt Col David E. Bullock, the 325th Bomb Squadron Commander, was scheduled to fly as Lt Col Holland's copilot on this mission. (Tab V-1.7, V-11.9, and V-37.10) However, approximately twelve hours before the flight he went on emergency leave and was replaced by Major Jay Slaughenhaupt. (Tab V-1.7 and V-37.10)

One crew member on the flight indicated that this exhibition was flown with extreme aggressiveness (Tab V-26.10). The flight profile included turns with very large bank angles, estimated at over 45° and at low altitudes less than 500 feet AGL. (Tab V-26.10 to V-26.14) Such turns would be contrary to Dash 11 guidance restricting bank angles during visual or circling

approaches in the traffic pattern to no more than 30° of bank. (Tab AA-2.2 and AA-2.3) ACCR 51-50 Vol 22 prohibits steep turns at altitudes of less than 1000 feet AGL. (Tab AA-6.4)

The exhibition also included a high speed pass down the runway and, at approximately midfield, a pitch up into a high pitch angle climb. The airspeed at the beginning of the climb was 390 KIAS. (Tab V-37.15) The aircraft pitch for the climb was estimated to be up to 80 degrees nose high by the radar navigator. (Tab V-26.11) A second crew member, the copilot thought the pitch may have been 60 degrees, but was not sure. (Tab V-37.15)

ACC approval was required for the exhibition, but had not been asked for or granted. (Tab V-17.5, V-17.7, and AA-4.7) The 92nd Bomb Wing Commander, Gen Richards, stated he looked to Col Pellerin, the 92nd Operations Group Commander, to ensure the B-52 exhibition was in compliance with appropriate ACC and FAA regulations, and believes he asked that very question. (Tab V-1.7) He was never informed that the B-52 exhibition might be contrary to ACC policy and Dash 11 guidance. (Tab V-1.6) Gen Richards recalls part of the B-52 exhibition, but was not able to focus on the B-52's maneuvers due to the demands on his time by the Thunderbirds. (Tab V-1-8) Col Pellerin counted on Lt Col Holland to coordinate with the appropriate authorities and had no reason to believe that it had not been accomplished. (Tab V-8.30 and V-8.31)

(6) 10 March 1994. Lt Col Holland flew a single ship mission to the Yakima Bombing Range to drop practice munitions and provide an authorized photographic opportunity for a free-lance author writing a book. (Tab V-28.4 and V-28.5) Lt Col Holland flew the aircraft closer to the ground than the 500 foot AGL minimum (ground) clearance plane specified by ACC regulations. (Tab V-28.6, V-29.5, and AA-18.3) The aircraft consistently crossed ridge lines at less than the minimum altitude, with the lowest crossover being less than 30 feet. (Tab V-28.8, V-29.5, and AA-25.4) A member of the crew, stated that if he had not intervened and demanded the aircraft climb, and then assisted on the aircraft's controls, they would have struck the ridge. (Tab V-28.8) During these low crossovers, the aircraft flew directly over people on the ground, contrary to restrictions in Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Part 91 and Air Force Regulation (AFR) 60-16. (Tab V-28.10, AA-3.3, and AA-5.9) Also, while on the range, Lt Col Holland, allowed his aircraft to join a formation of A-10's to accomplish a flyby over the author/photographer. (Tab V-28.9 and AA-25.4) This formation flight was not part of the planned mission profile and was in contradiction to ACC policy and directives. (Tab V-17.1, V-28.9, AA-10.1, and AA-10.2)

The 325th Bomb Squadron commander, Lt Col McGeehan, after hearing of the events on the range, to include the low crossovers and the flight over personnel on the ground, decided to ask Col Pellerin to restrict Lt Col Holland from further flying. (Tab V-2.26, V-8.26, and V-28.14)

(7) In April 1994, after a series of discussions between Lt Col McGeehan, 325th Bomb Squadron Commander, and Col Pellerin a meeting was scheduled to discuss the issue. (Tab V-8.23 and V-8.24) The issue was whether or not Lt Col Holland should be removed from flying status because of his airmanship on the Yakima Bombing Range and the example it set for younger flyers. (Tab V-8.25, V-8.26, V-21.8, V-28.17, and V-33.2) There was a second meeting which Lt Col Holland attended. (Tab V-8.26, V-21.8, V-28.17, and V-33.2) Col Pellerin denied Lt Col McGeehan's request and stated that Lt Col Holland would continue to fly and with whomever he wanted. (Tab V-8.26, V-21.9, and V-28.17)

Col Pellerin was not aware of the events on the range until Lt Col McGeehan brought them to his attention. Col Pellerin discussed the events with Lt Col Holland and was told that he (Lt Col Holland) was just trying to demonstrate the capabilities of the aircraft to fly below clearance planes in some particular circumstances. (Tab V-8.24) Col Pellerin considered Lt Col Holland's actions to be a breech of air discipline. (Tab V-8.24) He verbally reprimanded Lt Col Holland for his actions on the bombing range. (Tab V-8.26) Lt Col Holland assured Col Pellerin that he would not violate any air regulations. Col Pellerin stated he was not aware that another member of the crew had to intervene and take control of the aircraft to avoid hitting the ridge. (Tab V-8.25) Col Pellerin never saw the video of the flight and was not aware of the impromptu formation with the A-10s. (Tab V-8.24 and V-8.25)

Lt Col McGeehan did not pursue the issue with wing leadership. (Tab V-2.25) The board heard testimony that Lt Col McGeehan then decided to fly with Lt Col Holland any time he flew, rather than expose younger members of the crew force to his poor airmanship. (Tab V-33.3 and V-40.11) The board found no evidence that any annotations were made in Lt Col Holland's permanent training or qualification folders. Col Pellerin did not inform the wing commander, Col Brooks, of Lt Col Holland's actions at the Yakima Bombing Range. (Tab V-2.25 and V-8.26)

(8) During the April-May 1994 time frame, Lt Col (Dr) Robert Grant, 92nd Air Refueling Squadron Flight Surgeon, became concerned when he heard that Lt Col Holland would fly in the 1994 air show. He discussed his concerns about the maneuvers and Lt Col Holland's aggressive flying with a crew member who was at the clinic for a routine appointment. (Tab V-14.6) The crew member told Dr Grant that he would not fly with Lt Col Holland because of his overly aggressive flying. (Tab V-14.6)

Sometime later, Dr Grant discussed his concerns with the 92nd Bomb Wing, Chief of Wing Safety, Lt Col Michael E. McCullough, during an impromptu meeting at the flight surgeon's clinic. (Tab V-14.7) Lt Col McCullough told Dr Grant that Lt Col Holland was a good pilot and the maneuvers had been done before. The board found no evidence that Dr Grant pursued the matter further. Lt Col McCullough stated he did not recall this conversation with Dr Grant. (Tab V-18.2) Later, Dr Grant discussed his concerns with Lt Col (Dr) Issak, Chief of Aeromedical Services, 92nd Medical Group. (Tab V-14.11) Dr Issak did not pursue the issue after he learned Dr Grant had already discussed it with the wing safety officer. (Tab V-41)

mission for the 1994 air show. (Tab V-8.12) This flight profile was nearly identical to the accident profile flown on 24 June 1994, except that, two complete profiles were practiced. (Tab V-8.13) Both profiles included large bank angles and a high pitch angle climb to altitude. Bank angles were not as aggressive as the 24 June 1994 flight, but were still contrary to ACC and Dash 11 guidance. (Tab V-8.13, AA-2.2, AA-2.3, and AA-8.3) Both profiles, at times, were contrary to Col Brooks' guidance given at an air show planning meeting held by Col Brooks on 15 June 1994 described in paragraph 2(f) below. Col Brooks directed a maximum bank angle of 45 degrees and pitch angle of 25 degrees. (Tab V-8.13 to V-8.16) Col Pellerin, the 92nd Operations Group Commander, flew on this mission occupying the instructor pilot position during the exhibition. (Tab V-8.12 and AA-16.1) At the conclusion of the mission, Col Pellerin told the wing commander that "the profile looked good to him; looks very safe, well within parameters." (Tab V-2.23 and V-8.12)

One witness reported Col Brooks was able to view a portion of the profile and was concerned with the maneuver he witnessed. (Tab V-9.3) However, Col Brooks could only recall seeing a brief moment of the show. (Tab V-2.22) Col Brooks was concerned that one of Lt Col Holland's turns might break the air show's "show line". (Tab V-2.33, V-4.12, and V-4.13) An air show "show line" is the closest distance the spectators are allowed to get to the runway.

This practice mission required an FAA waiver. (Tab AA-3.2, AA-3.3, and AA-3.3A) The FAA representative reported no waiver had been asked for or granted. (Tab AA-3.5) Maneuvers performed during this mission also required ACC waivers that were not obtained. (Tab V-12.3) The bank angles used in the low altitude turns in the traffic pattern did not follow the guidance in the Dash 11. (Tab V-8.13, AA-2.2, and AA-2.3) Additionally, the Dash 11 prohibits acrobatic flight. (Tab AA-2.15)

(f) Air show planning. Early in the wing's air show preparation phase, Lt Col Holland was assigned the B-52 exhibition flight for the 1994 air show. (Tab V-8.5) The exact date of this decision could not be determined. (Tab V-8.6) Lt Col Holland had flown several B-52 air show exhibitions in recent years. (Tab V-8.6) The board could find no evidence that other pilots were considered for this mission or that there were any objections within the senior leadership to Lt Col Holland flying the B-52 exhibition. (Tab V-2.9 and V-8.6)

The 92nd Bomb Wing Commander, Colonel (Brig Gen select) William C. Brooks held a meeting on 15 June 1994 to review all air show plans. (Tab V-4.11 and V-8.7) Attending were Col Wolff, Col Pellerin, Col Richard E. Fitzhugh, Jr., the 453d Operations Group commander, along with other commanders and the air show staff. (Tab V-4.11 and V-8.8) The 453d Operations Group was a tenant unit at Fairchild and was to provide the KC-135R tanker aircraft exhibition for the Fairchild air show, with the call sign "Earl 01". Lt Col Holland and the Earl 01 crew commander attended the 15 June 1994 meeting. (Tab V-4.11 and V-8.8)

Lt Col Holland briefed his proposed maneuvers to Col Brooks and the staff at this meeting. Lt Col Holland's briefing was not a detailed briefing and only covered the points on his briefing

slides. (Tab V-8.7 and AA-13.1 to AA-13.10) His proposed profile included bank angles of at least 60 degrees, a high pitch angle climb of 50-60 degrees nose high, and KC-135/B-52 formation. (Tab V-2.15, V-8.10, AA-13.9, and AA-13.11) He also briefly reviewed 1993's air show maneuvers. (Tab V-8.10) Lt Col Holland briefed that the first maneuver would be a climbing turn to gain altitude. (Tab V-2.11) Col Brooks understood this maneuver to be a climb to a standard closed traffic pattern to gain altitude. (Tab V-2.11) A standard closed traffic pattern for a B-52 consists of two climbing 90 degree turns to pattern altitude. A downwind leg, parallel to the runway, is flown followed by two descending 90 degree turns to a final approach for landing. Lt Col Holland actually flew a climbing 360 degree turn around the tower. (Tab V-40.6 to V-40.7) The purpose of this climb was to always have minimum "deadhead" or inactivity time for the air show spectators. (Tab V-8.9)

The AA and Earl 01 were to demonstrate their aircraft to the air show crowd in the same time frame, but not in close formation. The exhibition profile called for each aircraft to make multiple, independent passes along the runway. As one aircraft passed the runway environment the other would be approaching. (Tab V-8.7)

Lt Col Holland had initially planned for a wing approach and pitchout to land. (Tab AA-13.9 and AA-13.11) A wing approach would place the two aircraft almost abeam each other in a visual formation. As the two aircraft approached approximately midfield over the runway, each would separately execute a turning descent to a landing. The formation was rejected by the 92nd Operations Group and 453d Operations Group Commanders and the commander of Earl 01 prior to the 15 June 94 meeting. (Tab V-4.13 and V-23.7 to V-23.9)

At the 15 June 1994 meeting, Col Brooks' instructions to Lt Col Holland were that there would be no formation flying. (Tab V-2.10, V-4.13, and V-8.7) The maximum maneuvers would be 45 degrees of bank and 25 degrees of pitch. (Tab V-2.15) He also stated that no one was to violate any of the rules and emphasized that safety was paramount. (Tab V-2.15, V-2.28, and V-34.3) After the meeting, Col Brooks was still concerned about the proposed profile, so Col Pellerin said that he would talk to Lt Col Holland. The next morning, Col Pellerin reiterated to Lt Col Holland that there would be no pitch angles in excess of 50 degrees. (Tab V-8.10 and V-8.11)

The 92nd Bomb Wing had not requested or obtained approval from Air Combat Command in accordance with (IAW) Air Force Instruction (AFI) 11-209, Air Force Participation in Aerial Events, dated 17 February 1994, for the AA's flight or any of the specific maneuvers as of the date of the accident. (Tab V-2.17 and V-8.19) AFI 11-209, the new manual, and AFR 60-18, the superseded manual, delegated to the Major Commands (MAJCOMS) the authority to grant approval for aircraft demonstrations such as the one flown by the AA. (Tab AA-4.2) ACC Regulation (ACCR) 55-18 states that the wing commander or equivalent can approve fly-overs for an on base event. A fly over is defined as a straight and level flight, by no more than four aircraft, over a fixed point, and not involving aerobatics or aircraft exhibition. (Tab AA-4.4) Additionally, the FAA is the only authority to grant waivers for a exhibition such as the one flown by the AA. (Tab AA-3.2, AA-3.3A, and AA-5.7)

(g) Authorized Flight Parameters.

- (1) 24 June 1994. The aircraft and crew were restricted to normal flying regulations. Maximum airspeed was restricted to no more than 250 Knots Indicated Air Speed (KIAS) below 10,000 feet Mean Sea Level (MSL). (Tab AA-3.2 and AA-5.8) No aerobatic flight maneuvers were allowed. An aerobatic (for the purposes of this report the term aerobatic is equivalent to acrobatic) maneuver is defined as an intentional maneuver involving an abrupt change in an aircraft's attitude, an abnormal attitude, or acceleration, not necessary for normal flight. (Tab AA-3.3A) The board could find no evidence that Lt Col Holland researched the regulations pertaining to the flight.
- (2) The B-52 Pilots' Flight Manual, T. O. 1B-52G-11-1 restricts the bank angles used for maneuvering in the traffic pattern to 30 degrees of bank for both circling and visual patterns. (Tab AA-2.2 and AA-2.3) The limit for steep turns at or above 1,000 feet AGL is 45 degrees of bank as outlined in ACCR 55-152. (Tab AA-8.3) The board could find no evidence that Lt Col Holland researched the authorized flight parameters. Additionally, acrobatic flight is prohibited. (Tab AA-2.15)
- (h) Mission planning. Lt Col Holland planned this mission as a cell departure. (Tab K-1) This is a large aircraft formation takeoff with the spacing between aircraft of one minute or more. The crew of Earl 01, planned their mission as a single aircraft. (Tab V-23.15) If a cell formation was intended, Lt Col Holland was required to conduct a formation briefing prior to the flight with all crew members from each aircraft in attendance. (Tab AA-8.2) The Earl 01 aircraft commander discussed the mission several times either over the phone or in meetings with Lt Col Holland. (Tab V-23.12) Crew members of Earl 01 testified that at no time did the entire two crews get together to discuss the mission. (Tab V-23.13)
- b. <u>Mission</u>. The mission was planned for a one hour sortie. Its flight objectives were air show practice and routine traffic pattern training. (Tab K-1, N-23 to N-26, and AA-14.1)
- c. Briefing and Preflight. The aircraft commander of this mission was authorized to certify his own aircrew briefing IAW ACCR 55-152. (Tab AA-8.2) The briefing authorization letter could not be found because of unit inactivation. No other personnel needed to attend the briefing except for the crew members flying. (Tab AA-8.2) The mission briefing length, detail, and adequacy of their mission planning could not be determined. Col Wolff did not attend mission planning. He was added to the mission the morning of the flight. (Tab V-2.30) The board found no evidence that Col Wolff attended the formal crew briefing prior to takeoff as required by ACCR 55-152. (Tab AA-8.2)

All mission planning paperwork was lost in the accident except the DD Form 175, Flight Plan; DD Form 365-4, Weight and Balance Clearance Form F; and ACC Form 50, Flight Orders, which were on file at base operations.

The accident crew filed a Visual Flight Rules (VFR) flight plan as the lead aircraft of a two aircraft cell formation with Earl 01. (Tab K-1) The Earl 01 aircraft commander did not consider himself to be in formation with the AA and he intentionally filed an independent flight plan. (Tab V-23.15) Because the AA aircraft commander's intent was to fly as a formation, he was required to conduct a cell formation briefing by ACCR 55-152. (Tab AA-8.2) He did not conduct the required briefing, but the AA aircraft commander did meet with the crew of Earl 01 at base operations to review the air show exhibition profiles and answer any questions. (Tab V-23.12) The remaining crew members of the AA were not present. (Tab V-23.13)

The crew did not fly the day prior and was scheduled for the proper amount of crew rest. (Tab G-5, G-6, G-10, G-11, G-15, G-16, G-20, G-21, and AA-5.4) The crew arrived at base operations at approximately 0700 PDT on Friday, 24 June 1994. (Tab V-22.2) The crew, with the exception of Col Wolff, received a weather briefing and filed their flight plan. (Tab K-1, V-40.3, and W-1) Col Wolff did not join the crew for the mission until just prior to aircraft taxiing. (Tab V-40.3) He did not receive a weather briefing as required by ACCR 55-152. (Tab V-40.3 and AA-8.2) The Supervisor of Flying, Capt Jesse E. Ward, IV, met with Lt Col Holland and the crew at base operations and told him that he had checked on their aircraft and it was in commission. (Tab V-40.2 and V-40.3)

Lt Col Holland called the watch supervisor in the airfield tower to brief the flight profile for the flight's planned air show maneuvers. (Tab N-23 to N-27 and V-30.3) The watch supervisor was the person in charge of operations in the air traffic control tower. The watch supervisor called Spokane Approach Control to coordinate Czar 52's exhibition profile. (Tab N-27 - N-32) Spokane Approach did not believe there would be a problem with the Czar 52's request. (Tab N-31) Scheduled takeoff time was at 1000 hours PDT. (Tab V-30.3 and AA-14.1) The mission was delayed approximately four hours due to distinguished visitors being on-station. (Tab V-8.17)

The crew arrived at the aircraft at approximately 0800 hours PDT for preflight. (Tab V-40.3) The crew was informed at some point during the preflight that their mission was delayed. They returned in the afternoon and completed their preflight. (Tab V-40.3) Maintenance personnel testified that the AA's preflight inspection surfaced no maintenance problems. (Tab V-31.4) A review of the crew's preflight procedures revealed that the pilot did not sign the Air Force Technical Order (AFTO) Form 6, B-52 Aircraft Refueling and Distribution Log, as required by T.O. 1B-52H-1-1. (Tab AA-1.2 and AA-19.1) He also did not sign the AFTO Form 46, Prepositioned Life Support Equipment, signifying that he had checked the aircraft's life support equipment for the required items and currency. (Tab AA-20.1 and AA-20.2) His signature on this form is required prior to takeoff. (Tab AA-7.4) Also, the pilot did not ensure the aircraft forms and weight and balance information were on the aircraft before taxi. The aircraft forms remained with maintenance personnel on the ground. The crew received their VFR clearance prior to engine start. Engine start was at 1318 hours PDT with taxi at approximately 1345 hours PDT. (Tab N-4 to N-9) Earl 01 and the AA taxied to runway 23 for departure. (Tab N-6 and N-9)

d. Flight. The AA took off at 1358 hours PDT and was followed approximately two minutes later by the takeoff of Earl 01. (Tab N-14, N-15 and AA-25) Lt Col Holland planned to be the



exhibition pilot for the air show. (Tab V-8.5) Medical evidence shows that Lt Col Holland was flying the aircraft at the time of the accident. (Tab X-1 and X-2) The board found no evidence that Lt Col McGeehan was performing the maneuvers. (Tab X-1 and X-4)

The takeoff power setting intended to be used was Takeoff Rated Thrust (TRT). (Tab V-40.9) This is the maximum thrust setting recommended by the aircraft manufacturer. (Tab AA-1.3) The use of TRT in this situation ignores performance manual recommendations on partial thrust takeoff power settings. (Tab AA-1.4) The AA lifted-off prior to midfield and began a climbing 360 degree turn around the tower with the flaps down. A bank angle of 50 degrees was planned, with 45 to 60 degrees being used. (Tab V-2.15 and V-40.10) Completing his 360 degree turn, the AA then turned approximately 30 degrees right of runway 23 heading, continued to climb, and retracted the flaps. The AA then turned left and descended for a low altitude, (estimated at less than 500 feet AGL), medium speed (estimated 250-270 KIAS) pass down runway 05. Upon completion of the medium speed pass, the AA turned left approximately 30 degrees, using 45 degrees of bank, off the runway 05 heading to set up for a high speed approach to runway 23.

The AA accelerated for his runway 23 pass and at approximately midfield, the aircraft started a pull up to demonstrate a high pitch angle climb with a low-G pushover at approximately 10,500 feet MSL. (Tab AA-21.1) This 8,000 foot climb took 24 seconds. (Tab AA-21.1) Sometime prior to the flight on 24 June 1994, Capt Ward discussed the planned maneuvers with Lt Col Holland. (Tab V-40.9) The planned airspeed for the start of this maneuver was 370 KIAS with a smooth 2 G pull to a pitch angle of 60 degrees nose high. (Tab V-37.15, V-40.9, and V-40.10) This airspeed required a waiver to the FARs, which was not asked for by the wing for the practice mission. (Tab AA-3.2 and AA-3.5) The pilot planned to push the aircraft nose over at 220 KIAS, so it was below the horizon and then let the aircraft accelerate. (Tab V-40.10) The AA then offset right and started a descending left teardrop to runway 05 for a pass at pattern altitude (estimated 1200 feet AGL). At the end of runway 05, the AA started a left turn, extending the flaps, to roll out on a downwind leg to runway 05. (Tab A-1)

On downwind, the AA extended the landing gear and turned approximately 90 degrees to roll out on a left base leg. The AA then completed a left turn to final and began a landing attitude demonstration. A landing attitude demonstration consists of a gear and flaps down configuration, extremely low altitude (approximately 50-100 feet AGL) pass down the runway. This demonstration is used to show new B-52 pilots an example of the attitude the aircraft should have for landing. The airspeed for this maneuver is usually slower than final approach speed and higher than landing speed. At midfield, the AA initiated gear retraction and began a steeply banked (60 degree) left climbing turn. Planned bank angle was 50 degrees. (Tab V-40.10) The Dash 11 states that aggressive turns at low altitude may result in very low clearance of the down wing and allow very little room for error. In a 40 degree banked turn, the down wing tip is approximately 55 feet below the aircraft fuselage. (Tab AA-2.13) After 90 degrees of turn, the AA rolled out and then turned right 90 degrees to a modified runway 23 downwind. The AA turned right to a base leg and right again to final approach to runway 23 for a low approach. The AA then accomplished a low speed (estimated at 150 KIAS) pass down runway 23 at an altitude

less than 200 feet AGL. At the end of the runway the AA added a large amount of power and made a steeply banked (approximately 80 degrees), climbing right turn. Part way around this turn the aircraft began a tail-first slide and lost approximately 100 feet in altitude. This tail-first slide may be evidence of the aircraft entering into a partially stalled condition.

The following is a brief summary, compiled by the board, of Dash 11 discussion and basic aerodynamic information pertaining to aircraft stalls and the effect of winds on aircraft.

AIRCRAFT STALLS

A stalled condition is one in which an aircraft is flying just below the minimum airspeed that will produce enough lift to keep it flying. This speed will vary depending on gross weight, aircraft configuration, bank angles, the amount of Gs being pulled, and other reasons. A stall at a G loading of greater than one G is called an accelerated stall. (Tab AA-2.13B) Stall speeds increase with bank angles and this increase becomes significantly more rapid at bank angles over 30 degrees. This emphasizes the need to avoid steep bank angles at low airspeeds. (Tab AA-2.10) During an accelerated stall the buffeting is more severe and the time from stall warning is less. (Tab AA-2.13B)

WIND EFFECT

The wind could also have an effect on the aircraft. The winds were 207 degrees at 11 knots a few minutes after this turn. The runway heading is 229 degrees. This would make the headwind component 10 knots. As the aircraft turned to the right the headwind component would change to a crosswind and finally into a tailwind. As the headwind decreases, the aircraft senses a loss in airspeed which would decrease lift and could bring the airspeed below the stall speed. The aircraft, in this turn, has in essence experienced a very slowly developing wind shear. (Tab AA-2.14)

Following the tail slide the AA rolled out approaching downwind and continued the climb to pattern altitude to set up for an approach to runway 23. The AA turned right 90 degrees to a base leg and continued his turn to final approach to runway 23. (Tab A-1) This approach signified the end of the planned exhibition profile.

After rolling out inbound to runway 23, the AA began a go-around because Earl 01 was on the runway completing a touch-and-go. (Tab V-25.4 and V-30.12) The AA started his go-around and made a slight turn to position himself left and parallel to the runway, but on a heading that took the AA between the tower and the runway. (Tab V-30.15) The crew raised the gear and requested a 360 degree turn around the tower for spacing from the tower controllers. (Tab V-30.12) The tower controller acknowledged the request, but did not specifically clear the crew to perform the maneuver. (Tab V-30.13) Tower controllers were uncertain about whether or not the air show practice session was over; they did not question the maneuver. (Tab V-30.13)

Testimony and other data indicates the AA pilot maintained approximately 250 ft AGL (Tab V-27.3 and AA-21.1) and 170-180 KIAS pattern airspeed (Tab V-30.17, V-40.10, AA-1.5, and AA-2.8) as he passed in front of the tower. The AA then began another level turn and applied a small amount of additional thrust. (Tab V-27.3)

The AA rolled into his left turn with a pitch angle that was slightly above the horizon. (Tab V-25.5 and V-27.3) The bank angle was 64 degrees and increased to 72 degrees after accomplishing 60 to 90 degrees of turn. (Tab AA-22.2) The aircraft began a tail-first slide and lost an estimated 50 to 100 feet in altitude. At this point, the aircraft again entered into a partially stalled condition. The high bank angles and the changing of the headwind component into a crosswind had the same effect as in the previous partially stalled condition described above. As the aircraft began to pass behind the tower, it rolled out slightly to an estimated 45 degrees of bank, which broke the stall, arrested the descent, and enabled the aircraft to start a slight climb. (Tab V-27.4 and AA-22.2) No additional power input was detected. Because no power was added throughout the first part of the turn, the aircraft had decelerated and was flying slower than the 170-180 KIAS at the start of the turn. Photography of the aircraft passing behind the air traffic control tower shows airbrake position two had been selected. (Tab S-1) This is consistent with tear down analysis performed on the flight controls. (Tab J-10) Selection of air brake position two, in the pattern, eases the pilot work load by significantly increasing the aircraft roll response. (Tab AA-2.6) The use of air brakes has a negligible effect on the stalling speed. (Tab AA-2.9) The AA rounded the tower and began to turn toward the runway.

As the aircraft completed its pass behind the tower, the AA steepened its bank to approximately 90 degrees of bank and the nose began to fall. (Tab V-25.5, V-27.4, and AA-22.2) The aircraft had entered into a stalled condition once more. Several events occurred that influenced the aircraft. First, the wind had now shifted to a tailwind of approximately 10 knots. The wings sensed a loss of 10 knots of airspeed since the turn was started. Second, the airspeed had decreased since the beginning of the turn because no power has been added. Since the aircraft was traveling slower it was closer to the stalling speed.

The following chart is derived from the aircraft performance manual and shows the relationship of bank angles and airspeeds. The speeds are based on the gross weight and configuration of the aircraft at the time of impact. (Tab J-7 and AA-1.5 to AA-1.7)

<u></u>	AIRCRAFT BANK ANGLE										
AIRSPEED	0 degrees	30 degrees	45 degrees	60 degrees							
Normal Go-Around*	163 KIAS	163 KIAS	N/A	N/A							
Minimum Recommended	120 KIAS	129 KIAS	141 KIAS	168 KIAS							
Initial Buffet**	115 KIAS	121 KIAS	134 KIAS	159 KIAS							
Strong Buffet***	110 KIAS	117 KIAS	123 KIAS	145 KIAS							

^{*}Normal go-around speed is based on the aircraft gross weight. It is 30 KIAS above the speed used to start the landing flare. It is not applicable to bank angles above 30 degrees, since that is the maximum bank angle allowed in an approach-to-landing pattern.

As the chart shows, at 60 degrees of bank, the initial buffet speed is just below the planned (0 to 30 degree) normal go-around speed of 163 KIAS. The chart in the performance manual does not depict bank angles greater than 60 degrees.

As the aircraft continued its final turn, there was a second, deeper stall, as evidenced by the nose falling through the horizon. [In a turning stall, the lower wing will stall first because it is sensing a lower airspeed than the upper wing. This will make the bank angle increase because there is greater lift on the upper wing. The aircraft will also tend to resist control inputs trying to bring the wings back to a level attitude.]

The falling of the nose was followed by a decrease in engine exhaust smoke and noise. (Tab AA-25.5)

The AA pilot made a control input to bring the right wing down and return to level flight. [Within normal flight regimes the B-52 can take up to three seconds to respond to a lateral control input. (Tab AA-2.11) Lateral control authority decreases significantly in a stalled condition because the spoilers will not be disrupting the airflow as effectively as they would in a non-stalled condition. (Tab AA-2.12) This effectively lengthens the time it takes the aircraft to respond to the control input.]

The nose of the aircraft continued to drop as the bank angle increased. The copilot attempted ejection, but the plane was too close to the ground and in too steep a bank. (Tab A-1 and X-4) The aircraft impacted the ground. With the aircraft attitude (90 degrees of bank and 15 degrees of dive), the pilots required 400 feet AGL and the radar navigator needed 520 feet AGL for a successful ejection. (Tab AA-2.4 and AA-2.5) Approximately twenty seconds had passed since the AA flew in front of the tower and initiated the final 360 degree turn. (Tab AA-25.5)

^{**} Initial Buffet speed is the speed when the aircraft enters into a mild buffet, warning the pilot of an approaching stall.

^{***} Strong Buffet speed is the speed when the aircraft is fully stalled.

e. <u>Impact</u>. The aircraft impacted the ground at approximately 1416 hours PDT in an open field on base at 47 36.29N and 117 39.2W. (Tab A-1) The aircraft impacted the ground at approximately 150 knots and 95 degrees of bank in a nose-low attitude. (Tab J-2 and J-3) The flight lasted approximately 18 minutes.

f. Ejection/Bailout

Investigation revealed no prior defects or discrepancies in the egress systems. All explosive items were current and properly installed. Three of the six ejection seats were occupied. The accident copilot attempted/initiated ejection, but was out of the ejection envelope. The ejection sequence was interrupted by ground impact. No other ejection attempts were made. The board found no evidence that manual bailout was attempted. The aircraft was below manual bailout parameters in its final turn.

g. Personal and Survival Equipment

- (1) All personal and survival equipment inspections were current. Col Wolff was using a spare helmet for this flight. It was never fitted to him prior to the flight. (Tab V-47.1)
 - (2) No personal/survival equipment deficiencies were noted by the board.

h. Rescue and Crash Response.

Airfield tower personnel immediately activated the crash net upon the AA striking the ground. (Tab V-30.20) Additionally, several fire department personnel were observing the flight and immediately responded. (Tab V-34.8) The first fire vehicles departed the main fire department station within 60 seconds of the crash. (Tab V-34.8) The base fire department also received help from the surrounding local communities with equipment and additional personnel. (Tab V-34.9) The Fairchild AFB hospital promptly responded to the accident site after notification by the primary crash net. Upon arrival in the crash area, witnesses notified fire and rescue personnel that at least one crew member had attempted ejection. Fire and rescue personnel began a search of the area. All crew members were found at the crash site and were fatalities. (Tab V-34.9) The rescue and crash response appeared to be well-organized and highly effective. (Tab V-10.5 to V-10.7) No deviations were noted.

i. Maintenance Documentation

- (1) No maintenance discrepancies were noted within the 60 days prior to the accident which related to the accident. (Tab AA-17.1)
- (2) All Time Compliance Technical Orders (TCTO) were up-to-date at the time of the accident. TCTO 1B-52-2525, Inspection Replacement Number 1 through 4 Main, Center Wing, and Outboard Tank Boost Pumps, is categorized as "interim routine", and is to be accomplished within 120 days of receipt or within 60 days prior to the recession date of 21 January 1995. The

TCTO requires maintenance to inspect and replace, as necessary, the Lear Romax fuel pumps. Work was to be done in conjunction with normally scheduled or unscheduled maintenance. This TCTO was partially done and did not contribute to the accident.

- (3) All aircraft scheduled inspections were satisfactorily completed.
- (4) Oil samples were analyzed every 30 hours of engine operation. An oil sample was due on the number 5 engine upon landing. All samples were historically taken on-time. No defects were noted, no oil samples were taken following the accident as no oil remained.
 - (5) All time change requirements were completed on-time.
- (6) After review of the Equipment Review Report, the only action that was overdue within the last 60 days was the aircraft wash. The aircraft wash was accomplished on 22 June 94. This was not relevant to the accident.
- (7) A review of all unscheduled maintenance performed since 26 April 1994 (60 days prior to the accident) indicated nothing relevant to the accident.
- (8) No maintenance procedures, practices, or performance could be identified as related to the accident.

j. Maintenance Personnel and Supervision


- (1) A preflight was performed on 23 June 1994 and was virtually reaccomplished on 24 June 1994. All personnel involved were professional, highly trained and experienced; many were senior Noncommissioned Officers. Aircraft 61-0026 was the only B-52 at Fairchild AFB at that time. Many personnel meticulously went over the aircraft prior to flight.
- (2) Training records of all maintenance personnel involved with the preflight were reviewed. Their training and proficiency levels were compared to the Special Certification Roster and no deficiencies were noted.
- (3) No maintenance practices or procedures contrary to technical data or sound logic were noted.

k Engine, Fuel, Hydraulic, and Oil Inspection Analysis:

- (1) All engine inspection, fuel test report, hydraulic fluid test report, and oil test report data were reviewed and found normal. (Tab O-10 to O-24)
- (2) Review of Joint Oil Analysis Program, Engine Condition Monitoring Program and engine historical records revealed that no adverse wear metal trends or chronic engine operational problems existed on any of the engines prior to the mishap. (Tab J-12)

1. Airframe and Aircraft Systems:

- (1) Review of engineering analysis of the engines showed all eight engines were operating between 60 and 80 percent RPM. Engine impact damage analysis and the fact that all overboard compressor bleed valves were captured in the open position confirm this conclusion. Additionally, all eight engines were capable of operating at full power. (Tab J-12)
- (2) Review of engineering analysis of the flight controls revealed all flight controls were operating or capable of operating at the time of impact. (Tab J-10 and J-11)
 - (3) In a review of engineering analysis of the instruments, engineers found:
 - (a) One attitude director indicator was found and no readings obtained.
- (b) The standby attitude indicator had the roll gimbal captured by impact in a position that correlated to approximately 95 degrees of left bank. Finding is reliable.
 - (c) Indicated airspeed indicators were found but readings from them are unreliable.
- (d) A true airspeed indicator was found with the sub-dial captured at 150 knots at time of impact. This is a reliable reading.
- (e) One altimeter was found from an undetermined position with no conclusive altitude obtainable.
 - (f) Radar altimeters provided no conclusive readings.
 - (g) Vertical velocity indicator parts were recovered, but none sufficient for analysis
 - (h) A standby compass was recovered and appeared functional.
- (i) Seven of the eight engine tachometer indicators were found. Engine tachometer indicators are generally a reliable investigative tool when analyzing an aircraft crash. The indicators ordinarily will capture the engine RPM at the time of impact. In this case however, the engine tachometer data available from the tachometers contradicts the majority of other evidence available, and are therefore, considered unreliable indicators of the engine RPM at the time of impact.
 - (i) Eight fuel flow indicators were found and considered to be inconclusive.
- (k) The total fuel quantity indicator retained its position on impact. The internal mechanism revealed that the gear mechanism was in a position that correlated to 73,920 pounds.
 - (1) Exhaust gas temperature indicator data was considered to be inconclusive.



- (m) Oil pressure indicators were damaged by the impact and are unreliable.
- (n) The total fuel quantity indicator will retain its position on impact. The internal mechanism revealed that the gear mechanism was in a position that correlated to 73,920 pounds.
 - (o) Hydraulic pressure indicators--no readings could be obtained.
 - (p) Flap position indicator--damaged to the extent that no reading could be obtained.
 - (q) Lateral trim indicator--no reading could be obtained.
- (r) Accelerometer "G" meter--readings were captured at impact. The internal mechanism was in a position that correlated to the following readings:

Positive Pointer +4G
Negative Pointer -2G
Carrier Pointer +1G

Nothing was noted during the analysis that indicated instrument or instrument system failure prior to impact or loss of input signal. (Tab J-2 to J-9)

m. Operations Personnel and Supervision. The flight was authorized by Lt Col Kenneth S. Huston, as the 325th Bomb Squadron Operations Officer, on Air Combat Command Form 50, Flight Order, IAW AFR 60-1. (Tab AA-15.1) The crew was authorized to conduct their own briefings. No other supervisory personnel participated their mission planning and briefing. The 92nd Bomb Wing Deputy Operations Group Commander, 453d Operations Group Commander, and the Supervisor of Flying were on the airfield and watched the practice flight. None of these individuals realized the AA was in trouble until just prior to impact, or realized the flight profile was in violation of directives as it looked like the previous practice and the previous years' air shows. The 92nd Bomb Wing Commander was on base but was not observing the practice.

n. Crew Qualifications. (Tab G)

- (1) Col Robert E. Wolff, 92nd Bomb Wing Vice Commander, was an experienced command pilot with 3696.9 hours total flying time and 3208.3 hours in the B-52. He was attached to the 325th Bomb Squadron for flying purposes. He was current in all B-52 training pertinent to the flight except for the following ACCR 51-50 Vol 22 or ACCR 55-2 training events: I001, Instrument Approach; P008, Takeoff; P013, Landing; LS01, Local Area Survival (aircraft ejection and egress are included); LS07, Egress Ejection Training; and LS09 Hanging Harness. (Tabs G-18, G-23, AA-6.6, AA-6.8, and AA-7.2)
- (2) Lt Col Arthur A. Holland, Chief of the 92 Operations Group Standardization and Evaluation Branch, was an experienced command pilot with 5275.3 hours total flying time, with 5038.3 hours in the B-52. He was attached to the 325th Bomb Squadron for flying purposes. He

was current in all B-52 training pertinent to the flight except for the following ACCR 51-50 Vol 22 or ACCR 55-2 training events: I001, Instrument Approach; G925, Instrument Independent Aircrew Training Device (ATD); LS01, Local Area Survival (aircraft ejection and egress are included); and LS07, Egress Ejection Training. (Tabs G-1, G-2, AA-6.5, AA-6.8, AA-6.9, and AA-7.2)

- (3) Lt Col Mark C. McGeehan, Commander of the 325th Bomb Squadron, was an experienced senior pilot with 3170.3 hours total flying time and 2842.5 hours in the B-52. He was current in all B-52 training pertinent to the flight except for the following ACCR 51-50 Vol 22 or ACCR 55-2 training events: 1001, Instrument Approach; G925, Instrument Independent ATD; LS01, Local Area Survival (aircraft ejection and egress are included); and LS07, Egress Ejection Training. (Tabs G-7, G-9, AA-6.5, AA-6.8, AA-6.9, and AA-7.2)
- (4) Lt Col Kenneth S. Huston, Operations Officer of the 325th Bomb Squadron, was an experienced senior radar navigator with 3378.1 hours total flying time and 2916.4 hours in the B-52. He was current in all B-52 training pertinent to the flight.
- (5) All of the crew members, except Lt Col Huston, were non-current for ACCR 55-2 required egress training events. This training event is required by ACCR 55-2 prior to flight. (Tab AA-7.3) The delinquent crew members had not reaccomplished the training.

Lt Col McGeehan's Individual Training Summary shows that he was non-current for P008, Takeoff, P13, Landing, and P097, Touch-and-Go landings. (Tab G-7) Lt Col Holland's Individual Training Summary shows that 24 June 94 was his last day of currency for P008, Takeoff, P13, Landing; and P097, Touch-and-Go landings. (Tab G-1) The board was able to determine that Lt Col Holland and Lt Col McGeehan flew on 17 June 94 and accomplished these currency events. (Tab V-8.22 and AA-16.1) This information was not included in the Individual Training Summary because the AF Form 3526, Event Accomplishment Report, was never completed and turned in to receive credit for accomplishment as directed in ACCR 51-50 Vol 22. (Tab V-46 and AA-6.2) However, both pilots were non-current for an I001, Instrument Approach, and should have been placed in supervised status for that event until accomplishing the event with a current instructor pilot. (Tab AA-6.3) The flight exhibition profile did not necessarily require an instrument approach to be flown.

The flying information presented below was generated from the flight records computer data base. (Tab G)

AN COUNTY AND THE PROPERTY

<u>NAME</u> Col Wolff Lt Col Holland			30/60/90 DA	Y INFO
NAME	TOTAL TIME*	<u>B-52 TIME</u> *	FLY TIME *	SORTIES
	3696.9	3208.3	0.0/1.4/2.4	0/1/2
Lt Col Holland	5275.3	5038.3	1.0/5.5/5.5	1/3/3
Lt Col McGeehan	3170.3	2842.5	1.0/9.7/17.3	1/5/6
Lt Col Huston	3378.1	2916.4	1.0/4.1/4.1	1/3/3
and a second				

^{*} In hours

- (6) There were no indications in any of the crew's training or qualification records of air discipline deviations.
- o. <u>Medical</u>. All crew members were medically qualified for flight at the time of the accident. There were no disqualifying medical, psychological, or physiological discrepancies in the crew members' histories.
- 1. Colonel Robert E. Wolff expired due to multiple extreme injuries. Toxicological studies were negative. (Tab X-1 and X-5)
- 2. Lieutenant Colonel Arthur A. Holland expired due to multiple extreme injuries. Toxicological studies were negative. (Tab X-1 and X-2)
- 3. Lieutenant Colonel Mark C. McGeehan expired due to multiple extreme injuries. Toxicological studies were negative. (Tab X-1 and X-4)
- 4. Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth S. Huston expired due to multiple extreme injuries. Toxicological studies were negative. (Tab X-1 and X-3)
- p. Navigational Aids and Facilities. All navigational aids and facilities were operating normally except for the Instrument Landing System (ILS). The ILS had been released to maintenance for preventative maintenance inspections. (Tab AA-23.1) This was not required for the exhibition profile and had no impact on the AA.
- q. <u>Weather</u>. There was no significant weather in the area at the time. Cloud cover was virtually nonexistent. Visibility was estimated at better than 10 miles. Winds observed at the time of the accident were 207 degrees at 11 knots. (Tab W-2)

r. Directives and Regulations.

(1) The following publications were applicable to the mission:

General Operating and Flight Rules FAR Part 91 Air Force Participation in Aerial Events AFI 11-209 Flight Management AFR 60-1 General Flight Rules AFR 60-16 **B-52 Crew Training** ACCR 51-50 Vol 22 Life Support Program ACCR 55-2 ACC Participation in Aerial Events ACCR 55-18 **B-52 Operating Procedures** ACCR 55-152 Pilots' Flight Manual T.O. 1B-52G-1-11 Flight Manual Performance Data T.O. 1B-52H-1-1 **HGU 55/P Flyers Helmet** T.O. 14P3-4-151

- (2) The following violations of regulations and technical order guidance were found:
 - (a) FAR Part 91.
- (1) Sub Part 91.117(a). Aircraft Speed. Unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator, no person may operate an aircraft below 10,000 feet MSL at an indicated airspeed of more than 250 knots. (Tab AA-3.2)
- (2) Sub Part 91.119. Minimum safe altitudes: General. "Except when necessary for takeoff or landing, no person may operate an aircraft below the following altitudes: (c) Over other than congested areas. An altitude of 500 feet above the surface, except over open water or sparsely populated areas. In those cases, the aircraft may not be operated closer than 500 feet to any person, vessel, vehicle, or structure." (Tab AA-3.3)
- (3) Sub Part 91.303. Aerobatic flight. "No person may operate an aircraft in aerobatic flight. (c) Within the lateral boundaries of the surface areas of Class B, Class C, Class D, or Class E airspace designated for an airport. (d) Below an altitude of 1,500 feet above the surface. For the purposes of this section, aerobatic flight means an intentional maneuver involving an abrupt change in an aircraft's attitude, an abnormal attitude, or abnormal acceleration, not necessary for normal flight." (Tab AA-3.3A) The airspace surrounding Fairchild AFB is Class C airspace.

(b) AFR 11-209.

- (1) Paragraph 7.1. Showmanship and Professionalism. "In developing and performing aerial events, supervisors and participants should remember the objective is to demonstrate Air Force professionalism and competence to the general public, and not to impress peers. Strict compliance to show lines and minimum altitudes reflects both professionalism and good showmanship ..." (Tab AA-4.1A)
- (2) Paragraph 7.3.2. Fly overs Over a Non congested Area. "Single aircraft ... over non congested areas--500 feet AGL." (Tab AA-4.1A)
- (3) Paragraph 7.3.3. Lower Minimum Altitudes (Fly overs). "In certain cases, such as demonstration team performances, approved maneuvers packages, and entry and exit into the fly over areas, the FAA may specifically waive the altitude requirements above. Even if the FAA authorizes a lower altitude, US Air Force controlled aircraft must not be flown lower than the following minimum altitudes: Single Aircraft Fly overs. 250 feet AGL. (Tab AA-4.1A)
- (4) Paragraph 7.3.4. Lower Minimum Altitudes (Demonstrations). "Any aerial demonstration by US Air Force aircraft ... that is intended to show their combat capabilities may require lower minimum altitudes than those specified in paragraphs 7.3.1 and 7.3.2. Each MAJCOM sets minimum altitudes for safe operations of their assets. All demonstrations must

follow MAJCOM approved profiles that specify the minimum altitude for each maneuver." (Tab AA-4.1A)

(5) Figure A2.1 Approval for On-base Aerial Events. Requires MAJCOM approval for fly overs and demonstrations. (Tab AA-4.2)

(c) AFR 60-16.

- (1) Paragraph 1-1d states that "the FARs govern Air Force pilots and nothing in this regulation relieves the pilot of the responsibility to follow them." (Tab AA-5.7)
- (2) Paragraph 1-4 states that "An ATC clearance is not authority to deviate from this regulation." (Tab AA-5.7)
- (3) Paragraph 5-1 says "Pilots must not operate Air Force aircraft in a careless or reckless manner or endanger life or property." (Tab AA-5.7A)
- (4) Paragraph 5-7b states that aircraft must "...not exceed 250 KIAS below 10,000 feet MSL, unless the MAJCOM has approved a higher speed according to the FAR 91.117(a) exemption." (Tab AA-5.8)


(d) ACCR 51-50 Vol 22.

(1) Paragraph 4-4a(2). Recurrency: Individuals delinquent in one or more mission ready flight currency events are placed in supervised status for that event and declared non-mission ready. (Tab AA-6.3)

(e) ACCR 55-2.

- (1) Paragraph 3-3i(1)(a)1. Egress/hanging harness class currency is 180 days. (Tab AA-7.2)
- (2) Paragraph 3-3j states "If an aircrew is delinquent in egress/ejection, hanging harness/personal lowering device,... the training must be accomplished prior to the next flight." (Tab AA-7.3)
- (3) Paragraph 6-8c. "Prior to each takeoff, aircraft commander's designated representative will ensure that all prepositioned life support equipment is properly inventoried, that equipment is serviceable, and will sign and date the certification block of the AFTO Form 46." (Tab AA-7.4)

(f) ACCR 55-18.



(g) ACCR 55-152.

- (1) Paragraph 2.5.3.3 All crew members in the formation require a formation briefing. (Tab AA-8.2)
- (2) Paragraph 7.5 Steep turns. "Limit the maximum target bank angle to 45 degrees (not to exceed 50 degrees)." It furthers states "For steep turns at or below 5,000 feet AGL, the following restrictions apply: The maneuver must be accomplished at or above 1,000 feet AGL." (Tab AA-8.3)

(h) T.O. 1B-52G-1-11.

- (1) page 2-132. Circling Approach. "Maintain 20 knots above best flare speed during the circling maneuver until beginning the roll out to align with the runway. Bank angle should be limited to 30 degrees throughout the maneuver." (Tab AA-2.2)
- (2) page 2-136. Approach procedure (Visual Pattern). "A 30 degree bank will be the maximum allowable in the traffic pattern." (Tab AA-2.3)
- (3) page 4-2. Crew Coordination. "The pilot at the controls will be notified immediately of any deviation from published procedures." (Tab AA-2.6A)
- (4) page 4-2. Crew Coordination. "WARNING" "If an apparent error in aircraft attitude is detected, the pilot flying the aircraft will be advised immediately. The pilot not flying the aircraft will also monitor the engine instruments. (Tab AA-2.6A)
- (5) page 5-23. Prohibited Maneuvers. Acrobatics of any kind are strictly prohibited. (Tab AA-2.15)

(i) T.O. 1B-52H-1-1.

(1) Page A11-1. Refueling and Distribution Log (AFTO Form 6). This log will remain with the aircraft Form 781 until has been checked and signed by the pilot during the Interior Inspection. (Tab AA-1.2)

(j) T.O. 14P3-4-151.

(1) Paragraph 5-26. Preflight Inspection. Prior to each flight, the user shall inspect the helmet to determine that it is in serviceable condition. This inspection shall assure that: a. The helmet, ear cups, and oxygen mask are properly fitted." (Tab AA-7.6)

3. STATEMENT OF OPINION:

Under 10 U.S.Code 2254(b) any opinion of the accident investigators as to the cause of or factors contributing to, the accident set forth in the accident investigation report may not be considered as evidence in any civil or criminal proceedings arising from an aircraft accident, nor may such information be considered an admission of liability by the United States or by any person referred to in those conclusions or statements.

This Accident Board's investigation determined that the allegations contained in Mr. Pearce's letter were essentially correct, and Lt Col McGeehan's and other crew members' concerns over Lt Col Holland's reckless flying style were justified. The board reviewed several specific instances of Lt Col Holland flying in violation of the Dash 11, USAF, ACC, or FAA regulations.

Based upon clear and convincing evidence, my opinion is that the 24 June 1994 aircraft accident was the result of pilot error, crew error, and several breakdowns in supervision / leadership. The accident was preventable. Causes are as follows:

CAUSE

- (a) <u>Pilot Error</u> On 24 June 1994, Lt Col Holland piloted the aircraft in a manner that violated regulatory provisions and flight manual guidance, which placed the aircraft outside viable flight parameters at an altitude and attitude where recovery was not possible. Lt Col Holland, by exceeding bank angles, speed, and altitude restrictions for maneuvering the aircraft during a circling approach, flew the aircraft into a stalled condition, departed controlled flight, and impacted the ground.
- (b) <u>Airmanship</u> The accident crew, perhaps not recognizing a dangerous situation developing, allowed the pilot to enter into a stalled condition.
- (c) <u>Supervision/Leadership</u> Dating from 1991, the pilot, Lt Col Arthur A. Holland, had an established history of overly aggressive flying and poor airmanship. This long term behavior was not readily apparent to the wing leadership and he was allowed to continue to fly. The wing's history of numerous leadership changes, during the period of 1991 to 1994, contributed to the failure to identify and resolve the problem. These leadership changes resulted in a lack of continuity in understanding Lt Col Holland's airmanship and tracking B-52 operations. Lt Col Holland's poor airmanship could have been masked by the credibility inherent in his position as the Chief of Standardization and Evaluation, the senior, most experienced B-52 pilot in the wing, and previous duty as a MAJCOM B-52 evaluator.
- (d) <u>Supervision/Leadership</u> The 92nd Operations Group commander and his staff lacked an adequate understanding of regulations concerning air shows and the bank angles permitted by the Dash 11 in the traffic pattern. They recommended an air show exhibition that was not in compliance with USAF and ACC regulations and the aircraft flight manual. Portions of this profile were rejected by the 92nd Bomb Wing commander because of its aggressiveness.

He did not direct the operations group to accomplish a total review of air show criteria after rejecting their profile. The wing commander ordered a flight profile that was less aggressive but was still not in compliance with ACC regulations and the Pilots' Flight Manual. This led to a B-52 air show exhibition profile that was not sanctioned by ACC nor complied with regulations or the Dash 11. Lt Col Holland, despite the orders given him by the wing commander, flew a very reckless profile and ignored those orders, without being curtailed by onboard supervisors including the squadron commander, an instructor navigator, and the vice wing commander.

Had the Operations Group sought clarification of a permissible exhibition profile and the required authority, after being questioned by the wing commander, it is likely that HQ ACC would have become aware of the planned unauthorized maneuvers and disapproved the request for this exhibition profile.

(e) <u>Supervision/Leadership</u> - The Operations Group Commander, after flying the exhibition profile the week before, did not realize it was contrary to regulations or good air discipline, and did not direct the profile be changed to bring it into compliance.

MICHAEL G. MCCONNELL, Colonel, USAF

AFR 110-14 Accident Investigation Board President

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- H AFTO FORMS 781
- I MATERIAL DEFICIENCY REPORTS
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- K DD FORM 175, MILITARY FLIGHT PLAN
- L DD FORM 365F, WEIGHT AND BALANCE CLEARANCE FORM F TACTICAL
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- S PHOTOGRAPHS
- T INDIVIDUAL FLIGHT RECORDS
- V TESTIMONY AND STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES
- W WEATHER OBSERVATIONS
- X STATEMENTS OF INJURY OR DEATH
- Y DOCUMENTS APPOINTING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD
- Z PHOTOGRAPHS NOT INCLUDED IN PART I OF SAFETY REPORT
- AA SUPPORTING ADDITIONAL DATA

USAF MISHAP REPORT

(Fill in all spaces applicable. If additional space is needed, use additional sheet(s).)

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, ORGANIZATION AND BASE SUBMITTING REPORT (De met abbreviate)

Twelfth Air Force, Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona

10. LIST OF PERSONNEL DIRECTLY INVOLVED

(See AFR 171-2 for execution instructions)

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Wolff, Robert E.	Col	-	FP	Cmd Plt	F	
Holland, Arthur A.	Lt Col		ΙP	Cmd_Plt	F	
McGeehan, Mark C.	Lt Col		IP	Sr Plt	F	
Huston, Kenneth S.	Lt Col		MR	Mst Nav	F	
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i (Enter applicable letter(e) in DEGREE INJURY column. None-N; Temperary Total-TT; Permanent Partial-PP; Parmanent Telal-PT; Fatal-F; Missing-N)

Mission Profile: The mishap crew (MC) planned a training flight for a local airshow. The mission profile started with a takeoff on Runway 23 followed immediately by a left, 360 degree climbing turn around the tower. Then the MC turned approximately 30 degrees right of runway heading, continued the climb, and retracted flaps. The mishap aircraft (MA) turned left, descended for a low altitude, medium speed pass down Runway 05, and turned left approximately 30 degrees of runway heading to set up for a high-speed pass to Runway 23. At approximately midfield, the MC started a pull up to a high pitch angle climb with a low-G pushover at the top. Then, the aircraft offset right and started a descending left teardrop to Runway 05 for a pass at pattern altitude. At the end of the runway, the MC started a left turn for a closed partern and extended the flaps. The MC extended the landing gear and turned left base for a landing attitude demonstration. At midfield, the MC started a left, climbing, 90 degree turn and retracted the gear. The MC turned 90 degrees right to a modified downwind, turned base with the gear up, and completed the right turn to final for a low approach to Runway 23. At the end of the runway the MC made a right turn to a closed downwind, then turned base while extending the landing gear. After rolling out on heading to Runway 23, the MC started a go-around due to another aircraft on the runway and shifted left of the runway while maintaining a low altitude. At approximately midfield, the MC requested and was cleared for a 360 degree turn for spacing and accomplished a low altitude turn around the tower. At approximately three quarters of the way around the turn, the aircraft impacted the ground. MP2 attempted ejection, out of the ejection envelope, and the ejection sequence was interrupted by ground impact. Aircraft was destroyed and all crewmembers were fatally injured.

12.	AUTHENT	ICATION	
	TYPED HAME AND GRADE	HENATURE	DATE
AMIB President	JOHN C. MOORE, Colonel	Jak CMoone	18/4/94

I, FACTUAL SUMMARY OF CIRCUMSTANCES. GIVE A DETAILED MISTORY OF PLIGHT OR CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF FACTS AND Circumstances Leadine: To, the mishap. The results of investigation will be contained in the "analysis part" Of the report. Analysis of and conclusions drawn from Oral or written statements obtained only in the Interest of mishap prevention will not be included in this summary.

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- G FLIGHT AND PERSONNEL RECORDS
- H AFTO FORMS 781
- I MATERIAL DEFICIENCY REPORTS
- J TECHNICAL AND ENGINEERING EVALUATIONS OF MATERIAL (DOD)
- K DD FORM 175, MILITARY FLIGHT PLAN
- L DD FORM 365F, WEIGHT AND BALANCE CLEARANCE FORM F TACTICAL
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- Y DOCUMENTS APPOINTING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD
- Z PHOTOGRAPHS NOT INCLUDED IN PART I OF SAFETY REPORT
- AA SUPPORTING ADDITIONAL DATA

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USAF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT INDEX TAB FORM

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C	AF FORM 711b - AIRCRAFT MISHAP REPORT
D	AF FORM 711c - AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL REPORT
Ğ	FLIGHT AND PERSONNEL RECORDS
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Z	PHOTOGRAPHS NOT INCLUDED IN PART I OF SAFETY REPORT
AA	SUPPORTING ADDITIONAL DATA



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	Ø6:Ø5)	INDIVIDU	AL TRAINING	SUMMARY ACFT		VENT MASK ****
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FLT CONTROL 6922	930607	940630				
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ELECTRICS G924	930222	941231				
INSTRUMENTS G925	881228	891231				
FUEL SYS G926	930920	940930				
PNEUMATICS 6927	93Ø92Ø	94Ø93Ø				
LOCAL SURVI LSØ1	9311Ø8	94Ø531				
CST LSØ2	930101	94Ø131				
WATER SURVI LSØ3	940302	950331				
ACDE/HARNES LSØ4	930716	94Ø731				
ACDE/EGRESS LSØ5		94Ø731				
LS EQUIPMEN LSØ6		95Ø331				
EGRESS/EJEC LSØ7		940331				
HANGING HAR LSØ9		94Ø93Ø				
PHYSICAL EX PPØ1		94Ø93Ø				
PHY REFRESH PP11		941231				
FLT REC CHE REØ1		940930		-, -, -,		

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PERSONAL DATA - PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

AS OF DATE:

15 JUL 94

INDIVIDUAL FLIGHT DATA

MDS: ***

CREW-POS:

NAME: HC AGE: DAFSC:	DLLAND Ø14:	ARTHUR 46 35Y	LAST PHYS		: LTC 3Ø8Ø3 11219	RPI: 6			3A SAC
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REPARED 94 JUL 15 AME: HOLLAND ARTHUR A JET: 1 CMP: SAC WING: 0092 PERSONAL DATA-PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 FLYING HISTORY REPORT (PA). AS DE 94 JUL 15 GRADE; LTC CAREER TOTALS INQUIRY 805RP1: 6 FACT: 30325 BASE: FATECHILD AFB PCN. SA002-G05 · . \odot

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EVENT MASK **** INDIVIDUAL TRAINING SUMMARY (1Ø:15:51) Ø6 JUL 94 CREW POS IPDX ACFT H TYPE-TNG C NAME MCGEEHAN MARK C C C C С С A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 DL DD. **EVENT** ID HI/LOW BOMB BØØ1 ØØ/Ø3/ØØ Ø7/Ø3/2Ø 94Ø5Ø3 940702 C-HI ALT CO B002 00/00/00 00/01/01 940208 0000000 MED ALT CON BØØ3 ØØ/ØØ/ØØ ØØ/ØØ/Ø1 93Ø9Ø7 ØØØØØØ HI ALT SIOP BØ**Ø8 ØØ/ØØ**/ØØ ØØ/ØØ/Ø2 931214 0000000 LO/ALT MINE B026 00/00/00 00/01/00 940214 0000000 C-LW A CONV BØ34 ØØ/ØØ/ØØ Ø7/Ø2/Ø9 94Ø328 ØØØØØØ S-LO SIOP B B035 00/03/00 00/00/07 940503 ØØØØØØ BXØ4 ØØ/Ø1/ØØ Ø3/Ø1/Ø6 94Ø5Ø3 ØØØØØØ 4X SORTIE DUR TEN BXØ5 ØØ/ØØ/ØØ ØØ/ØØ/ØØ ØØØØØØØ ØØØØØØ 4 X 0000000 DUR ONE BX06 00/04/00 10/07/08 940509 4 X DUR TEN BXØ7 ØØ/Ø5/ØØ 2Ø/Ø6/Ø9 94Ø5Ø3 ØØØØØØ 4 X BX10 00/00/00 03/02/03 940323 000000 CTSS CTS DUR TEN BX11 ØØ/ØØ/ØØ ØØ/ØØ/ØØ ØØØØØØ *QQQQQQ* CTS DUR ONE BX12 ØØ/ØØ/ØØ 17/Ø8/31 94Ø323 000000 CTS DUR TEN BX13 ØØ/ØØ/ØØ 1Ø/Ø7/22 94Ø323 ØØØØØØ INSTRU APPR 1001 00/04/00 04/03/11 940509 940623 MISSED APPR 1010 00/00/00 02/01/01 940328 ØØØØØØ L/A N/LEG D NØ15 ØØ/ØØ/ØØ Ø3/Ø2/1Ø 94Ø328 940527 PØØ2 ØØ/Ø1/ØØ Ø6/Ø3/14 94Ø5Ø9 000000 SORTIE ØØØØØØ C- HAVE QUI PØØ7 ØØ/ØØ/ØØ ØØ/Ø2/Ø2 940214 PØØ8 ØØ/ØØ/ØØ Ø3/Ø2/14 94Ø323 94Ø5Ø7 TAKEOFF PØ13 ØØ/Ø8/ØØ Ø7/Ø3/18 94Ø5Ø9 94Ø623 LANDING SIM ENG LOS PØ15 ØØ/Ø2/ØØ Ø3/ØØ/Ø4 94Ø5Ø3 ØØØØØØ LANDING (NI PØ16 ØØ/ØØ/ØØ Ø3/Ø4/13 94Ø3Ø9 940707 FLAP UP APP PØ21 ØØ/ØØ/ØØ ØØ/ØØ/Ø1 94Ø122-ØØØØØØ ØØØØØØ CELL FORM ~~P022 00/00/00 03/02/08 940323 PØ24 ØØ/ØØ/ØØ ØØ/ØØ/ØØ 930719 940719 S- MITO VISUAL PATT PØ36 ØØ/Ø4/ØØ Ø4/Ø5/Ø9 94Ø5Ø3-0000000 SIM 6ENG AP PØ63 ØØ/ØØ/ØØ ØØ/ØØ/Ø2 94Ø122 ØØØØØØ PØ7Ø ØØ/ØØ/ØØ ØØ/ØØ/Ø1 940122 940721 PILOT PRO TOUCH-GO LN PØ97 ØØ/ØØ/ØØ Ø6/Ø2/13 94Ø323 940507 S-PLZT G-IN P106 00/00/00 00/00/00 930721 940721 RØØ1 ØØ/ØØ/ØØ Ø5/Ø1/16 94Ø328 94Ø512 AIR REFUEL RØØ5 ØØ/ØØ/ØØ ØØ/ØØ/Ø7 94011Ø 940510 NIGHT A/R FORM BMB PR T002 00/00/00 02/01/04 940316 ØØØØØØ C-NVG EXERC T101 00/00/00 00/00/04 940110 940410 VP31 ØØ/Ø1/ØØ Ø1/ØØ/Ø2 94Ø5Ø9 ØØØØØØ INSTR/EVAL KC-10 REFUE VR41 00/00/00 00/00/01 931019 000000 YDØ1 ØØ/ØØ/ØØ ØØ/ØØ/ØØ ØØØØØØ ØØØØØØØ EPTS YDØ7 ØØ/ØØ/ØØ ØØ/ØØ/Ø1 931Ø19 ØØØØØØ LO CPTS MD/HI CPTS YDØ8 ØØ/ØØ/ØØ ØØ/ØØ/ØØ ØØØØØØØ gggggg

PERSONAL DATA - PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

INDIVIDUAL FLIGHT DATA MDS: AS OF CREW-POS:

DATE:	15 JUL 94	4				CKEW-	-rus:	*
AGE:	AN MARK (38 2350	C LAST PHYS LAST ALT	SICAL: 9	: LTC 31216 21217		SSA1 S ASC: MAJ('	2A SAC
MDS C SEQ BØ52G P ØØ BØ52H P Ø1 CØ12F P ØØ FØ15D P ØØ TØ37B P ØØ SBØ52G P ØØ SMBØ52H P Ø2 SMTØ4ØO P ØØ SMTØ77A P ØØ	TOTAL 2570.7 271.8 1.5 1.5 139.9 88.5 18.0 4.0 7.5	PRIMARY 1117.8 59.3 Ø.Ø Ø.Ø 80.5 26.8 9.Ø 4.Ø 5.3	SECOND 983.2 53.7 Ø.Ø 0.Ø 52.3 25.7 8.5 Ø.Ø 2.2	INSTR 233.7 148.6 Ø.Ø Ø.Ø Ø.Ø 36.Ø Ø.Ø Ø.Ø	EVAL Ø.Ø Ø.Ø Ø.Ø Ø.Ø Ø.Ø Ø.Ø	OTHER 236.0 10.2 1.5 1.5 7.1 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0	COMBAT Ø.Ø Ø.Ø Ø.Ø Ø.Ø Ø.Ø Ø.Ø Ø.Ø Ø.Ø Ø.Ø Ø.	CMBT SFT Ø.Ø Ø.Ø Ø.Ø Ø.Ø Ø.Ø Ø.Ø Ø.Ø Ø.Ø Ø.Ø Ø.
TOTALS	3103.4	1302.7	1125.6	418.3	ø.ø	256.8	ø.ø	ø.ø
CAREER TOTALS FLYING TIME: PRI/INST TIME	ALL	2985.4 1639.9			TOTAL: RI/INST	TIME:	3179 1639	

LS EQUIPMEN LSØ6 931029

EGRESS/EJEC LSØ7 931Ø29

MANGENG MAD LEMO 931917

941031

94Ø43Ø

9403430

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Ø6 JUL 94 (10:17:32)	INDIVIDUAL TRAINING		EVENT MASK ****
NAME MCGEEHAN MARK C	TYPE-TNG A	ACFT H	CREW POS IPDX
C	C		
EVENT ID DL	DD		
CCTS ACADEM AØØ1 ØØØØØØ	@@@@@@ OF##700		
QUAL CK AAØ1 93Ø9Ø3	950228 ØØØØØØ		
SIM CHECK, AAØ2 ØØØØØØ QUAL/INST C AA21 93Ø9Ø3	9 5Ø228		
INITIAL CER GØ51 ØØØØØØ	988888		
FBF G102 931029	951Ø31		
CWD G112 930909	950131		
CREW RES MG G123 930930	<u>ଜ୍ଜର୍ଜ୍ଜର୍</u>		
CREW RES MG G124 ØØØØØØ	ଉଉଉଉଉଉ		
INST/EVAL C G125 ØØØØØØ	ଉଉଉଉଉଡ		
ACFT SVC G209 000000	ଷ୍ଟର୍ଷଷ୍ଟର		
EVS/TAP G221 ØØØØØØ	ଷ୍ଟ୍ରଷ୍ଟ୍ର		
NUC SURETY G300 930701	940731		
AWR-1 G3Ø1 93Ø7Ø1	940731		
AWR-(CDNV) 6302 930701	940731		
STRK MSN PR G303 930701	94Ø731 ØØØØØØ		
AWR-4 (CONV G304 000000 EWO STUDY G310 930930	94Ø131		
EWO STUDY G31Ø 93Ø93Ø CCP G312 93Ø916	731Ø31		
UMB G330 930930	00000 0		
EPC G340 930714	ଷ୍ଟ୍ରଷ୍ଟ୍ର		
ORI 6350 000000	ØØØØØØ		•
CPC 6340 000000	ଉଉଉଉଉଉ		
CTT-1 G511 ØØØØØØ	ଉଉଉଉଉ ଉ		
CTT-2 G512 930708	940930		
CTT-3 G513 930709	94Ø93Ø	. 🕶	
CTT-4 G514 000000	00000 00		
CTT-5 G515 ØØØØØØ	ØØØØØØ 333333		
CTT-6 G516 ØØØØØØ	ØØØØØØ 3.33333		
CTT-7 G517 ØØØØØØ CTT-8 G518 ØØØØØØ	ଷ୍ଟର୍ଷ ବ୍ରଷ୍ଟ ବ୍ୟ ବ୍ରଷ୍ଟ ବ୍ୟ		
CTT-8 G518 000000 INITIAL CER G51A 000000	ශුක්කිකිකික ක්රික්කිකිකික		•
COMM PROCED G601 000000	ଷ୍ଟ୍ରହ୍ମଷ୍ଟ୍ର		
AIRC 6604 000000	ଉଦ୍ଭବ୍ଧର		
FLIF/ICAD G607 000000	000000		
AIRPORT QUA G640 000000	ଉଷ୍ଟଉଷ୍ଟ		
INT NUCLEAR G900 000000	ଷ୍ଟ୍ରହ୍ମଷ୍ଟ୍ର		
INT CONV WS G910 000000	ଉଉଉଉଉଉ		
HYDRAULICS G921 93Ø616	9406 30		
FLT CONTROL G922 93Ø616	940630		
ENGINES 6923 930920	940930		
ELECTRICS 6924 930625	941231		
INSTRUMENTS G925 ØØØØØØ	ØØØØØØ 94Ø63Ø		
FUEL SYS G926 930625 PNEUMATICS G927 930920	740030 940930		
PNEUMATICS G927 930920 IN/UN CHCE G938 000000	990000 000000		
ACDE INT WS 6970 000000	ଷ୍ଟ୍ରଷ୍ଟ୍ରପ୍ରତ୍ର ଜନ୍ମପ୍ରତ୍ରତ		
IND CONV WS 6990 000000	@@@@@@		
LOCAL SURVI LSØ1 93Ø723	940131		•
CST LSØ2 ØØØØØØ	ଉପ୍ରପ ପ୍ତ ପ୍ର		
WATER/EQUIP LSØ3 931Ø29	941031		
ACDE/HARNES LSØ4 931217	941231 G-9		
ACDE/EGRESS LS03 931217	941231		
	941 <i>0</i> 331		

FORMS CLASS X668 BORDER BORDER

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CHAR C CTD: SAC LIGGOOD? 33.76. ***********************************			:			3			PERSONA			•	
CYSE CED: SAC LINGUIST SAAN: ORGANIZATION: 3225 858: 3 \$555.0486 : 24/35 APR CY RAGE: 35 POSZH SERIAL NUNBER - UNKNOWN *** ACCIDENT ATREAST *** PRI SEC LINST EVAL OTH TIPE PRILINST NGT LINS SIM SORT 19:0 53:5 143:4 00:0 10:2 271:3 220:5 00:0 0:0 2:1 3 18 5 18 5 5 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1							1						
THE PART SEE UNKNOWN *** ACCIDENT AIRCRAFT *** *** ACCIDENT AIRCRAFT *** *** OTHER ACTIVE AIRCRAFT ***		466	0.0	0.0			2985.4	256.3	0.0	362.3	1089.2	1257.6	: 🌂
CYDE SAC UNGROUN *** ACCIDENT AIRCRAFT *** PRI SEC 145T EVAL OTH TIPE PRIJES 13.5 13.5 13.5 13.5 13.5 13.5 13.5 13.5		SORT	CMBT	CHE T	STUD	FRI/INST		CAREER	1	ISNI	SEC	PRI	DATES_FF/LE
CYSE CCP: SAC LING: 0092 34. *** ORCHIZATION: 0325 RSC: 3 \$557 PARS: 2073 APR CF 20473 APR CF 2017 PARS: 1007235 AGE: 35 PROSET PROSETT SERVINE PRIOR	0		-										.)
CASE CEP: SAC WING: 0.092 34. ORGANIZATION: 0325 BSC 3 SECURATE: 2A/93 APR C7 DASSE MOTADIC AGE: 35 DOS2H SERIAL NUMBER = UNKNOWN *** ACCIDENT AIRCRAFT *** PRI SEC INST EVAL OTH TIPE PRI/INST NGT INS SIM SORT 1.4 1.9 5.3 0.0 10.2 271.8 200.9 13.5 13.5 11.4 46 1.4 1.9 5.3 0.0 10.3 271.8 20.9 13.5 0.0 0.0 2.7 3 3 3 3 5 6 0 0 0.0 0 1.5 97.3 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 3 6 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0	·			•			 						
PARK C PD: SAC WING: 0092 3W. ORGANIZATION: 0325 BS: 3 PSCLDATE: 2A/93 APR 07 DAFSC: NOT 235 AGE: 35 CPOS: IP CURRIG: SENJOR PILOT 235 AGE: 35 CPOS: IP CURRIG: SENJOR PILOT 235 AGE: 35 CPOS: IP CURRIG: SENJOR PILOT 235 AGE: 35 DESCRIPTION: 325 AGE: 35 DESCRIPTION: 325 AGE: 35 DESCRIPTION: 325 AGE: 35 DESCRIPTION: 325 DESCRIP	G-11					; ;							
PAPK C PD: SAC WING: 0092 3W. ORGANIZATION: 0325 BS CPOS: IP CUR RTG: SENJOR PILOT 235 AGE: 35 CPOS: IP CUR RTG: SENJOR PILOT 235 AGE: 35 CPOS: IP CUR RTG: SENJOR PILOT 235 AGE: 35 CPOS: IP CUR RTG: SENJOR PILOT 235 AGE: 35 CPOS: IP CUR RTG: SENJOR PILOT 235 AGE: 35 CPOS: IP CUR RTG: SENJOR PILOT 235 AGE: 35													
PARK C LING: 0092 34. ORGANIZATION: 3325 RS. 3 \$50/DATE: 24/93 APR C7 DAFSC: 10012330 AGE: 35 CMS CMS: SERIAL NUMBER = UNKNOWN *** ACCIDENT AIRCRAFT *** PRI SEC INST EVAL OTH TOTAL 59.3 53.7 148.6 0.0 10.2 271.8 207.9 13.5 10.0 0.0 2.7 2 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5	Ç∰) 											RCRAFT_DAT	==NO-NORE-AI
PAPK C UING: 0092 3W. ORGANIZATION: 0325 BS CPCS: IP CURRIG: SENIOR PILOT AGE: 36 CMB CPD: SAC UING: 0092 3W. ORGANIZATION: 0325 BS CPCS: IP CURRIG: SENIOR PILOT AGE: 36 CMB						*					•		
PAPK C GAD: LTC SSAN: ORGANIZATION: 0325 BS CPCS: IP CURRIG: SENIOR PILOT SS CHO CHO: SAC UING: 0092 3W, ORGANIZATION: 0325 BS CPCS: IP CURRIG: SENIOR PILOT B052H SERIAL NUMBER = UNKNOWN *** ACCIDENT AIRCRAFT *** PRI SEC INST EVAL OTH TIME PRI/INST NGT INS SIN SORT		o-v-	**************************************	000	000	N-40	70-100		0000	-WO	الموسي		305NH/1PDX 300 DAYSS:
MCGEEHAN PAPK C GRD: LTC SSAN: PPI: 6 FAC: 3 ASCADATE: 2A/93 APR C7 DAFSC: NOTZ35C AGE: 1 FAC: CMB CPD: SAC WING: 0092 3W, ORGANIZATION: 0325 BS CPCS: IP CUR RTG: SENIOR PILOT TYPE = B052H SERIAL NUMBER = UNKNOWN *** ACCIDENT AIRCRAFT ***	-	SCRT	L IS ES	17.5	NGT	PRI/INST	TIME	H10		ISAI	\$EC .		
MCGEEHAU MARK C GRO: LTC SSAN: PRI: 6 FAC: 3 ASCADATE: 2A/93 RPR C7 DAFSC: NOTZ35C AGE: 1 F.CC: CM9 CMD: SAC WING: 0092 3W. ORGANIZATION: 0325 RS CPCS: IP CUR RTG: SENIOR PILOT	;	,				•	:		:				*
			LOT	SENIOR PI	TP:	CPCS: IP	FAC: 3	PPI:		DO92 34,	🗢	n	AREL MOGERNAU PAR



Ø6 JUL 94 (10:3	22:46) INDIVIDUA	L TRAINING SUMMA		EVENT MASK ****
NAME HUSTON KENNE	ETH S	TYPE-TNG C	ACFT H	CREW POS IRDX
		СС		•
EVENT ID	A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6	DL DD		•
HI/LOW BOMB BØØ1	00/00/00 05/01/20	940323 940522		
C-HGH ALT B BØØ2		. 940323 - 000000		
MED ALT CON BO03		931117 ØØØØØØ		
HI ALT SIOP BØØ8		: 930923 - 0000000		
LD/ALT MINE BØ26		931130 000000		
C-LW A CONV BØ34		940111 000000		
S-LO SIOP B BØ35				
HI ALT SIOP BØ38	@Ø/ @Ø /ØØ ØØ/ØØ/Ø1	930720 000000		
4X SORTIE BXØ4		940215 000000		
4X DUR TEN BXØ5		୍ଷ୍ୟର୍ଷ୍ୟର ପ୍ରତ୍ୟବ୍ୟର		
4X DUR ONE BXØ6				
4X DUR TEN BXØ7	_ @@/@Ø/@Ø_@@/Ø8/@4	940215 000000		
CTSS BX10		940323 000000		
CTS DUR TEN BX11		ପ୍ରତ୍ରତ୍ତ୍ୱର ପ୍ରତ୍ରତ୍ତ୍ୱ		
CTS DUR ONE BX12		940323 000000		
CTS DUR TEN BX13		; 940310		
S-AGM-86 HG CØ13		931020 000000		
APP MON IØ26		; 94Ø517 94Ø914		
L/A N/LEG D NØ15				
SORTIE PØØ2		940517 ØØØØØØ		
	00/00/00 01/01/07	' 940323		
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _	@0/00/0 0 00/00/02	940111 000000		
CAMERA SCOR VB51	@@/@@ /@@ @@/@@/@3	: 931020 000000		
CONV CAM SC VB52		940111 000000		
		931020 000000		
CONV CM S B VB54		940323 000000		
INSTR/EVAL VP31	ØØ/ØØ/ØØ Ø1/Ø2/Ø7	940310 000000	 -	
EPTS YDØ1	ØØ/ØØ/ØØ ØØ/ØØ/Ø1			
LO CPTS YDØ7				•
	00/00/00 00/00/01			

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06 JUL 94		20:41)		L TRAININ <mark>G</mark> TYPE-TNG A	SUMMAF	RY ACFT	ы	E\ CREW	MASK IRI	
NAME HUST	ON KENN			ITELING M		HOLL		O! (III-	 	- '
		C	C							
EVENT	ID	DL	DD							
QUAL CK		921014	940331							
CMD		930625	940630							
CREW RES	MG G123	911122	<u>ଉପ୍ଟେଶ୍</u> ପର							
CREW RES	MG G124	931202	941231							
INST/EVAL			ØØØØØØ							
ACFT SVC		94Ø225	95Ø228							
NUC SURET		93Ø8Ø5	94Ø831							
AWR-1		94Ø114	950131							
AWR- (CONV		930923	940930							
STRK MSN			@@@@@@							
AWR-4 (CO	NV G3Ø4	@@@@ @ @	ଉଉଉଉଉଉ							
EWO STUDY		931118	940331							
CCP	G 312	94Ø222	940331							
UMB	G33Ø	920521	<u> අතුල්ල්ල්ල්</u>							
EPC	G34Ø	ØØØØØØ	000000							
ORI	G35Ø	ଓଡ଼ଉଉଉଉ	ଉପ୍ରଥମଣ							
CPC		ØØØØØØ	000000					•		
CTT-1		931203	941231							
CTT-2		930930	940930							
CTT-3		930903	940930							
CTT-4		921Ø27	931231							
CTT-5		921027	931231							
CTT-6		930603	940630							
CTT-7		921029	931231							
NIRC		931115	ØØØØØØ							
INT NUCLE			ØØØØØØ							
OAS S & T			ØØØØØØ							
MISSLE MA		ØØ ØØØ Ø	000000							
IN/UN CHC	-	ØØØØØØ	000000							
LOCAL SUR	=	940222	94Ø831							
CST		930101	940131							
WATER/EQU			940930							
ACDE/HARN	FS LSØ4	940121	95Ø131							
ACDE/EGRE			95Ø131							
LS EQUIPM			940930							
EGRESS/EJ			940630							
HANGING H			940731							
PHYSICAL			941130							
ALT-CHMBR			95Ø531							
SIOP MSN	CE 0017	สสสสสส	ଉଷ୍ଟର୍ଷ୍ଣ							
CONV MSN	CE 0015	ดผลผลผล	<i>@</i> @@@@@							
FLT REC C	OF SETT	Q700000	941130							
		738787 000000	888888							
PC D OC Small AR M			ØØØØØØ							
			ØØØØØØ							
FORMS CLA	22 VOOK	17、15、15、15、15、15、15、15、	50- 40- 10- 10- 10-			•				

PERSONAL DATA - PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

AS OF

INDIVIDUAL FLIGHT DATA

MDS: ******

DATE: 15 JUL 94

CREW-POS:

NAME: AGE: DAFSC:	ни		KENNETH 41 525C	LAST PH	YSICAL:	K: LTC 930915 920507	RPI: FAC:	SSA 6 ASC 3 MAC	•	2A SAC
MDS 80521 80521 80526 80526 80526 80526 70376 T0376 T0436 KC1356 SB0526 SB0526 SMW0526	NZZZZZZZZZZZ	Ø1 ØØ ØØ ØØ ØØ ØØ	TOTAL 6.Ø 796.9 445.4 25.8 763.8 18.Ø 866.5 1.4 6.1 34Ø.8 2.6 Ø.Ø 11.2 19.5	PRIMAP 749. 445. 618. 215. Ø. 175. Ø. Ø. 4.	Ø Ø.Ø 6 Ø.Ø 4 Ø.Ø 3 Ø.Ø 1 Ø.Ø Ø Ø.Ø 7 Ø.Ø Ø Ø.Ø Ø Ø.Ø Ø Ø.Ø Ø Ø.Ø Ø Ø.Ø	Ø.Ø 22.8 Ø.Ø Ø.Ø 54.5 Ø.Ø 646.3 Ø.Ø 0.Ø 165.1 Ø.Ø 0.Ø 11.2	EVAL Ø.6 Ø.6 Ø.6 Ø.6 Ø.6 Ø.6 Ø.6	7 9.9 7 24.5 7 9.9 7 18.5 7 9.9 7 9.9 7 9.9 7 9.9 7 9.9	8. Ø.	CMBT SFT Ø.Ø Ø.Ø Ø.Ø Ø.Ø Ø.Ø Ø.Ø Ø.Ø Ø.Ø Ø.Ø Ø.
TOTALS			3304.0	2239.	5 0.0	914.8	91.	z 58. 5	5 Ø.Ø	Ø • Ø
CAREER FLYING PRI/INS	TIN	1E: 4		3273 3123			TOTAL		3370 312	

			-			•				·			C.)
						1974	DATA-PRIVACY ACT OF 1974		PERSONAL				
t.							5	END PAGE					9A2G: 94175
		655	0.0	0.0	104.8	1979.4	2081.8	11.2	91.2	700.8	0.0	1278.6	850108/940617
		SORI	CMST	LEAD	AUIS	PRI/INSI	TOTAL		EVAL	ISKI	SEC	PRI	DATES FF/LF
							TOTALS ***	CAREER	***				
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	G-1:								-				
	 							1					
						-							
							212622	01267 701746				RCRAFT_DATA:	
A Section			0000	0000	0000	6. 4-3		000-1	0000		0000	21 2000	2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 200
 		SORT	NZ NZ NZ	INS	NGT	PEI/INST	TIME	0TH	EVAL	1457	SEC	PRI	!
						•	AIRCRAFT ***	ACCIDENT AI	*** /				
						1			1	NKNOWN	SERIAL NUMBER - UNKNOWN		CFT TYPE = 8052H
		AGE: 41	C: NO1525C	PASTER	CUR RTG:	DATE:	SZS ES	ORGANIZATION: 0325	TORGANI	ELTC SSAH:	GROT LTC	ETH SETH SAC	AME: HUSTON KENNETH
		02	PCN-\$4002-402	JUN-24PC	AS- OF-94	IGATION- (PA)	TRESTI	REPORT-FOR-AIRCRAFT-ACCIDENT-INVESTIGATIO	FOR-AIRCA	REPORT			REPARED-94-JUN-24
						1974	CY ACT OF	PERSONAL DATA-PRIVACY ACT OF	PERSONAL				

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C)

NA9650: 95196


PERSONAL DATA-PRIVACY

ACT

OF 1974

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PERSONAL DATA - PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

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INDIVIDUAL FLIGHT DATA

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DATE: 15 JUL 94

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PERSONAL DATA-PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

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PERSONAL DATA-PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

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PERSONAL DATA-PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

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- D AF FORM 711c AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL REPORT
- G FLIGHT AND PERSONNEL RECORDS
- H AFTO FORMS 781
- I MATERIAL DEFICIENCY REPORTS
- J TECHNICAL AND ENGINEERING EVALUATIONS OF MATERIAL (DOD)
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NOTE:

AIRCRAFT COMMANDER or DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE

PLEASE SIGN BACK OF THIS FORM PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.

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To be co ertify that the items listed (mpleted by aircraft commander or on this form are on board and in ap	r designated representative prior to dep parent serviceable condition on the date	e indicated by my signature.
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B-52 AIRCRAFT REFUELING AND DISTRIBUTION LOG

1J.S. Government Printing Office: 1991 — 548-1974 RICHT DROS 4505 RIGHT OUTBOARD 3-1400F 1000 2/5 SIGNATURE OF AIRCRAFT COMMANDER (Approved) 3 - DIPSTICK / VISUALLY CHECKED POUNDS ON BOARD PIT/TRUCK NUMBER 50 7 POL SOURCE FLOWMETER READING 3237 75-Þ NO. 4 MAIN 9700 80 8 700 BLOCK II ~ GALLONS BEFORE REFUELING AIRCRAFT TOTAL BEFORE SERVICE NAME OF REFUELING SUPERVISOR READING AFTER SERVICE GALLONS AFTER TOTAL POUNDS **FUEL DENSITY** ZER READING POUNDS FUEL DIFFERENCE **MULTIPLY BY** DIFFERENCE DELIVERED REFUELING TOTALIZER IN TANKS NO. 3 MAIN 2 2 005/6 DATE PREVIOUS EDITION WILL BE USED SIGNATURE OF LAUNCH CREW SUPERVISOR ار ال FORWARD BODY CENTER WING AFT BODY MID BODY 2000 3000 BLOCK 1 2125 2 - GAGE READING AFTER REFUELING Ø LEGEND 800 Maximum allowable difference between totalizer reading (after refueling) and totalizer reading before refueling plus fuel delivered will not exceed 3% for B-F and 4% for G and H. GFH models after T.O. 1B-52-2305 only outboard wings, aft body and external tanks are required for fuel load distribution by dipstick. All other tanks are optional. This form shall be properly filled in and verified as accurate by the fuel servicing crew for each refueling . defueling and when adjusting fuel in partially filled tanks. After Aircraft Commander signs, this form will be retained on file for 72 hours after date of flight. DATE OF REFUEL / DEFUEL NO. 2 MAIN 20016 Keep with AFTO Form 781 until Aircraft Commander signs. DATE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 1 MAIN 700 SIGNATURE OF REFUELING / DEFUELING SUPERVISOR (Serviced) 1 - SCHEDULED FUEL LOAD AFTO FORM 6, AUG 91 LEFT OUTBOARD AIRCRAFT SERIAL NUMBER 7400 7000 788 LEFT DROP 020 260 ĸ, ci

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The AFTO FORM 781 Series binder was not on board the aircraft and all entries were made available. Copies of the B-52 Aircraft Refueling and Distribution Log (AFTO FORM 6) and the Prepositioned Life Support Equipment form (AFTO FORM 46) are included.

RICHARD A. LANE, Maj, USAF

Maintenance Member

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PRODUCT QUALITY DEFICIENCY REPORT

No product quality deficiency reports were submitted during the course of this investigation.

RICHARD A. LANE, Maj, USAF

Maintenance Member

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- 1. Flight Instrument Analysis Report

 2. Flight South J. A.
- 2. Power Plant Analysis Report

MISHAP AIRCRAFT: B-52H, SERIAL NUMBER 61-026

MISHAP DATE: 24 JUNE 1994

OC-ALC INVESTIGATOR: Mr. Robert C. Murray

I. Introduction:

The following are the results of the analysis conducted on the instruments recovered from B-52H, S/N 61-026 Class "A" Flight Mishap. This mishap occurred at Fairchild AFB, WA on 24 Jun 94. All instruments had sustained impact and fire damage. Some had sustained damage to the extent that no readings could be obtained. Most instruments had sustained extensive post-impact fire damage which would have destroyed any pointer impact marks that may have existed. Instrument reactions to impact forces and heat vary depending upon the particular design. Where applicable, the peculiarities are discussed under the individual subheadings. Where more than one like item was installed on the aircraft and system application on crew position could not be determined, the components have been labeled alphabetically for documentation purposes.

II. Evaluation:

A Flight and Navigation Instruments.

- Attitude Director Indicator (ADI). Only one ADI from an undetermined crew position was recovered. The entire front section including the roll gimbal and attitude sphere were missing. No reading was obtained.
- 2. Standby Attitude Indicator. This indicator incorporates a self-contained gyro that can operate for several minutes after loss of electrical power due to gyro inertia. This indicator's front glass, pitch trim and caging knob, and attitude sphere were missing. The OFF flag was in view. The roll gimbal was captured by impact in a position that correlated to approximately 95 degrees left bank. No pitch reading was obtained.
- 3. Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI). The HSI employs a high-ratio gear mechanism to position the numerous presentations, and it will retain most presentations existing upon loss of electrical power. The heading marker and course presentations can change slightly if the set knobs are struck during the impact sequence. Only one HSI from undetermined crew position was recovered. This indicator's dial glass, bezel, heading set knob, and course set knob were missing. The following readings were obtained:

Compass Card 337 degrees
Heading Marker 230 degrees
Bearing Pointer 315 degrees
Course Arrow 228 degrees
Course Window 228 degrees

Range Indicator 2 miles (Warning Flag in View)

- 4. Indicated Airspeed Indicator. The design on this indicator is such that pressures operate a bellows assembly to position the pointer and drum. The presentation will return to zero upon loss of input. Unless immediate capture occurs, the presentation can change as the result of impact forces.
 - a. Pilot's Indicated Airspeed Indicator. This indicator's dial glass and pointer were missing. The maximum allowable airspeed pointer was at 457 knots. The maximum allowable mach index was at .825 mach. Internal examination revealed impact marks on the vernier drum that correlated to a drum presentation at 62 knots. Examination at the dial face did not reveal any pointer impact marks. No conclusive reading was obtained.

- b. Co-pilot's Indicated Airspeed Indicator. This indicator's dial glass was intact. The maximum allowable airspeed pointer was at 380 knots. The maximum allowable mach index was at .84 mach. As recovered, the indicator was depicting approximately 430 knots but was not captured. Dial face and internal examination did not reveal any impact marks. No reading was obtained.
- 5. True Airspeed Indicator. The design of this indicator is such that it will retain the indication existing upon loss of electrical power. Only one indicator from an undetermined crew position was recovered. This indicator's dial glass and bezel were missing. The sub-dial was captured by impact at approximately 150 knots. The pointer was at 80 knots but was not captured. It is concluded that this indicator was reading approximately 150 knots at the time of impact.
- 6. Altimeter. The design of the altimeter is such that unless immediate capture of the drum readout occurs, the presentation can change as the result of impact forces. Only one altimeter from and undetermined crew position was recovered. This indicator's reset lever was missing. The barometric pressure set knob was bent. The dial glass was cracked. The STBY flag was in view. The barometric pressure setting was 30.18. This setting could have changed slightly when the set knob was struck during the impact sequence. Internal examination revealed that the altitude drums were indicating approximately 2,300 feet but were not captured. No conclusive altitude reading was obtained.
- Radar Altimeter. The design of this indicator is such that the pointer will return to a power-off position (below zero feet) upon loss of electrical power.
 - a. Indicator "A". This indicator's bezel, dial glass, low altitude limit index cursor, and control knob were missing. The OFF flag was in view. The pointer was captured in a position that correlated to approximately 25 feet.
 - b. Indicator "B". This indicator's bezel, dial glass, low altitude limit index cursor, and control knob were missing. The pointer was indicating offscale at the power-off position.
- 8. Vertical Velocity Indicator (VVI). Parts from both VVI's were recovered; however, the parts recovered were insufficient for analysis.
- 9. Standby Compass. The compass was recovered intact and appeared to be functional. No reading was obtained.

B. Engine Instruments.

- Tachometer Indicator. The design of this indicator is such that it will drive to
 the low end (zero RPM) stop upon loss of electrical signal unless capture occurs
 almost simultaneously with loss of signal. Since the exact instance of capture is
 unknown, all readings should be considered a minimum. Seven of the eight
 tachometers were recovered.
 - a. No. 1 Engine. This indicator's dial glass and main pointer were missing. Internal examination revealed that the gear mechanism was captured in a position that correlated to 100 percent RPM.
 - b. No. 2 Engine. This indicator's dial glass was missing. The main pointer was indicating 78 percent RPM but was loose on the shaft. Internal examination revealed that the gear mechanism was captured in a position that correlated to 70 percent RPM.

- c. No. 3 Engine. This indicator's dial glass was missing. The markings on the dial face were destroyed by heat. Internal examination revealed that the gear mechanism was intact, free to rotate, and was at the low end stop.
- d. No. 4 Engine. This indicator's dial glass was broken. The markings on the dial face were destroyed by heat. The main pointer was in a position that correlated to a reading in excess of 106.7 percent RPM. Internal examination revealed that the gear mechanism was captured in a position that verified this reading.
- e. No. 5 Engine. This indicator's dial glass and main pointer were missing. The markings on the dial face were destroyed by heat. Internal examination revealed that the gear mechanism was captured in a position the correlated to 28 percent RPM.
- f. Indicator "A" (No. 6 or No. 7 Engine). This indicator's dial glass and tip of the main pointer were missing. The remainder of the main pointer was in a position that correlated to approximately 95 percent RPM. Internal examination revealed that the gear mechanism was captured in a position that correlated to approximately 105 percent RPM.
- g. No. 8 Engine. This indicator's dial glass was missing. The main pointer was indicating 4 percent RPM. Internal examinations revealed that the gear mechanism was captured in a position that correlated to approximately 105 percent RPM.
- 2. Fuel Flow Indicator. The fuel flow indicator does not employ a gear train, and the pointer position can change as the result of impact forces. The indicators had sustained major impact damage, and the following readings are considered to be inconclusive.
 - a. No. 2 Engine. This indicator's glass was missing. The markings on the dial face were destroyed by heat. The pointer was captured in a position that correlated to 13,000 pounds per hour (PPH).
 - b. 'No. 3 Engine. This indicator's dial glass was missing. The markings on the dial face were destroyed by heat. The pointer was captured in a position that correlated to 2,900 PPH.
 - c. No. 5 Engine. This indicator's dial glass was missing. The markings on the dial face were destroyed by heat. The pointer was captured in a position that correlated to approximately 1,100 PPH.
 - d. No. 6 Engine. This indicator's dial glass was missing. The markings on the dial face were destroyed by heat. The pointer was captured in a position that correlated to 13,300 PPH.
 - e. Indicator "A". This indicator was damaged to the extent that no reading could be obtained.
 - f. Indicator "B". This indicator's dial glass was missing. The pointer was captured at an indication of approximately 1,330 PPH.
 - g. Indicator "C". This indicator was damaged to the extent that no reading could be obtained.
 - h. Indicator "D". This indicator was damaged to the extent that no reading could be obtained.
- 3. Total Fuel Flow Indicator. This indicator was damaged to the extent that no reading could be obtained.

- a. Indicator "A" (No. 1 or No. 7 Engine). This indicator's dial glass, case, and rear section were missing. The pointer and pointer positioning mechanism were in positions that correlated to 240 degrees C but were not captured.
- b. Indicator "B" (No. 1 or No. 7 Engine). This indicator's dial glass, pointer, and case were missing. The pointer positioning mechanism was in a position that correlated to approximately 700 degrees C but was not captured.
- c. No. 2 Engine. This indicator's dial glass and rear of the case were missing. The markings on the dial face were destroyed by heat. The pointer and pointer positioning mechanism were captured in positions that correlated to approximately 280 degrees C.
- d. No. 3 Engine. This indicator's dial glass was missing. The markings on the dial face were destroyed by heat. The pointer was free to move. The pointer positioning was in a position that correlated to 500 degrees C but was not captured.
- e. No. 4 Engine. This indicator's dial glass was missing. The markings on the dial face were destroyed by heat. The pointer was free to move. The pointer positioning was in a position that correlated to zero degrees C but was not captured.
- f. No. 5 Engine. This indicator's dial glass was missing. Most markings on the dial face were destroyed by heat. The pointer was captured at an indication of 320 degrees C. The pointer positioning mechanism was in a position that correlated to 320 degrees C but was not captured.
- g. No. 6 Engine. This indicator's dial glass was shattered. The pointer was indicating zero degrees C but was free to move. The pointer positioning mechanism was in a position that correlated to zero degrees C but was not captured.
- h. No. 8 Engine. This indicator's dial glass and pointer were missing. The pointer positioning mechanism was in a position that correlated to approximately 200 degrees C but was not captured.
- 5. Engine Pressure Ratio (EPR) Indicator. The EPR indicator employs a minor gear train to position the pointers; however, the presentation can change as the result of impact forces. The indicators had sustained major impact damage, and the following readings are considered to be inconclusive.
 - No. 1 Engine. This indicator was damaged to the extent that no reading could be obtained.
 - b. No. 2 Engine. This indicator's dial glass was shattered. The pointer was captured below 1.2 EPR.
 - c. No. 3 Engine. This indicator's dial glass and internal mechanism were missing. The pointer was captured below 1.2 EPR.
 - d. No. 4 Engine. This indicator's dial glass and internal mechanism were missing. The pointer was captured at approximately 2.2 EPR.

- e. No. 5 Engine. This indicator's dial glass and part of the internal mechanism were missing. The pointer was captured at 2.9 EPR.
- f. No. 6 Engine. This indicator's dial glass and internal mechanism were missing. The pointer was captured at 1.75 EPR.
- g. No. 7 Engine. This indicator was damaged to the extent that no reading could be obtained.
- h. No. 8 Engine. This indicator was damaged to the extent that no reading could be obtained.
- 6. Oil Pressure Indicator. The design of this indicator is such that the pointer position can change as the result of impact forces. The following readings are considered to be inconclusive.
 - a. No. 1 Engine. This indicator's dial glass was missing. The pointer was indicating 40 pounds per square inch (PSI) but was free to move. The pointer positioning mechanism was in a position that correlated to approximately 80 PSI but was not captured.
 - b. No. 2 Engine. This indicator's dial glass was missing. The pointer and pointer positioning mechanism were free to move. No reading was obtained.
 - c. No. 3 Engine. This indicator's dial glass was missing. The pointer and pointer positioning mechanism were free to move. No reading was obtained.
 - d. No. 4 Engine. This indicator's dial glass was shattered. The pointer was indicating 10 PSI but was free to move. The pointer positioning mechanism was in a position that correlated to approximately 65 PSI but was not captured.
 - e. No. 5 Engine. This indicator's dial glass was shattered. The pointer and pointer positioning mechanism were in positions that correlated to approximately 65 PSI but were not captured.
 - f. No. 6 Engine. This indicator was damaged to the extent that no reading could be obtained.
 - g. No. 7 Engine. This indicator's dial glass was missing. The pointer and pointer positioning mechanism were in positions that correlated to approximately 25 PSI but were not captured.
 - h. No. 8 Engine. This indicator's dial glass was missing. The pointer and pointer positioning mechanism were in positions that correlated to approximately 75 PSI but were not captured.
- 7. Oil Temperature Indicator. The design of this indicator is such that it will retain the indication existing upon loss of electrical power. This indicator's dial glass, dial face, and pointer were missing. Internal examination revealed that the gear mechanism was in a position that correlated to a reading of 100-120 degrees C. The oil temperature selector switch was destroyed

C. Miscellaneous Instruments.

1. Fuel Quantity Indicator. The design of this indicator employs a major gear train to position the pointer and internal potentiometer. This design will retain the indication existing upon loss of electrical power.

- a. Left External. This indicator's dial glass, dial face, and pointer were missing. Internal examination revealed that the gear mechanism was in a position the correlated to approximately 4,500 pounds.
- b. Right External. This indicator's dial glass, dial face, and pointer were missing. Internal examination revealed that the gear mechanism was in a position that correlated to approximately 4,000 pounds.
- c. Left Outboard. This indicator's dial glass, dial face, and pointer were missing. Internal examination revealed that the gear mechanism was in a position that correlated to approximately 7,000 pounds.
- d. Right Outboard. This indicator's dial glass, dial face, and pointer were missing. Internal examination revealed that the gear mechanism was in a position that correlated to approximately 7,000 pounds.
- e. No. 1 Main. Only the front section of this indicator containing the gears was recovered. Internal examination revealed that the gear mechanism was in a position that correlated to approximately 8,000 pounds.
- f. No. 4 Main. This indicator's dial glass, dial face, and pointer were missing. Internal examination revealed that the gear mechanism was at the low end (zero pounds) stop.
- g. No. 2 Main. This indicator's dial glass was missing. The pointer was melted to the dial face at approximately 19,000 pounds. Internal examination revealed that the gear mechanism was in a position that verified this reading.
- h. No. 3 Main. This indicator's dial glass, dial face, and pointer were missing. Internal examination revealed that the gear mechanism was in a position that correlated to approximately 13,000 pounds.
- i. Center Wing. This indicator's dial glass, dial face, and pointer were missing. Internal examination revealed that the gear mechanism was in a position that correlated to approximately 4,000 pounds.
- j. Forward Body. This indicator's dial glass, dial face, and pointer were missing. Internal examination revealed that the gear mechanism was in a position that correlated to approximately 1,000 pounds.
- k. Mid Body. This indicator's dial glass, dial face, and pointer were missing. Internal examination revealed that the gear mechanism was in a position that correlated to approximately 4,000 pounds.
- 1. Aft Body. This indicator's dial glass, dial face, and pointer were missing. Internal examination revealed that the gear mechanism was in a position that correlated to approximately 2,000 pounds.
- 2. Total Fuel Quantity Indicator. The design of this indicator is similar to the other fuel quantity indicators, and it will retain the indication existing upon loss of electrical power. This indicator's dial glass, dial face, and pointers were missing. Internal examination revealed that the gear mechanism was in a position that correlated to 73,920 pounds.
- Hydraulic Pressure Indicator. Only two indicators were recovered. Both indicators were damaged to the extent that no readings could be obtained.
- 4. Flap Position Indicator. This indicator was damaged to the extent that no reading could be obtained.

- 5. Lateral Trim Indicator. This indicator was damaged to the extent that no reading could be obtained.
- 6. Outside Air Temperature Indicator. The design of this indicator is such that the pointer is easily displaced by impact forces. This indicator's dial glass was missing. The pointer and pointer positioning mechanism were captured in positions that correlated to approximately +10 degrees C.
- 7. CG Display Unit. This indicator employs a digital display. No reading was obtained.
- 8. Clock. Only the co-pilot's clock was recovered. The indicated time was 12:53:49. The elapsed time indicator was at 59 minutes.
- 9. Crosswind Crab Indicator. This indicator was damaged to the extent that no reading could be obtained.
- 10. Cabin Pressure Indicator. The design of this indicator is such that the pointer will return to zero upon loss of input pressure. This indicator's dial glass was intact. The pointer was indicating 49,000 feet but was not captured. Examination of the dial face did not reveal any pointer impact marks. No reading was obtained.
- 11. Manifold Temperature Indicator. The design of this indicator is such that the pointer is easily displaced by impact forces. This indicator's dial glass was shattered. The pointer and pointer positioning mechanism were free to move. No reading was obtained.
- 12. Accelerometer "G" Meter. The design of the "G" meter is such that it will record the vertical "G's" experienced during the impact sequence until the instrument reaches its design limits, is captured, or the mass connecting mechanism breaks. It most likely does not represent the "G's" experienced prior to impact. This indicator's dial glass was shattered. The pointers were missing. Examination of the dial face did not reveal any pointer impact marks. Internal examination revealed that the mechanism was in a position that correlated to the following readings:

Positive Pointer +4G
Negative Pointer -2G
Carrier Pointer +1G

- 13. Liquid Oxygen (LOX) Quantity Indicator. The design of this indicator is such that it will retain the indication existing upon loss of electrical power. This indicator's dial glass, dial face, pointer, and OFF flag were missing. Internal examination revealed that the gear mechanism was in a position that correlated to approximately 65 liters.
- 14. Ammeter. The design of the ammeter is such that the pointer is easily displaced by impact forces. Only two ammeters were recovered. System application could not be determined.
 - a. Indicator "A". This indicator's dial glass was missing. The pointer and pointer positioning mechanism were captured at the low end of the scale (below zero amps).
 - b. Indicator "B". This indicator's dial glass was missing. The pointer was indicating 50 amps; however, the pointer and pointer positioning mechanism were free to move. No reading was obtained.
- 15. Frequency Meter. The design of this indicator is similar to the ammeter. Most of this indicator's dial glass was missing. The pointer and pointer positioning mechanism were captured in positions that correlated to 385 cycles.

III. Determination:

Nothing was noted during this analysis that indicated instrument or instrument system failure prior to impact or loss of input signal.

Equipment Specialist
OC-ALC/LIINT

Tinker AFB OK 73145-3029

DSN 336-3655/Commercial (405) 736-3655

FLIGHT CONTROLS REPORT

MISHAP AIRCRAFT: B-52, SERIAL NUMBER 61-0026

MISHAP DATE: 24 JUNE 1994

I. Introduction

As a result of the crash of B-52H S/N 61-0026 at Fairchild AFB, WA on June 24, 1994, the undersigned was tasked by OC-ALC to serve as a technical advisor to the Mishap Investigation Board. Travel to Fairchild, AFB was on June 28, 1994.

II. Background

B-52H 61-0026 from Fairchild AFB, WA impacted Fairchild Field on June 24, 1994. Impact was approximately 3000 ft. southeast of the midpoint of the runway. The mishap occured during exeution of a 60° bank, low altitude, 360° turn around the tower. Due to the low airspeed and moderate angle of impact, the wreckage was contained in a relatively compact area. Flight control components in the cockpit were completely destroyed from the impact and subsequent breakup. Other pertinent flight control components were found and evaluated.

III. Evaluation

- A. VERTICAL STABILIZER The vertical stabilizer was found still connected to the empennage and came to rest in the horizontal position. The vertical stabilizer had severe fire damage and impact damage to the upper and leading edges. No evidence was found to indicate any malfunction.
- B. RUDDER CONTROL SYSTEM The rudder structure was basically intact and operable, though bent and damaged from impact. The skin showed extensive evidence of fire and impact damage. The rudder control system was complete showing only impact damage. Measurements taken from the rudder trim actuator indicate the rudder was trimmed 0.6° airplane nose right. This is not considered to be conclusive evidence since the cable system was severely disturbed by the separation of the tail section. The fuselage directly below the rudder shows evidence of two impacts. Measurements taken from these impact marks indicate that the rudder hit at 0.5° and 4.4° nose right. Analysis of the soot marks show the 0.5° mark occurred before any fire and is therefore a result of aircraft initial impact. There is no evidence of any rudder system malfunction. Video reviews also verify the rudder system was functional before impact.
- C. HORIZONTAL STABILIZER TRIM SYSTEM The stabilizer trim mechanism was intact in the empennage portion of the wreckage. Measurements of the traveling nut position and the jackscrew show that the trim was set at 1.9° stabilizer nose up (aircraft nose down). Cockpit control position could not be determined due to extensive damage to the cockpit. The aisle stand and all control quadrants were extensively damaged by impact and fire. Stabilizer control mechanism was in an appropriate setting with no indication of a runaway condition.
- D. ELEVATOR CONTROL SYSTEM The major portion of the right elevator was attached to the stabilizer, which came to rest in the vertical position still attached to the empennage. The right elevator was structurally intact with evidence of fire and impact damage. The left elevator was still attached to the left stabilizer which came to rest beyond the empennage section. The elevator had impact damage to the inboard edge and minor soot. Impact damage from the elevator indicate right impact damage occurred with 2.8° nose down elevator. Damage from the left elevator indicate impact at 1.4° nose up. This information is questionable value, the elevators are interconnected and raise and lower simultaneously. Blast forces and tumbling would affect these positions and it is evident that the elevators were moving during the crash sequence. Both elevators still have free movement. No evidence was found to indicate elevator malfunction.
- E. SPOILER AND AIRBRAKE CONTROL SYSTEM All fourteen spoilers and actuators were found scattered throughout the wreckage site. Spoilers five, six and seven were still attached to a upside down left wing section in a fully retracted position. Due to the lack of impact damage expected if the spoilers had been extended, these spoilers were probably retracted prior to impact and during subsequent tumbling. The remaining spoilers were detached and scattered with the left wing spoilers generally located in one area and the right wing spoilers generally located at the far end of the site.

Actuators No. 1 and 3 were attached to their respective spoiler with zero extension indicating full

Number 2 actuator was found completely detached with the end fitting broken off and had 3 3/8 inch ram extension. This extension indicates a 33° deployment.

Number 4 actuator was found completely detached with the ram completely pulled out. No determination could be made as to the spoiler position.

Actuators 5,6, and 7 were found intact in a left wing section with their respective spoilers and zero extension.

Actuator No. 8 was found attached to a right hand wing section. This actuator had the end fitting broken off with 6 3/8 inch ram extension. The ram was also bent approximately 10° and dented. This translates to 18 3/4 inch total extension. The measured extension indicates a 59° deployment.

Actuator No. 9 was found attached to a right hand wing section. This actuator had the end fitting broken off with 5 5/8 inch ram extension. This translates to 18 inch total extension. This extension indicates a 52° deployment.

Number 10 actuator was found completely detached with the end fitting broken off and had 2 5/8 inch (27° deployment) ram extension. The extended actuator was slightly bent.

Number 11 actuator was found completely detached with the end fitting broken off and a zero ram extension. A zero extension equals no spoiler deployment.

Actuator No. 12 was found attached to a right hand wing section. This actuator had the end fitting broken off with 4 7/8 inch ram extension and was slightly bent. This translates to 17 1/4 inch total extension. This extension indicates a 46° deployment.

Actuator No. 13 was found under a right hand wing section. The end fitting was broken off with the ram extended 1.43 inches. The ram could not be moved either in or out. Total extension would be 13.8 extension. This extension indicates a 15° deployment.

Actuator No. 14 was attached to spoiler no. 14 with 19 1/8 inch total extension. This extension

indicates a 60° deployment.

Evidence indicates that the left side spoilers were fully retracted since the majority of the hydraulic rams were found in the fully retracted position. The majority of the right side actuators were found with the rams extended and three were bent, indicating deployment of these spoilers at impact. No conclusive determination can be made based on these results alone since the actuators can change position due to the breakup forces. However, film of the wreckage sequence shows that the right spoilers are fully deployed and the left are retracted prior to impact.

Both inboard airbrake actuators were found intact in wing sections. Both of the actuators had a measured extension of 0.55 inches. Both outboard airbrake actuators were found with the linkage severally damaged from impact. The left hand was fully retracted and the right was extended 0.90 inches. The inboard actuators indicate an airbrake position of 2 or 3. The outboard actuators do not agree as one indicates 0 airbrakes and the other suggests airbrakes 3 or 4. The evidence indicates the airbrakes were probably in position 2 or 3. No firm conclusion can be made on the airbrake setting since the actuators can change position due to the impact forces.

F. FLAP SYSTEM - All four flaps, eight flap drive screws, flap drive motor and timing screw were recovered. All damage to the flaps was post impact damage and no evidence was found to indicate an inflight failure. The flap drive screws and flap drive timing screw indicate the flaps were in the fully extended position. All flap tracks were inspected and no evidence was found to indicate an inflight failure. The flaps were in the fully extended position which can be supported by film evidence. Position of cockpit flap selector could not be determined due to the extensive cockpit damage.

IV. Determination

There was no evidence to suggest there was any kind of flight control malfunction before impact with the ground. The evidence suggests the pilot was trying to roll the aircraft to the right using full right spoilers at time of impact. The airbrake was probably in the airbrakes 2 or 3 position. The flaps were in the fully extended position. The rudder was near its trim position and nearly neutral at time of impact. The horizontal stabilizer was set at 1.9 units of aircraft nose down trim. The elevator position could not be satisfactorily determined. The above findings are consistent with all the film evidence.

FREDERICK E. WILD, GS-12

Aerospace Engineer OC-ALC/LAHRH DSN 336-4445

Comm: (405) 736-4445

B52H, S/N 61-026 Class A Aircraft Mishap, 24 June 1994 ALC Investigator: Mr. Troy Maddox, OC-ALC/LPARPB

- A. Investigation and analysis of all eight engines installed on this aircraft was completed on site. None of the engines had been moved from their locations prior to my arrival at the scene. The eight engines all sustained extremely heavy impact damage to the fan sections, compressor and turbine sections. All externally mounted engine accessories were broken/torn loose from the engines and sustained severe post-impact fire damage. All eight engines were rotating in the low power, low revolution per minute (RPM) range. This is evidenced by:
 - Compressor and turbine rotor blades bent in both the direction of rotation and direction
 opposite rotation in numerous areas of the engines while absorbing the impact forces.
 - 2. Little or no ingestion of dirt and debris was evident in the combustion chambers and beyond.
 - 3. Little evidence of compressor blade interference, stator or rotor rubs, shroud rub or of high speed rotation elsewhere on any of the engines.
 - 4. All eight engine overboard compressor bleed valves were in the open position at impact and were captured in the open position by impact forces. This indicated the engines were operating in the idle (60%) to bleed valve opening (80%) range at impact.

Review of Joint Oil Analysis Program (JOAP), Engine Condition Monitoring Program (ECMP) and engine historical records revealed that no adverse wear metal trends or chronic engine operational problems existed on any of the engines prior to the mishap.

B. Conclusions:

- 1. The eight engines were capable of producing rated thrust until impact.
- 2. There is no evidence of overtemperature of any of the engines prior to impact.
- 3. There is no evidence of overspeed of any of the engines.
- 4. No maintenance discrepancies were noted during this analysis.

TROY MADDOX, GS-11

Equipment Specialist OC-ALC/LPARPB

DSN 336-5195/5196

Comm: A/C 405-736-5195/5196

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To aid in accurate identification of personnel participating in the filed flight. TOLLAND AIRSPEED 200 POINT OF DEPARTURE クスチ 4.4. CREW/PASSENGER LIST NAME AND INITIALS ETE TO ALTH ROUTIME USES: ATTACHED DISCLOSURE: HINACY ACT STATEMENT PROPOSED DEPARTURE TIME (Z) 1700 To provide data required to process llight plans with appropriate air traffic service authorities. A file is retained by the agency processing the flight plan. Voluntary; however, failure to provide the SSN could result in denial of flight plan processing. NOTAMS Corr ALTITUDE 848 WEATHER SEE PSGR MANIFEST DEPARTURE TALE AND TYPICAL WT AND BALANCE bolon RANK 10 DARG 61 ROUTE OF FLIGHT AIRCRAFT SERIAL NUMBER, UNIT, AND HOME STATION DATE 426 Pish shoutward 1588 24 Jan 94 NSS AIRCRAFT CALL SIGN 325 BS/ 1240 ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION のスチ AIRCRAFT DESG AND TO COQE , なな 4/8-52 70 8+25 313 D

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DATE: 9	4-06-24 AC	YPE: B-52	H FROM:	FAIRC	HILD AFB, WA HOME STN: FA.	HILD AFB, W	A
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CERTIFICATE OF DAMAGE

I certify that B-52H aircraft, S/N 61-026, was completely destroyed in the crash and post impact fire/breakup on Fairchild AFB, Washington, on 24 Jun 1994, and is beyond economical repair. Cost of the subject aircraft, engines, electronics and modifications to date, (IAW AFI 65-503, Attachment A10-1, dated 15 Feb 94) is 73.7 million dollars. Government property damage includes preliminary estimate of \$32,476 for repair of power substation and a preliminary estimate of \$58,950 for environmental cleanup of the crash site. See Tab O.

RICHARD A. LANE, Maj, USAF

Maintenance Member

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS 92D AIR REFUELING WING (AMC) FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON



11 July 94

TRANSCRIPT #1

(1) Subject: H/B52 Mishap

(2) Identify of The Recording Facility: Fairchild Tower (SKA)

(3) Facilities and Controller Positions and Abbreviations:

Ground Control (GC)

Outside Line (OL)

CZAR 52 (C52)

EARL 01 (E01)

Aircraft 3538 (AC 3538)

WAYLAY 02 (W02)

Transit Alert (T)

Aircraft 1452 (AC 1452)

KNIGHT 23 (N23)

Barrier Maintence (BM)

Engine Seven (Crash)

BLADE 13 (B13)

EXPO 92 (EX 92)

(4) Position Being Recorded: Position #1 (GC)

(5) Date and Time Covered by the Transcript: 24 Jun 94 2002:00-2117:30

(6) Source of Time Entries: DIGI Time with Auto Search

(7) To avoid duplication, portions of this transcript are not transcribed because the controller working the position being transcribed is monitoring another position. Transmissions that appear to be omitted are actually transcribed in the appropriate position.

(8) Certification: "As custodian of the original recording, I certify this to be a true and exact transcript."

CAROLYN J. HEYDT, Capt, USAF Commander, Airfield Operations Flight

2002:00-No Transmissions

2002:15

C52: Fairchild Ground CZAR Five Two, uh, equipment check, uh, on, uh, stub, uh, thirty-six, do you

read?

GC: CZAR Five Two Ground you're loud and clear

C52: Altimeter, uh, Sir

GC: CZAR Five Two altimeter three zero one four

C52: Three zero one four for CZAR Five Two, and, uh, we'll be, uh, VFR flight plan at, uh, on the hour

GC: CZAR Five Two roger

GC: CZAR Five Two I have your class C clearance available when ready to copy



C52: Go ahead Sir for Five Two

GC: CZAR Five Two departure frequency will be three eight four point niner, squawk zero three two zero

C52: Four nine, three eight two zero for CZAR Five Two

2003:00-No Transmissions

2004:00-No Transmissions

2005:00-No Transmissions

2006:00-No Transmissions

2007:00-No Transmissions

2008:00-No Transmissions

2008:58

W02: Ground, WAYLAY...

2009:00

W02: ...Zero Two is clear

GC: WAYLAY Zero Two welcome to Fairchild hold short of the parallel taxiway

W02: WAYLAY Zero Two

T: Roger thank you ***

T: Hey, you got customs on the way I see you got that T- Thirty-Three over here

UNK: (unreadable) Standby

GC: Transit Alert, Tower

T: Uh, Tower this is Transit on the A-Four send him down to taxiway Echo please

GC: Roger, he's an A-Ten

T: Yeah an A-Ten

GC: WAYLAY Zero Two, make a right turn on the parallel taxiway, taxi northeast bound follow me will pick you up

C 1

W02: WAYLAY Zero Two roger

2010:00-No Transmissions

2011:00-No Transmissions

2012:00-No Transmissions

2013:00-No Transmissions

2014:00-No Transmissions

2014:23

GC: Tower's on

BM: Tower this is Barrier Maintence requesting clearance to cross your active from the Oh-five Deep

Creek side barrier

GC: Barrier Maintence hold short of the runway

BM: Roger Tower, holding short ***

2014:46

GC: Barrier Maintence proceed across the runway report when off

BM: Roger Tower, proceeding across will report when off

2015:00

2015:13

BM: Tower, be advised Barrier Maintence clear of the active

GC: Barrier Maintence, roger

2016:00-No Transmissions

2017:00-No Transmissions

2017:31

GC: Transit Alert, Tower

T: Go ahead

GC: Where would you like this T-Thirty-Three?

T: Uh, Echo

GC: Roger

2018:00

C52: Ground, CZAR Five Two startin' engines stub thirty-six

GC: CZAR Five Two, roger

GC: NITE Two Three, Ground, you up?

N23: Ground, this is NITE Two Three

GC: NITE Two Three, welcome to Fairchild, make a right turn on the parallel taxiway, taxi northeast bound follow me will pick you up in about two thousand feet

N23: Two Three

AC1452: Fairchild Ground, this is aircraft Fourteen Fifty-Two

GC: Fourteen Fifty-Two, Ground

AC1452; Request, uh, hot de-fuel at this time on spot forty-five

GC: Fourteen Fifty-Two say again?

AC1452: Request hot de-fuel at this time on stub forty-five

GC: Standby

N23: And Ground, this is NITE Two Three, is it possible for us to park next to the other Canadian, uh, dude over there please?

2019:00

GC: Calling Ground, say again?

N23: Ground this is NITE Two Three, uh, wondering if we can park next to the other canadian aircraft, er, the, uh, trainer

GC: Aircraft Fourteen Fifty-Two, approved as requested, monitor this frequency, advise termination

AC 1452: Thanks

GC: NITE Two Three, standby, I'll coordinate

GC: (on Ramp net) UNK: Copy F-Five *** Transit Alert, Tower

T: Go ahead

GC: The T-Thirty-Three is requesting to be parked by the other Canadian aircraft, or is that possible?

T: Naw, well he'll be right across from the CT, but anyway (unreadable) he's gonna go with the airshow aircraft...he'll be close

GC: Roger

2020:00

2020:01

T: Hey, Transit one or two, zero

GC: NITE Two Three, Ground, continue taxiing, Transit said they'll get ya as close as possible to him

N23: Roger thanks

2021:00-No Transmissions

2022:00-No Transmissions

2023:00-No Transmissions

2024:00-No Transmissions

2025:00-No Transmissions

2026:00-No Transmissions

2026:19

GC: Tower's on

CRASH: Fairchild Tower, Seven, permission to cross your active, Delta

GC: Engine Seven, standby

CRASH: Seven's standing by

GC: Engine Seven proceed across runway, Tower will observe you off

CRASH: Understand clear to cross, Tower will observe us off

2027:00

GC: Runway's clear (talking to local)

2028:00-No Transmissions

2029:00-No Transmissions

2029:44

AC1452: Fairchild Ground, this is aircraft Fourteen Fifty-Two

GC: Fourteen Fifty-Two, Ground

AC1452: Roger, terminating hot de-fuel at this time on stub forty-five, request frequency change

GC: Frequency change approved

AC 1452: Thank you and have a nice day

GC: (unreadable)

2030:00-No Transmissions

2031:00-No Transmissions

2032:00-No Transmissions

2032:36

E01: Ground, EARL Zero One taxi

GC: EARL Zero One, taxi to runway two-three, wind two four zero at five, altimeter's three zero one four

E01: Three zero one four, EARL Zero One. Sir we'll stop short of the parallel so the bomber can get by

GC: EARL Zero One roger

GC: EARL Zero One I have a new sqwuak for your Class C clearance

E01: Zero One go ahead

2233:00

GC: EARL Zero One squawk zero three one one

E01: Zero three one one

2033:42

AC3538: Fairchild Ground, tail thirty-five thirty-eight looking for, uh, clearance for engine start, radio check and altimeter

GC: Thirty-five thiry-eight, you're loud and clear, standby engine run

AC3538: Roger

2034:00

GC: Thirty-five thirty-eight, which stub are you parked on?

AC3538: Sorry about that, we're on stub eleven

2035:00-No Transmissions

2036:00-No Transmissions

2037:00-No Transmissions

2037:25

GC: Three five three eight, Ground

AC3538: Go ahead

GC: Three Five Three Eight your engine run is approved, monitor this frequency report termination

AC3538: Oh, Three Five Three Eight, wilco

2038:00-No Transmissions

2039:00

E01: Fairchild Ground, EARL Zero One

GC: EARL Zero One, Ground

E01: Uh, yes Sir, do you have any idea how long the, uh, EXPO is gonna be in the pattern?

GC: He's full stop on this approach

E01: Copy, thank you

C 1

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2039:31

GC: EARL Zero One, we have two more proposed inbounds, one at, uh, four seven and one at five four

E01: Copy Sir, thanks, how bout after that?

GC: Nothing scheduled after that, everybody's aware of you

E01: (unreadable)

2040:00-No Transmissions

2041:00-No Transmissions

2042:00-No Transmissions

2042:30

B13: Ground, BLADE One Three

UNK: Fairchild Gr...

GC: BLADE One Three, Ground

GC: Calling Ground, say again

B13: Hanger ten oh five, uh, for engine start, we'll be local instrument pattern

GC: BLADE One Three, engine start approved your discretion, altimeter three zero one four

B13: Zero one four

EX92: EXPO Niner Two is clear the active

GC: EXPO Niner Two, Ground taxi to parking

2043:00

GC: BLADE One Three, I understand you would like to go into the instrument pattern?

B13: That's affirmative Sir, just, uh, one approach back to Fairchild

GC: BLADE One Three, roger

2044:00

2044:14

GC: BLADE One Three, Ground

B13: Go ahead

GC: BLADE One Three, you can expect all your approaches in, uh, VFR conditions, I have your Class C clearance if you'd like it

B13: BLADE One Three is ready to copy

GC: BLADE One Three, departure frequency will be three eight four point niner, squawk zero three zero seven

B13: Three eight four niner, zero three zero seven

2044:48

C52: Ground, uh, CZAR Five Two taxi, uh, VFR to Fairchild

GC: CZAR Five Two, Fairchild Ground, taxi to runway two three, wind one six zero at seven, gust one four...

2045:00

GC: ...altimeter three zero one four

C52: One four, uh, for CZAR Five Two

2045:05-No Further Transmissions

2046:00-No Transmissions

2047:00-No Transmissions

2047:43

AC3538: And Ground, this is tail number thirty-five thirty-eight terminating engine run

GC: Three five three eight, roger, frequency change approved

2047:55

B13: Ground, One Three

GC: BLADE One Three, Ground

2048:00

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B13: BLADE One Three, request frequency change to Tower for present position take off

GC: BLADE One Three frequency change approved

2049:00-No Transmissions

2050:00-No Transmissions

2051:00-No Transmissions

2052:00-No Transmissions

2053:00-No Transmissions

2053:28

C52: Ground, Fairchild Ground, CZAR Five, uh, Five Two going to Tower

GC: CZAR Five Two, Roger

E01: Zero One going to Tower

GC: EARL Zero One, roger (they're both comin' to ya ((spoken to the Local controller)))

2054:00-No Transmissions

2055:00-No Transmissions

2056:00-No Transmissions

2057:00-No Transmissions

2058:00-No Tranmissions

2059:00-No Transmissions

2100:00-No Transmissions

2101:00-No Transmissions

2102:00-No Transmissions

2103:00-No Transmissions

2104:00-No Transmissions

2105:00-No Transmissions

2106:00-No Transmissions

2107:00-No Transmissions

2108:00-No Transmissions

2109:00-No Transmissions

2110:00-No Transmissions

2111:00-No Transmissions

2112:00-No Transmissions

2113:00-No Transmissions

2114:00-No Transmissions

2115:00-No Transmissions

2116:00

2116:32

GC: He's going down, get the crash phone! (Loud Squeal)

2117:06

GC: Steve can I have the runway to cross...Fire Department...they're comin', they're comin'

2117:11

GC: Tower's on the crash net

GC: Runway crossing approved for all Fire Department and Emergency Vehicles, acknowledge



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE TEADQUARTERS 92D AIR REFUELING WING (AMC)

FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

11 July 1994

TRANSCRIPT #2

(1) Subject: H/B52 Mishap

(2) Identity of The Recording Facility: Fairchild Tower (SKA)

(3) Facilities and Controller Positions and Abbreviations:

Local Control (LC)

Spokane Approach (GEG APP)

CZAR 52 (C52)

EARL 01 (E01)

BLADE 13 (B13)

Spokane Tower (GEGT)

PINTO 21 (P21)

Charlie (CH1)

(4) Position being Recorded: Position #2 (LC)

(5) Date and Time Covered by the Transcript: 24 Jun 94 2050;00-2117:30

(6) Source of Time Entries: DIGI Time with Auto Search

(7) To avoid duplication, portions of this transcript are not transcribed because the controller working the position being transcribed is monitoring another position. Transmissions that appear to be omitted are actually transcribed in the appropriate position.

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CAROLYN & HEYET Capt USAF Commander, Airfield Operations Flight

2050:00-No Transmissions

2050:11

B13: Tower, BLADE One Three

LC: BLADE One Three, Tower

B13: Sir, BLADE One Three's on the ladder abeam hangar ten-o-five for, uh, present position takeoff

LC: BLADE One Three, roger, proceed as requested, wind one two zero at one zero

2051:00

2051:44

B13: Tower, BLADE One Three is switching to Departure

LC: BLADE One Three, maintain at or below four thousand, contact Departure

B13: (unreadable) One Three, four thousand

2052:00

2052:27

GEGT: Fairchild Tower, Spokane Tower, (garbled) approval request

LC: Tower

GEGT: Senica going to Port Angeles, uh, like to transition through your airspace VFR

LC: Approved, S-A

GEGT: O-I

2053:00

2053:37

C52: Uh, Fairchild Tower, CZAR Five Two, uh, with ya number one and, uh, how close are the two inbounds sir?

LC: CZAR Five Two Heavy, Fairchild Tower, I don't even have 'um on the screen yet

2054:00

C52: Uh, Tower CZAR Five Two, uh, ready for take off and, uh, we'd like to, the three sixty around you

LC: CZAR Five Two Heavy, taxi into position and hold for release

C52: Five Two on to hold

UNK: Tower say winds

2055:00

LC: Wind one two zero at five

UNK: Thanks

2056:00

2056:56

LC: CZAR Five Two Heavy, I'm awaiting a release from Spokane Departure, and sir if ya could, uh, maint, uh, main, er, remain on my frequency, can you monitor, uh, Departure frequency three eight four decimal niner also?

2057:09

C52: Affirmative for, uh, CZAR Five Two and, uh, EARL, uh, three eighty-four nine on the other radio

LC: CZAR Five Two Heavy, roger, continue holding

2058:00

LC: CZAR Five Two Heavy, wind one four zero at four, cleared for takeoff

LC: CZAR Five Two Heavy, Tower

C52: Five Two, did you say we're cleared for takeoff?

LC: CZAR Five Two Heavy, affirmative, wind one three zero at four, cleared for take off

C52: Ok, we"re gonna make a left three-sixty right around you and climb it up to five thousand

LC: Roger Sir, proceed as requested

C52: (unreadable) We're on the roll, Zero One

E01: Tower, EARL Zero One ready for take off

LC: EARL Zero One Heavy, roger wind one three zero at five, cleared for takeoff, caution wake turbulence

E01: EARI Zero One, we're gonna wait for CZAR to make his 360 and follow him out

LC: EARL Zero One, roger understand

2059:00

LC: EARL Zero One Heavy, wind is now one five zero at eight

E01: Zero One

2100:00

LC: CZAR Five Two Heavy, you have traffic, three miles, twelve o'clock, a dash eight, nine thousand, descending

C52: Rodg

C52: We're level five

LC: CZAR Five Two Heavy, roger

C52: EARL Zero One, you airborne yet?

LC: CZAR Five Two Heavy, company traffic is airborne

C52: (unreadable)

2101:00

C52: Zero One, Five Two, uh, we're starting our left turn back in bound, you got us in sight?

E01: (unreadable)

2102:00

LC: CZAR Five Two Heavy, do you want your max climb to twelve thousand after your next tear drop?

C52: That's affirmative

LC: Uh, roger

E01: The same for EARL Zero One sir

LC: EARL Zero One Heavy, roger

C52: Don't worry we're not gonna hit ya

LC: CZAR Five Two Heavy, after your next approach you're cleared to twelve thousand

C52: Five Two, copy

C52: Commin' around, Zero One, you got us in sight?

E01: In sight (garbled)

2103:00

C52: CZAR's level three thousand

LC: CZAR Five Two Heavy, you have traffic five miles, uh, BLADE One Three, UH-1, three thousand two hundred, he's, uh, inbound to Spokane at this time

C52: Roger, we're in a, uh, right teardrop back to you at this time

LC: CZAR Five Two Heavy, roger

C52: EARI Zero One, where are you?

GEGT: Fairchild Tower, Spokane Tower

- 113 144

LC: Fairchild

C52: Ok, Zero One push it up now (on freq. 289.6)

2104:00

GEGT: BLADE One Three is on a mile and a half final from my runway two one here, he'd like a low approach and then transition to you, er, uh, how would you like him?

LC: Uhhh, put him on a left downwind to five

GEGT: A left downwind, runway five VFR, Kilo Mike

LC: Thank you, S-A

LC: CZAR Five Two Heavy contact departure

2105:00

C52: Zero One, we're off-center (unk, unreadable)

C52: All right, Zero One we're turning back in bound to zero five at this time, I'm six thousand

2106:00

E01: Zero One's in the climb

B13: Tower, BLADE One Three

LC: BLADE One Three

LC: BLADE One Three, Tower

B13: BLADE One Three is just off the international, would like to proceed direct to the South Training

Area

LC: BLADE One, BLADE One Three, roger

E01: Zero One is, uh, topping out

E01: Turning right

C52: RA, right now on final

C52: I'm at four thousand, still on about two-twenty indicated

GEG APP: Fairchild Tower, Spokane Approach *** PINTO Two One, C-130... he's about, uh, thirty-five to the ssss, to the south, uh, west there, do you want us ta hold him out, er, how?

C1

E01: Zero One say...Five Two, say position

2107:00

C52: Uhm.. two miles off the end, off the approach end of zero five, we're level at four thousand indicating about two twenty

E01: Five Two, if I don't see you, I'll just extend my turn to final until I've got you and you're, uh, I'm pretty much abeam ya

C52: Roger

LC: CZAR Five Two Heavy, Tower

C52: Go-head

LC: Five Two Heavy, traffic is a UH-1, three miles, uh, north east of the field at this time, in bound, uh, South Training Area, he'll remain, uh, well south east of the runway

C52: Five Two copies that

C52: And Tower, Zero, uh, Five Two Heavy, we're, uh, left closed, touch and go

LC: CZAR Five Two Heavy, left closed traffic approved

2108:00-.

LC: CZAR Five Two Heavy, uh, company traffic is on five mile dog-leg

C52: Zero One, got you in sight, we're heading at you, turning to set um up

E01: Okay

2109:00

CH1: Fairchild Tower, Charlie

LC: Callin' Tower say again

CH1: Roger, uh, this is, uh, Charlie One, uh, just wondering the, uh, helicopter traffic while we have the, uh, (unreadable)

C52: Zero One, Five Two turning behind you now

LC: Charlie One that, uh, that traffic will be remaining south, uh, south east of the runway at this time, I can have him transition over to, uh, helipad five, if you like

CH1: Well, uh, as long as we can keep the safe separation between, uh, him and, uh, and the heavies, uh, during their, uh, routine, uh, that'll work, but, uh, we'll want to keep a real close eye on that

LC: Charlie One, roger

LC: BLADE One Three, sir, uh, if you could transition over to helipad five until these guys are done doin' their demonstration practice...

C52: Hey, Zero One, we're rolling out on final behind you

LC: Wind one eight zero at six

2110:00

B13: Tower, One Three

LC: BLADE One Three, Tower

B13: Sir, we'd like a Class C, we're gonna, uh, head over to, uh, Felts Field just to get out of the area. So we're not interfering with these guys

LC: BLADE One Three, roger, stand by

UNK: Maintain, uh, about a thirty degree, uh, turn here, (unreadable) degrees of bank

2111:00

LC: EARL Zero One Heavy, will this be your last teardrop?

E01: That's affirmative sir, uh, after this we'll pitch up for the touch and go

LC: Roger

E01: Touch and go and then we're gonna full stop

LC: Roger

GEG APP: Tower, Approach

LC: CZAR Five Two, will that be the same for you, one more teardrop, touch and go to a full stop?

C52: That's a negative, we'll do a touch and go and,uh, stay with you for about another thirty minutes or

LC: CZAR Five Two Heavy, roger

C52: We're gonna have to extend beyond Airway Heights here a minute.

UNK: We'll go down to two hundred feet now

ده 🎜

UNK: Whenever you get rolled out on final

UNK: I'm gonna be way the hell behind you

UNK: All righty

2112:00

E01: Zero One is two hundred feet above (unreadable)

C52: Rodg

LC: BLADE One Three, execute a left turn out, uh, proceed direct northeast bound

B13: BLADE One Three

2113:00

LC: BLADE One Three, squawk zero three zero seven

B13: Zero three zero seven, BLADE One Three, do you want us to continue northeast bound?

LC: Affirmative

UNK: In the break

C52: Lookin good there, Zero One

E01: Thanks

C52: Don't have to use (unreadable) slow down do ya

GEG APP: Tower, Approach

LC: EARL Zero One, squawk one two zero zero

E01: Zero One

E01: Unable right now, Tower

2114:00

B13: Tower, BLADE One Three

P21: Fairchild Tower, PINTO Two One

LC: PINTO Two One, Tower, stand by

LC: BLADE One Three, go ahead

B13: We'd like to amend our clearance to go to Hayford and then, ah, after Hayford returning back to Fairchild to pick up the jumpers

LC: BLADE One Three, roger

C52: I'm off to your five o'clock position, obviously I'll just wait 'til you turn in front of me

LC: EARL Zero One Heavy, confirm full stop

E01: Touch and go for EARL Zero One

LC: Roger

E01: Right base, gear down, touch and go, EARI Zero One

LC: EARI Zero One, wind two zero zero at one two, cleared touch and go

E01: Cleared touch and go, EARL Zero One

LC: PINTO Two One, Fairchild Tower, runway Two Three is in use, altimeter is three zero one two, you gonna be number three to field, traffic is Heavy B-Fifty Two turning base at this time

2115:00

P21:-PINTO Two One has, uh, both airplanes in sight, thanks

UNK: (Unreadable)

LC: BLADE One Three, frequency change approved

B13: One Three

C52: EARL Zero One, uh, we'll go by you on your left

E01: Roger

LC: PINTO Two One, will this be a full stop?

P21: PINTO Two One, affirmative

LC: Roger

C52: And Tower, Five Two, we've got Zero One in sight, we'll just adjust

LC: Roger

C52: How bout just a three sixty. ...

2116:00

C52: ...around you right now to get us some spacing?

UNK: (unreadable)

LC: CZAR Five Two Heavy roger, traffic is a C-130 approaching base leg, uh, he'll be a full stop

E01: Tower, EARL Zero One, request closed

LC: EARI Zero One Heavy, extend your upwind three miles, then closed traffic approved

E01: Three miles

2116:30

LC: EARL Zero One, uh, I need you to, uh, go North of the field and hold at or below three thousand seven hundred, five miles north of the field

E01: EARL Zero One

2117:00

LC: PINTO Two One, wind estimated two zero zero at one two, cleared to land

P21: PINTO Two One

LC: PINTO Two One, disregard that sir, I need you to go around

P21: PINTO Two One is on the go



11 July 1994

TRANSCRIPT #3

(1) Subject: H/B-52 Mishap

(2) Identity of Recording Facility: Fairchild Tower (SKA)

(3) Facilities and Controller Positions and Abbreviations:

Watch Supervisor (WS)

Flight Data (FD)

Spokane Watch Supervisor (GEG WS)

Outside Lines (OL)

Spokane Flight Data (GEG FD)

(4) Position Being Recorded: Position #4 (WS)

(5) Date and Time Covered by This Transcript: 24 Jun 94 1444:00-1456:00

(6) Source of Time Entries: DIGI Time and Search

(7) To avoid duplication, portions of this transcript are not transcribed because the controller working the position being transcribed is monitoring another position. Transmissions that appear to be omitted are actually transcribed in the appropriate position.

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CAROLYN J. HEVDT, Capt, USAF Commander, Airfield Operations Flight

1444:00

GEG FD: Tracon Data

FD: Fairchild, I just put in CZAR Five Two

GEG FD: Yeah

FD: Into the, uh, should be in the tab list over there*** He's not going to depart 'til seventeen hundred but they already called it up so I put it in. He's going to be doing an airshow practice.

GEG FD: Let's see if we got it here. I don't see it, hang on a sec*** I didn't print a strip, well it wouldn't print a strip out.

FD: Should be in the VFR, (unreadable) I'm sorry

GEG FD: You put a proposal in at seventeen hundred

SKA FD: Naw it's a VFR

GEG FD: Aw, ok, just a sec

FD: Should be in your TAB over there

GEG FD: Yeah he's in there, where's he goin'?

FD: He's gonna be VFR around Fairchild. He's gonna be doin' an airshow practice for the airshow

GEG FD: Practice for the airshow, aw ok and ah

WS: Sgt Wimsett may I help you

OL: Hi this is Lieutenant Colonel Holland over at (unreadable)

WS: How ya doin Sir?

OL: Pretty good pretty good hey we're gonna beating up the local pattern here on our oh an quasi airshow practice

WS: (laugh) Ok

OL: Starting at ah ten o'clock for about an hour

1445:03

WS: Ok

OL: And ah...

WS: Wa...what do ya need?

OL: Ok, we're gonna file VFR

WS: Right

OL: And I understand that normally the top of your airspace is about four thousand, forty-five hundred something like that.

WS: Ah, well we actually own surface to five but ah approach don't necessarily agree with us on that. But that's what it says in the book.

OL: Cause I'll tell ya wha well what we'd like to do we"re gonna take off as a cell with the tanker.

WS: Ok

OL: We being the bomber, are going to go first

WS: Uh huh

OL: We're gonna takeoff wa we're gonna come...were you here last Friday?

WS: No Sir, I was on leave last Friday.

OL: Ok we're gonna take off and we're gonna, we wanted to do a tight three hundred and sixty degree left hand turn right around you, in other words we'll takeoff get the gear up fly by the Tower and then pull up and do like a three hundred and sixty degree turn right around the Tower.

1446:00

WS: To the left?

OL: To the left

WS: Ah ok

OL: Don't worry, don't worry we won't, well we probably won't be any more than a quarter mile at the most.

WS: Yeah (unreadable)

OL: Beyond you

WS: Ok but that'll still be somethin' ... I'll have to work out.

OL: Yeah, yeah, right, right

WS: Ōk

CL: And then our profile is pretty much gonna be we'll take off first, we're gonna do a, we'd like to do a three sixty right around you and then depart off to the southwest. We would like to climb to five thousand feet

WS: That should be no problem.

OL: In the bomber, as soon as we rolled out heading southwestbound in front of the Tower, the the tanker wants to go

WS: OK

OL: And he is gonna go just a straight takeoff to the southwest, he wants to climb to six thousand feet.

WS: OK

OL: And what we're gonna do is ah off of that departure we're gonna go ah maybe about ah five miles to the southwest and then we wanna do a left hand tear drop back to zero five

1447:00

OL: And then we, being the bomber, will come first, we'll go probably about three DME off the TACAN. And then do ah, we'd like to do ah left hand teardrop back to five and the tanker will extend out to maybe about five or six DME and then he'll do a left hand tear drop back to zero five, and then we'll do uh a teardrop to five, then we'd like to do break off about midfield and then enter a uh like uh right hand teardrop back for two-three.

UNK: Andre

OL: And on the second pass which would be the the basically the first time we came by on two-three we'd like to get uh if at all possible clearance up to about twelve thousand feet.

WS: Ok, on the second pass

OL: The second pass on two-three, we gonna take off on two-three

WS: Ok (unreadable) let me read this back and

OL: (Laughter)

WS: Let's see if I can, you're gonna depart initially, do a left hand three sixty around the Tower, roll out about mid-field, at that point the KR-35 is gonna roll

OL: Right

1448:00

WS:-He's gonna go out, you're gonna make your teardrop back to five at three DME at five thousand, he's gonna make his at six

OL: Right

WS: He's gonna do it at about five DME, both of you are gonna make a low pass over to

OL: Right

WS: Runway five

OL: Right

WS: And execute another right hand teardrop back to runway two-three

OL: Correct

WS: And at that time you're gonna be requesting twelve thousand on that climb

OL: That's right, we're gonna come through first and do our climb to twelve and then uh he's gonna be behind us, probably uh thirty seconds or so, and then he's gonna come in about the same mid field, and then he's gonna go to twelve.

WS: Ok, now on your first teardrop to runway five what are you gonna roll out as an altitude, when you pull back up to your uh to execute your right teardrop to two-three?

OL: Okay well we won't go above uh maybe three thousand feet

WS: That won't be a problem then

OL: We won't come, we won't get above your, ya know just like what we'll probably do is all the teardrops

WS: That's all yeah you don't (unreadable)

OL: The height of the teardrop will be the traffic pattern altitude. Say thirty-seven hundred feet

WS: Ok

OL: And then after the climb out, we'll be climbing to twelve thousand feet heading off to the southwest

WS: Right

OL: Then as soon as we get level at twelve...

1449:00

OL: ...we'll start uh a uh, pretty much a descending teardrop back to zero five and for us, the B-Fifty Two, we're gonna come through like at four thousand feet, just do like an overhead pattern, and the tanker, when we are just about, if you can visualize this, when we're on the downwind in overhead pattern; the tanker should be just about over the threshold, for zero five doing a altitude ya know landing altitude demo.

WS: Ok

OL: And then we will follow, we will roll out behind him and we will both break off to the left and do another right teardrop to two-three and then we will come in, and he'll pitch up and they'll probably do a touch and go, and then we'll pitch up and do a touch and go, and the for all practical purposes then we're separated from then on for about the next hour or so and we'll just be out there dorkin' off

WS: Ok

OL: (Laughter)

WS: Sound's like it's gonna be fun

OL: Yeah, and the other thing is if you could check with uh Approach and tell 'em that uh...

1450:00

OL: ...on a lot of these stunts we'll be exceeding two hundred and, uh, traffic, and, uh, traffic pattern here and, uh, we'll be let's see what else, and on a couple of 'em we'll be like about three-fifty indicated on the pull-ups

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, is

WS: Ok

OL: And if they got any heartburn with that let us know

WS: Ok, Sir where's a good number I can reach you at?

OL: (Laughter) And, uh, like I say we'll be, we'll be out there, we'll shoot on about a ten o'clock take off

local

WS: Ok, Sir

OL: Hey, thanks a lot

WS: Do you got a phone number I can reach you at Sir?

OL: Right now we're just at Base Ops

WS: Oh, Ok

OL: You've got a hot line to Base Ops

WS: Oh yeah, oh yeah

OL: We'll be here probably we'll be at Base Ops for another forty-five minutes or so

WS: -Ok, OK, Sir

OL: Ok, Thanks

WS: Uh huh

OL: Bye

WS: Bye

WS: Well they did it last year too

1451:00

GEG WS: Spokane's Sup's desk

WS: Yeah, how ya doin' this is Sgt Wimsett Watch Sup over here at Fairchild

GEG WS: Yep

WS: Yeah how ya doin' today

GEG WS: Good

WS: I, um got a special request...Colonel Holland just called me, he's the pilot of the B-Fifty Two who's gonna be flyin' the Demo on Sunday (unreadable)

GEG WS: CZAR Five Two

WS: Yeah

GEG WS: Yeah

WS: He's going up this morning to practice

GEG WS: Yeah we got a, I think we put him in the tab already

WS: Yeah, ok, what he wants to do, I'll try and break this down quickly and as easy as I can for you, he wants to depart runway two-three, which is what we're landing right now, he's gonna do a left turn three left hand, three-sixty right here in the pattern, make a loop around the base of the Tower, or around the Tower cab, roll back out on downwind in front of the Tower and then he's gonna depart runway two-three, and what's gonna happen at that point is the KR-Thirty-Five is gonna request to depart at the same time

GEG WS: Ok

WS: So basically he's gonna be about mid field airborne, and the KR-Thirty-Five is gonna start his departure roll

GEG WS: Ok

WS: The B-Fifty-Two is going to climb to five thousand, go out to about three DME...

1452:00

WS: ...and execute a teardrop back to runway five and the KR-Thirty-Five is gonna go out to about five to six DME and do the same thing at six thousand, execute a teardrop back to runway five

GEG WS: Ok

WS: Ok, and after they have done that

GEG WS: They gonna stay with you on all this

WS: Well, they can if you want them if you want 'em, if you want me to keep 'em on my frequency I can do that if you want to take the pointout

GEG WS: Yeah

WS: Now if he's gonna go out to almost six DME he's gonna be actually out of the Tower airspace, but...

GEG WS: Yeah that's right

WS: You know, if I, if I can, if you want me to work 'em on the frequency I can, ya know reference your traffic

GEG WS: I think, uh, at the time why don't you coordinate and, uh, see what,...

WS: Ok

GEG WS: ...if we want to work him or not

WS: Okay, let me finish telling ya what else he wants to do here...okay, well now after he's done his teardrop back to runway five he'll be doin' uh, the same thing just basically here in the Tower pattern... executing uh, another one-eighty teardrop to runway two-three, so basically he's gonna break it off at the approach end of five...

1453:00

WS: ...execute a right teardrop back to runway 23

GEG WS: Does he have to make a right teardrop?

WS: Well it won't be, it'll be in our airspace, it'll be north of the airport, it'll be actually be like just like a normal-closed-traffic pattern here in the Tower

GEG WS: If he's going to five it seems like a right teardrop, a right turn on the missed

WS: Ok, oh

GEG WS: You mean...

WS: What he's gonna do is just like a circling approach, same thing basically

GEG WS: Ok

WS: A circling approach to the north

GEG WS: Ok

WS: Ok after he does that that's when he's request a max climb up to twelve thousand and obviously we'll have to coordinate that

GEG WS: Yeah

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WS: As soon as he is requesting it, as soon as we see him turnin', probably right base out there to two-three we'll be callin you for release and the climb to twelve

GEG WS: Yeah

WS: Which, well, really isn't that unusual because it'll be just like a normal departure

GEG WS: Yeah

WS: Yeah, you know just climbin' up to twelve thousand

GEG WS: Now this is with both of them, right?

WS: Right, this will be with both aircraft, now he's gonna after that obviously we'll be shipping him to your frequency if he's gonna climin' that high we don't need to be talking to him

GEG WS: Yeah

WS: And then he wants to go out to five or six, seven, eight miles, he said and do another teardrop...

1454:00

WS: ...back to runway five, so basically what he's doin' is, ya know, makin' Curly Cues to either end of the runway

GEG WS: Makin' what?

WS: Well, what do you call 'em, wooferdils, wooferdils I think these guys call 'em there, like left ninety, right two-seventies to the runway, only he is doing 'em a little wider, he's doin' 'em you know at seven or eight miles, usually they do them right here within our pattern but

GEG WS: Yeah ok

WS: Ok

GEG WS: They'll go up to twelve out to five to eight DME and drop back to runway Five

WS: Right

GEG WS: Stay with you again then after that

WS: No, and then after that he'll do one more teardrop to two-three and at that point him and the KR Thirty-Five will split up and they will be doin' whatever they're gonna be doin' on the last hour that they're up on their own, they will be separate. They will not be a flight anymore

GEG WS: Ok

WS: Ok (unreadable), Sir a lot of the stuff that he's gonna be doing here in the Tower pattern he's gonna be exceeding the two hundred fifty knots.

GEG WS: Yeah

WS: Ok?

1455:00

WS: And then when he does his pull-up on his climb to twelve he will probably be exceeding three hundred fifty knots, when he does that

GEG WS: Ok

WS: And he told me to find out if y'all don't have any problem with that

GEG WS: Well, I don't think so

WS: Yeah didn't ya know he (laughter)...Like I said I'll call you back. He's planning on departin' at ten o'clock so I'll call you back probably about nine thirty when he starts taxiing out.

GEG WS: Ok

WS: All right and we'll try and get some of that set into motion for him

GEG WS: Ok

WS: All right Sir

GEG WS: Ok, I'll try and, uh, brief the west controller on all of this

WS: Yeah, a lot of it I think will be done right here in the Tower pattern, uh the things that are going to affect you the most will be when he's executing those teardrops back to runway five

GEG WS: Yeah

WS: Cause if you guys got departure traffic commin' off twenty-one

GEG WS: Well if he's out there, you know, if he's out five or six miles and he doesn't make too vide a turn

WS: Right...

GEG WS: It, it shouldn't affect us that much

WS: Yeah

GEG WS: You know, the climb to twelve we'll need to coordinate that

C1 •

WS: Right

GEG WS: So that we can keep people out of the way

1456:00

WS: Ok

GEG WS: And, uh, other than that I think we should be able to work with 'em

WS: Ok Sir

GEG WS: All right

WS: All right

GEG WS: Thanks for calling

WS: D-W

GEG WS: Bye



ADQUARTERS 92D AIR REFUELING WING (AMC) FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

11 July 1994

TRANSCRIPT #4

(1) Subject: H/B52 Mishap

- (2) Identity of The Recording Facility: Fairchild Tower (SKA)
- (3) Facilities and Controller Positions and Abbreviations:

Watch Supervisor (WS) Base Ops (BOPS)

- (4) Position Being Recorded: Position #4 (WS)
- (5) Date and Time covered by the transcript: 24 Jun 94 1529:30-1530:30
- (6) Source of Time Entries: DIGI Time and Search
- (7) To avoid duplication, portions of this transcript are not transcribed because the controller working the position being transcribed is monitoring another position. Transmissions that appear to be omitted are actually transcribed in the appropriate position.

(8) Certification: "As custodian of the original recording, I certify this to be a true and exact transcript."

CAROLYN LATE Commander, Airfield Operations Flight

1529:30

WS: Tower

BOPS: Hey it's Lieutenant Colonel Holland again and now I'm on change three I guess

WS: Ok-

BOPS: It looks like our takeoff now is gonna be slipped until two o'clock this afternoon

WS: Ok

BOPS: What they want to do is, I think they tried to screw us over totally and get us trying to fly when all of the transients in the world are tryin' to get in here.

WS: Right

BOPS: (Laughter) But anyway that's, that's the game plan right now, two o'clock.

WS: All right Sir

BOPS: So talk to you later

WS: Thanks

BOPS: Thanks

WS: Bye



11 July 94

TRANSCRIPT #5

(1) Subject: H/B52 Mishap

(2) Identity of The Recording Facility: Fairchild Tower (SKA)

(3) Facilities and Controller Positions and Abbreviations:

Watch Supervisor (WS)

Spokane Watch Supervisor (GEG WS)

Spokane Tower (GEGT)

Spokane Approach (GEG APP)

Flight Data (FD)

(4) Position Being Recorder: Position #4 (WS)

(5) Date and Time covered by the Transcript: 24 Jun 94 2050:00-2117:30

(6) Source of Time Entries: DIGI Time with Auto Search

(7) To avoid duplication, portions of this transcript are not transcribed because the controller working the position being transcribed is monitoring another position. Transmissions that appear to be omitted are actually transcribed in the appropriate position.

(8) Certification: "As custodian of the original recording, I certify this to be a true and exact transcript."

CAROLYN J. HEYDAY. Capt. USAF Commander, Airfield Operations Flight

2050:00-No Transmissions

2051:00-No Transmissions

2052:00-No Transmissions

2052:28

GEG TWR: Fairchild Tower, Spokane Tower

GEG APP: Fairchild, Approach

LC: Tower (speaking to GEG TWR)

WS: Go ahead (Speaking to GEG APP)

GEG APP: Would like to go through the north side of your airspace with that seven three bravo there, about two north of Geiger

WS: Yeah, sure

GEG APP: Thanks

WS: Delta Whiskey

2053:00-No Transmissions

2054:00-No Transmissions

2054:09

WS: Line clear

GEG APP: Approach

WS: Yeah, Fairchild Tower, request release Class C for CZAR Five Two Heavy *** and EARL Zero One

Heavy

GEG APP: Ok I will call you back

WS: Delta Whiskey

2055:00-No Transmissions

2055:49

WS: Fairchild Tower

GEGWS: Yeah this, uh, the supervisor over here

WS: Okay

GEG WS: Er, whh, reference BLADE One Three there, wh, we're not gonna, whh, run him in on the

approach with these other guys goin'

WS: Right, right, that's fine

GEG WS: You want us to hold him 'til...

WS: Yeah

2056:00

WS: Hold him and tell him why he's holding out, I've already talked to the aircrast commander and told him this was a possibility *** yah, cause they pack these guys so close together on their practices here

GEG WS: Ok, we've got another guy off there, just, uh, west of ya anyway, we can't let him go at this moment so you want to let us, uh, run that BLADE in on a short turn-on?

2056:18

WS: Uh, naw, I'd rather have ya hold him out, really, uhh, who you talking bout, seven three zero?

GEG WS: Yeah

WS: Mmm kay, and he's west bound

GEG WS: Yeah, he's west bound

WS: Ok, now you know CZAR Five Two on this when he initially departs is gonna do a left three-sixty around our Tower here, over the South Training Area, remaining with...

GEG WS: Ok left tear drop back

WS: Right remaining within like a half a mile of our runway

GEG WS: Ok yeah we're... we didn't know exactly how close he, buh

WS: Yeah, we've already told him that

GEG WS: Ok

WS: I told him that when he called me this morning, he's gonna keep it pretty tight, cause ya know that, that conflicts with your traffic pattern

GEG WS: Ok but then he's gonna come back on a two three head, zero...

WS:-Right then he'll be commin' off runway heading, he, he, uh...

GEG WS: Yeah, and the tanker ...

WS: Right, do you want us ta keep 'em on our frequency while he's doin' that?

GEG WS: Is he gonna remain within five miles or so?

2057:00

WS: Pretty close, he said he was gonna go to about three and that the tanker is gonna go to about six

GEG WS: Ok, just a minute

WS: Ok ***

GEG WS: ***Just a minute

WS: Mm kay

GEG WS: Ok, uh, ya, you don't have any problem with that seven three zero and seven three Bravo out there to the southwest, (unreadable) the Buff's released then

WS: Uh, ok, and do you, we're gonna have him...

<u>C.</u>1

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2058:00

WS: ...monitor your frequency three eight four nine just in case you have ta give him a pop up traffic advisory

GEG WS: Ok

WS: All right

GEG WS: But you will be talkin' to him (unreadable)

WS: That's affirmative

GEG WS: Ok we'll take the point out on him then

WS: All right, sir

GEG WS: Dee Kay

WS: Delta Whiskey

2059:00-No Transmissions

2100:00-No Transmissions

2102:00-No Transmissions

2102:16

WS: Line clear *** (unreadable)

GEG APP: Approach

WS: Okay, uh, CZAR Five Two?

GEG WS: Yep

WS: Commin' off the, uh, first tear drop, he's on his second teardrop now to two three lookin' for a max climb to one two thousand ***

GEG APP: Yep, go ahead

WS: Thank you, Delta Whiskey, and he'll be commin' to you after this one

GEG APP: That's fine D-K

C1 -

2103:00

2103:12

WS: Line clear

GEG APP: Approach

WS: Okay, and, uh, EARL will be following CZAR Five Two as a flight, both goin' to twelve

GEG APP: The splat there

WS: Both climbing to twelve with yer approval

GEG APP: Yeah, uh, that's approved and, oh...

WS: Ok

GEG WS: Confirm that CZAR Five Two is the splat there

WS: Heh, heh, heh, yeah, he's the one turning base right now

GEG APP: Ok, Dee Kay

WS: Delta Whiskey

2104:00-No Transmissions

2105:00-No Transmissions

2106:00-No Transmissions

2106:40

GEG APP: Fairchild Tower, Spokane Approach

WS: Go ahead

GEG APP: Yeah, we got a PINTO Two One, C-130, he's bout, uh, thirty-five to the south, uh, west there. Do you want us to hold him out, er, how long till these guys are through?

WS: Ok, my understanding was this will be their last teardrops to runway five, after this they'll make one teardrop to two three and then normal departure back to you, so they should be able...

2107:00

WS: ...to just come in bound

GEG APP: OK, one teardrop to, uh, two three after this, or...

WS: Right, right off of this approach, in other words he's gonna do a, basically a circling to two three...

GEG APP: Ok, both aircraft's...

WS: With both aircraft's, uh, then come back to you, uh, then they're done with their stuff

GEG APP: Ok, do you know what they're gonna want when they come back to us?

WS: Uh, just normal pattern work

GEG APP: Ok, thanks, Dee Kay

GEG APP: Yep, Delta Whiskey

2108:00-No Transmissions

2109:00-No Transmissions

2110:00-No Transmissions

2111:00-No Transmissions

2111:15

GEG APP: Tower, Approach

WS: Go ahead

GEG APP: Yeh, reference, uh, CZAR and EARL there, you can release that BLADE One Three to, uh,

Felts Field

WS: Ok, thank you

GEG APP: Was, was he just goin' to Felts, or is he gonna do his parachute drop thing?

WS: Na, well he's just gonna go over to Felts and get out of the airspace for a little while

GEG APP: Ah, ok

WS: So, so these guys can finish up, then he'll probably be back over in a little bit to do his para drops.

GEG APP: Okay

WS: All right sir, Delta Whiskey

2112:00

2112:03

GEG APP: Ok, eh, they're gonna maintain at or below five, is that correct?

FD: Affirmative, ahh

GEG APP: That's for approaches right?

WS: No, they're, uh, I think they're gonna, er, stay with us the remainder of the time, standard traffic

GEG APP: They're gonna stay with you, then?

WS: That's what it sounds like

GEG APP: Okay

WS: EARL's only gonna do one more approach too, then he's full stoppin' and I think CZAR Five Two is gonna stay with us, standard traffic

GEG APP: Okay

WS: Standard traffic

GEG-APP: When we get that PINTO, then we'll just run him in, he's a gonna be a visual approach, er, correction, he's VFR

WS: Okay

GEG APP: Just run him in for downwind there for runway two three, then

WS: To two three, affirmative

GEG APP: Okay

WS: Delta, uh, and thank you very much for you guys' help

GEG APP: Sure

WS: Delta Whiskey

2113:00

2113:46

GEG APP: Tower, Approach

WS: Go ahead

GEG APP: PINTO, uh, Two One has, uh, both the, uh, Buff and the tanker in sight, uh, we'll just send him to you and you can call his base leg.

WS: Ok, sir dat'l work, thank you very much

2114:00

2114:18

GEG APP: Spokane

WS: Ok, PINTO, or excuse me, BLADE One Three is commin' to ya now, just wants to go to Hayford,, hold there till these guys are done, then he's gonna back and pick up the jumpers

GEG APP: He wants to go where?

WS: To Hayford...just hold at Hayford drop zone

GEG APP: Okay

WS: Ok sir? Delta Whiskey

2115:00-No Transmissions

2116:00-No Transmissions

2116:18

WS: Tower, Tower

GEGT: Tower

WS: Ok, I got a B-Fifty Two executing a left closed and he's staying within about a quarter of a mile of the runway

GEGT: Ok, my airspace is yours

WS: All right, Delta Whiskey

2117:00-No Transmissions

2117:30-No Transmissions, only phone rings



11 July 1994

TRANSCRIPT #6

(1) Subject: H/B52 Mishap

(2) Identity of The Recording Facility: Fairchild Tower (SKA)

(3) Facilities and Controller Positions and Abbreviations:

Flight Data (FD)

Base Ops (BOPS)

Central Security Control (CSC)

Watch Supervisor (WS)

Spokane Approach (GEG APP)

Fire Department (CRASH)

- (4) Position Being Recorded: Position #3 (FD)
- (5) Date and Time Covered by The Transcript: 24 June 94 2058:00-2117:30
- (6) Source of time Enteries: DIGI Time with Auto Search
- (7) To avoid duplication, portions of this transcript are not transcribed because the controller working the position being transcribed is monitoring another position. Transmissions that appear to be omitted are actually transcribed in the appropriate position.

(8) Certification: "As custodian of the original recording, I certify this to be a true and exact transcript."

CAROLYN J. HEYDT Capt, USAF Commander, Airfield Operations Flight

2058:00-No Transmissions (Dialing Sounds)

2058:51-

CSC: Sgt Black

FD: Yeah hey let the guys in the W-S-A know that the bomber is doin' his thing now

CSC: Okay

FD: All right, R-K

2059:00-No Transmissions

2100:00-No Transmissions

2101:00-No Transmissions

2102:00-No Transmissions

2103:00-No Transmissions

2104:00-No Transmissions

2105:00-No Transmissions

2106:00-No Transmissions

2106:21

BOPS: Ops

FD: Yeah, hey we got, uh, two departure, at five eight with, er... CZAR Five Two with EARL Zero One

BOPS: Thank you, M-E

FD: I'm just callin' in now, R-K

BOPS: And I have an inbound

FD: Go ahead

BOPS: Moose One

FD: Moose?

BOPS: Moose

FD: What is it?

BOPS: F- Five, Twenty-One (unreadable) Three

FD: Twenty what?

BOPS: Forty-Three, Twenty-One Forty-Three

FD: Thank you

BOPS: You're welcome

FD: R-K

BOPS: M-E

2107:00-No Transmissions

2108:00-No Transmissions

2109:00-No Transmissions

2110:00-No Transmissions

2110:02

FD: Line Clear

GEG APP: Approach

FD: Fairchild, BLADE One Three would like to go, uh, on his Class C Departure to Felts Field, can I get

a clearance, can I just get a heading for him?

GEG APP: Ahh, ok, uh, reference your...

FD: We'd like to go east if we could

GEG APP: Well

FD: Or northeast

GEG APP: Let, let me call you right back

FD: R-K

2111:00 See Transcript #5

FD: Approach, Fairchild

GEG APP: Approach

FD: Yeah, BLADE One Three, is he released northeast bound?

GEG APP: Affirmative

FD: R-K

GEG APP: He is released and, uh, BLADE, or, correction, CZAR Five Two and, uh, EARL Zero One

2112:00

FD: Affirmative

GEG APP: Ok, uh, they're gonna maintain at or below five is that correct?

FD: Affirmative

GEG APP: Commin off, that's for approaches right?

WS: No they're, I think they're gonna stay with us the remainder of the time, standard traffic

GEG APP: They're gonna stay with you then?

WS: That's what it sounds like, EARL's only gonna do (cut off) see Transcript #5

2113:00-No Transmissions

2114:00-No Transmissions

2114:01

FD: Tower

CRASH: Fairchild Tower, Seven, permission to your cross active, Delta

FD: Engine Seven, hold short

Crash: Seven's holding short

2115:00-No Transmissions

2116:00-No Transmissions

2116:30-See Transcript #7



11 July 1994

TRANSCRIPT #7

(1) Subject: H/B52 Mishap

(2) Identity of The Recording Facility: Fairchild Tower (SKA)

(3) Facilities and Controller Positions and Abbreviations:

Flight Data (FD)
Fire Department (Crash)
Base Ops (BOPS)

Hospital (H)

(4) Position Being Recorded: Crash Phone #2

(5) Date and Time Covered by The Transcript: 24 Jun 94 2116:30-2118:00

(6) Source of time Entries: DIGI Time With Auto Search

(7) To avoid duplication, portions of this transcript are not transcribed because the controller working the position being transcribed is monitoring another position. Transmissions that appear to be omitted are actually transcribed in the appropriate position.

(8) Certification: "As custodian of the original recording, I certify this to be a true and exact transcript."

CAROLYN J. HEYDR Capt, USAF Commander, Airfield Operations Elight

2116:00

2116:35

FD: This is Fairchild Tower with a...this is Fairchild Tower with a crash...uh...Fairchild Tower with a ground emergency, type aircraft Heavy B Fifty-Two, call sign: CZAR Five Two...nature of the Emergency: the aircraft is on the ground...Location: approximately, uh, two thousand feet behind the Tower right next to the W-S-A...runway two three in use...persons on board, unknown...fuel, no...unknown... no dangerous cargo...wind direction, uh, two zero, two one zero at one one...uh, any questions crash?

2117:26

CRASH: No, no questions

FD: No questions, any questions Base Ops?

BOPS: Negative, XRAY, XRAY

FD: Any questions hospital?

H: What is wrong with the aircraft?

FD: The aircraft has crashed approximately 2000 feet behind the Tower

H: Okay

FD: Any questions?

H: No, no questions

FD: R-K, R-K in the Tower secure the net.

USAF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT INDEX TAB FORM

Δ Δ	F FORM 71	1 -	USAF	MISHAP	REP	ORT
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- C AF FORM 711b AIRCRAFT MISHAP REPORT
- D AF FORM 711c AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL REPORT
- G FLIGHT AND PERSONNEL RECORDS
- H AFTO FORMS 781
- I MATERIAL DEFICIENCY REPORTS
- J TECHNICAL AND ENGINEERING EVALUATIONS OF MATERIAL (DOD)
- K DD FORM 175, MILITARY FLIGHT PLAN
- L DD FORM 365F, WEIGHT AND BALANCE CLEARANCE FORM F TACTICAL
- M CERTIFICATE OF DAMAGE
- N TRANSCRIPTS OF RECORDED COMMUNICATIONS
- O ANY ADDITIONAL SUBSTANTIATING DATA REPORTS
- Q ORDERS APPOINTING INVESTIGATING BOARD
- R DIAGRAMS (FALLOUT-IMPACT AREA)
- S PHOTOGRAPHS
- T INDIVIDUAL FLIGHT RECORDS
- V TESTIMONY AND STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES
- W WEATHER OBSERVATIONS
- X STATEMENTS OF INJURY OR DEATH
- Y DOCUMENTS APPOINTING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD
- Z PHOTOGRAPHS NOT INCLUDED IN PART I OF SAFETY REPORT
- AA SUPPORTING ADDITIONAL DATA

TAB O INDEX

1	Preliminary	Assessment	Of Governmen	nt Damage
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- 2. Labatory Results Of Maintenance Fluid Samples
- 3. Soil Composition Report





DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS 92D SUPPORT GROUP (ACC) FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

14 July 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR 92 BW/SIB

FROM: 92 CES/CEO

SUBJECT: Estimate for Government Property Damage on Fairchild AFB as a Result of the B-52 Crash

- 1. The attached estimate is for damage found at the South Substation as a result of the B-52 crash on 24 June 1994. It should be noted that the South Substation has not yet been energized since the crash. We have done extensive testing of major pieces of the substation; however it is very difficult to know if the substation has damage that cannot be found through testing. After the substation is energized we will know the complete situation. This cost estimate does not take into account any damage that might be found after the substation is energized.
- 2. Direct any questions to Rex Belleville, 92 CES/CEOE, ext. 75468.

IRVIN B. LEE, Major, USAF Chief, Operations Flight

1 Attachment:
Cost Estimate

h Prog. Ss This Item is

Intended For:

Author: Scott D. Whittaker

Subject: Estm Enviro Cost B-52

Listed are the estimated environmental cleanup cost associated with the B-52 crash on 24 June 94. The estimate is purely speculative because the extent, amount, and type of hazard has not been identified. Previous crash site have revealed that very little of the crash debris results in a hazardous waste. Assuming that some fuel contaminated soils exist, disposal cost is \$65/Ton, estm. 30 tons and \$1950. Sampling cost is estm. at \$1350/sample 20 samples or \$27,000. other hazardous waste disposal cost is estimated at \$750/55 gal drum and 40 drums or \$30,000. Total estimated cost would be about \$58,950. This is only an estimate, and only addresses disposal and sampling cost, no labor, monitoring, or supply cost are factored into this estimate.

	CONSTRUCTION COST ESTIMATE B	ST ESTIM		REAKDOWN	z		OMB No. 0704-0193	0193		
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING AF FORM 3052

Col 1 Item. Description of materials required, work to be done, special equipment needed, etc. Breakdown should be in sufficient detail to permit itemizing of all direct costs.

Col 2 Unit of Measure. Description of the unit in which each item is to be estimated (examples-square yards-SY, oubic yards-CY, square feet-SF, linear feet-LF, board feet-BF, each-EA, pound-LB).

Col 3 Quantity. Contractor's estimate of quantity required in terms of unit of measure (column 2). Items and units of measure will be furnished by the Government. Quantity estimates will be furnished by the Government only when it is anticipated that a unit price contract will be issued. Otherwise, the contractor is responsible for determining quantity estimates.

Col 4 and 5 Material Costs. Enter unit cost (Col 4) of material to be supplied and total cost (col 5) for item listed in column 1.

Col 6, 7 and 8 Labor Costs. Enter in col 6 the estimated number of manhours or mandays needed to perform the work listed in column 1. Enter in col 7 the average rate per manhour (manday) and in col 8 the total labor cost.

Col 9 Other Direct Costs. Enter estimated costs of special equipment and other items (listed in column 1) which are special to the contract and of significant dollar value.

Col 10 Line Total. Self-explanatory.

NOTE: In addition to other totals entered on various pages, the grand total of column 10, plus overhead and profit will be shown on the last page as follows.

TOTAL MATERIAL COSTS		\$
TOTAL LABOR COSTS		\$
TOTAL OTHER DIRECT COSTS		\$
TOTAL DIRECT COSTS		\$
OVERHEAD	%	\$
SUBTOTAL	•	\$
PROFIT	%	\$
TOTAL PRICE		\$
DATE		FIRM NAME
TITLE	 .	3Y(Signature)

INSTRUCTIONS TO OFFERORS

- 1. The purpose of this form is to provide a standard format by which the offeror submits to the Government a summary of incurred and estimated costs (and arrached supporting information) suitable for detailed review and analysis. Prior to the award of a contract resulting from this proposal the offeror shall, under the conditions stated in ASPR 3-807.3, be required to submit a certificate of current cost or pricing data (see ASPR 3-807.3(e) and 3-807.4).
- 2. In addition to the specific information required by this form, the offeror is expected, in good faith, to incorporate in and submit with this form any additional data, supporting schedules, or substantiation which are reasonably required for the conduct of an appropriate review and analysis in the light of the specific facts of this procurement. For effective negotiations, it is essential that there be a clear understanding of
 - a. The existing, verifiable data.
 - b. The judgmental factors applied in projecting from known data to the estimate, and
 - c. The contingencies used by the offeror in his proposed price.

In short, the offeror's estimating process itself needs to be disclosed.

- 3. When attachment of supporting cost or pricing data to this form is impracticable, the data will be described (with schedules as appropriate), and made available to the contracting officer or his authorized representative upon request.
- 4. By submission of this proposal the offeror grants to the contracting officer, or his authorized representative, the right to examine, for the purpose of verifying the cost or pricing data submitted, those books, records, documents and other supporting data which will permit adquate evaluation of such cost or pricing data, along with the computations and projections used therein. This right may be exercised in connection with any negotiations prior to contract award.

		CONSTRUCTION COST ESTIMATE	ST ESTIM		BREAKDOWN	2		OMB No. 0704.0193	.0193		
8	CONTRACTOR	CTOR				ADDRESS	ESS	expires 31 October 1989	oher 1989		
8	NTRA	CONTRACT FOR /Work to be performed									
<u> </u>	沟	LE AT	CRASH SETE	15 H	72			PROPOSED TOT	PROPOSED TOTAL CONTRACT PRICE	10.6	
ž.	IRCHA!		- 	PROJECT N	E SE			WORK LOCATION	N. C. DAT	1	
					MAT	MATERIAL COST		LABOR COSTS	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	3	
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		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(2)	(9)	(2)	(8)	<u> </u>) 5
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AF Form 3052, JAN 88

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING AF FORM 3052

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Col 10 Line Total. Self-explanatory.

NOTE: in addition to other totals entered on various pages, the grand total of column 10, plus overhead and profit will be shown on the last page as follows.

TOTAL MATERIAL COSTS	s				
TOTAL LABOR COSTS	\$				
TOTAL OTHER DIRECT COSTS	\$				
TOTAL DIRECT COSTS	, 91,426				
OVERHEAD 15 %	<u>s_13,714</u>				
SUBTOTAL	\$				
PROFIT	s <u>9,143</u>				
TOTAL PRICE	<u>: //4, 283</u>				
DATE 14 JUY 1994	FIRM NAME FATPCHTAD AFR				
TITLE CLECTRICAL PAULINCERS (Signature)					
(5.6,2.1)					
INSTRUCTIONS TO OFFERORS					

- 1. The purpose of this form is to provide a standard format by which the offeror submits to the Government a summary of incurred and estimated costs (and arrached supporting information) suitable for detailed review and analysis. Prior to the award of a contract resulting from this proposal the offeror shall, under the conditions stated in ASPR 3-807.3, be required to submit a certificate of current cost or pricing data (see ASPR 3-807.3(e) and 3-807.4).
- 2. In addition to the specific information required by this form, the offeror is expected, in good faith, to incorporate in and submit with this form any additional data, supporting schedules, or substantiation which are reasonably required for the conduct of an appropriate review and analysis in the light of the specific facts of this procurement. For effective negotiations, it is essential that there be a clear understanding of
 - The existing, verifiable data. a.
 - The judgmental factors applied in projecting from known data to the estimate, and b.
 - The contingencies used by the offeror in his proposed price.

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- 3. When attachment of supporting cost or pricing data to this form is impracticable, the data will be described (with schedules as appropriate). and made available to the contracting officer or his authorized representative upon request.
- 4. By submission of this proposal the offeror grants to the contracting officer, or his authorized representative, the right to examine, for the purpose of verifying the cost or pricing data submitted, those books, records, documents and other supporting data which will permit adquate evaluation of such cost or pricing data, along with the computations and projections used therein. This right may be exercised in connection with any negotiations prior to contract award.

0 - 7

AIRCRAFT 61-026 CRASH SITE

FLUID COLLECTION DATA

Sample #1: Engine driven hydraulic pump #1272

- 84 inches due south from power box B424 on northern end of site

Sample #2: Fuel control JFC2514

- 75 inches north east of power box B424

- Part power stopped

- Sample taken from a severed fuel tube in the vertical position

Sample #3: Fuel transmitter, serial number AF-60-T-12087

- 54 inches southwest from power pole f1, 9 north end of site

Sample #4: Hydraulic reservoir

- Due east of power box B424

NOTE: All engine oil reservoirs appear to be empty, no oil sample collected

Fluid Samples From Servicing Carts

- 1. Hydraulic Service Cart #1
- 2. Hydraulic Service Cart #2
- 3. Hydraulic Service Cart #4
- 4. Hydraulic Service Cart #5
- 5. Hydraulic Service Cart #6
- 6. Oil Service Cart #1
- 7. Oil Service Cart #2
- 8. Fuel Truck 91L-55
- 9. LOX Storage Tank #104
- 10. LOX Service Cart #10

Submitter's Sample No: 40-2035

Lab Report No: 94-F-1607

USAF Aerospace Fuels Laboratory

Det 35, SA-ALC/SFTLD 10 Park Ave C Bldg 1 Mukilteo WA 98275-1618

Contract No: Batch/Lot No: NSN: 9130-

Quantity Represented: 6000

Reason Submitted: Aircraft Crash/Incident

Submitted by:

92 SUPS/LGSF

FAIRCHILD AFB WA 99011-5000

Date Reported: 30Jun94 30Jun94 Date Received: Date Sampled: 24JUNE94

Date Manufactured: Origin: 91L-55

Product: Aviation Turbine Fuel Specification: MIL-T-5624 JP4

SPEC LIMITS LAB MAX RESULTS MIN TEST METHOD Pass Pass MIL-T-5624 Workmanship Report 26 Color, Saybolt D156 Total Acid Number, mg KOH/g 0.015 0.009 D3242 25.0 12.2 Aromatics, %vol D1319 5.0 0.5 D1319 Olefins, %vol 0.002 0.000 Mercaptan Sulfur, %wt D3227 0.03 0.40 Total Sulfur, %wt D4294 Report 15 Distillation IBP ,°C D2887 84 Report 10% 100 130 20% 50% 185 145 250 220 90% 237 Report 95% 272 320 ΕP 57.0 54.6 45.0 D1298 Gravity, API 2.0 3.0 2.3 Vapor Pressure, psi D323 -58 -66 Freezing Point, °C D2386 18400 18734 Heat of Combustion, BTU/lb D3338 14.4 Hydrogen Content, %wt 13.5 D3343 20.0 27.0 D1322 Smoke Point, mm 1 1a Copper Corrosion D130 D3241 Thermal Stability <3 1 Tube Rating; Visual 25 0 Change in Press., mm of Hg 0.2 7.0 Existent Gum, mg/100ml D381 1.0 0.2 Particulate Matter, mg/l D2276 10 4 Filtration Time, minutes D2276 1B 1 D1094 Water Reaction 0.10 0.15 0.12 FSII, %vol D5006 217 150 600 Conductivity, pS/m D2624 Report See Below Gas Chromatography Scan GC

PAGE 2

Submitter's Sample Number

40-2035

Date 30Jun94 Lab Report Number 94-F-1607

REMARKS:

GC Scan: No Detectable Contamination.

Material represented by this sample meets specification limits.

Reference telefax of test report to 92 SUPS/LGSF, Accident Investigation Team on 30 JUN 94.

Approved By

DAVID L. FISHER

Submitter's San le No: 902074

Lab Report No: 94-F-1609

Contract No:

Batch/Lot No:

NSN: 9130-00-256-8613 Quantity Represented:

Reason Submitted: Aircraft Crash/Incident

USAF Aerospace Fuels Laboratory

Det 35, SA-ALC/SFTLD 10 Park Ave C Bldg 1 Mukilteo WA 98275-1618

Submitted by:

92 SUPS/LGSF

FAIRCHILD AFB WA 99011-5000

Date Reported:

30Jun94

Date Received:

30Jun94

Date Sampled:

Date Manufactured:

Origin: FLOW TRANSMITTE

Product: Aviation Turbine Fuel Specification: MIL-T-5624 JP4

		SPEC LIMITS	LAB
METHOD	TEST	MIN MAX	RESULTS
D2887	Distillation IBP ,°C	Report	42
	10%	Report	84
	20%	130	111
	50%	185	152
	90%	250	224
	95%	Report	240
	EP	320	285
GC	Gas Chromatography Scan	Report	See Below

REMARKS:

GC Scan: No Detectable Contamination.

Reference telefax of test report to 92 SUPS/LGSF, Accident Investigation Team on 30 JUN 94.

Approved By

DAVID L. FISHER

Chief, Aerospace Fuels Laboratory

Directorate of Aerospace Fuels

Submitter's Sa. le No: 402075

2075 Lab Report No

Contract No: Batch/Lot No:

NSN: 9130-00-256-8613 Quantity Represented:

Reason Submitted: Aircraft Crash/Incident

USAF Aerospace Fuels Laboratory Det 35, SA-ALC/SFTLD

10 Park Ave C Bldg 1 Mukilteo WA 98275-1618

Submitted by:

92 SUPS/LGSF FAIRCHILD AFB WA 99011-5000 Date Reported: Date Received: 30Jun94 30Jun94

Date Sampled:

Date Manufactured:

Origin: FUEL CONTROL VA
Product: Aviation Turbine Fuel
Specification: MIL-T-5624 JP4

		SPEC LIMITS	LAB
METHOD	TEST	XAM NIM	RESULTS
D2887	Distillation IBP ,°C	Report	95
	10%	Report	135
	20%	130	151 ##
	50%	185	184
	90%	250	239
	95%	Report	252
	EP	320	292
GC	Gas Chromatography Scan	Report	See Below

REMARKS:

GC Scan: No Detectable Contamination.

Material represented by this sample does not meet specification limit for Distillation 20% Point. This is typical of fuel exposed to high heat/fire. Light distillate material in fuels will evaporate under these conditions showing higher than normal values for low-medium range distillation points.

Reference telefax of test report to 92 SUPS/LGSF, Accident Investigation Team on 30 JUN 94.

DAVID L. FISHER

Approved By

Submitter's Sa. le No: 402067

Contract No: Batch/Lot No:

NSN:

Quantity Represented:

Reason Submitted: CRASH SAMPLE

Submitted by:

92 SUPS/LGSF

FAIRCHILD AFB WA 99011-5000

Lab Report No. 94-I-1011

USAF Aerospace Fuels Laboratory Det 35, SA-ALC/SFTLD 10 Park Ave C Bldg 1 Mukilteo WA 98275-1618

Date Reported: 1Jul94
Date Received: 30Jun94

Date Sampled:

Date Manufactured: Origin: CART# 1

Product: Hydraulic Fluid, Petroleum Base

Specification: Mil-H-5606

GC SCAN: No Detectable Contamination

REMARKS:

Reference telefax of test report to 92 SUPS/LGSF, Accident Investigation Team on 01 JUL 94.

VEWYX X

Chief, Aerospace Fuels Laboratory Directorate of Aerospace Fuels

FISHER

402068 Submitter's Sample No:

Contract No: Batch/Lot No:

NSN:

Quantity Represented:

Reason Submitted: A/C CRASH

Submitted by:

92 SUPS/LGSF

FAIRCHILD AFB WA 99011-5000

Lab Report No: 94-I-1612

USAF Aerospace Fuels Laboratory Det 35, SA-ALC/SFTLD 10 Park Ave C Bldg 1 Mukilteo WA 98275-1618

Date Reported:

1Jul94

Date Received: 30Jun94

Date Sampled:

Date Manufactured: Origin: CART # 2

Product: Hydraulic Fluid, Petroleum Base

Specification: Mil-H-5606

GC SCAN: No Detectable Contamination

REMARKS:

Reference telefax of test report to 92 SUPS/LGSF, Accident Investigation Team on 01 JUL 94.

Approved By

DAVID L. FISHER Chief, Aerospace Fuels Laboratory Directorate of Aerospace Fuels

Submitter's Sample No:

Contract No: Batch/Lot No:

NSN:

Quantity Represented:

Reason Submitted: A/C CRASH

Submitted by:

92 SUPS/LGSF

FAIRCHILD AFB WA 99011-5000

Lab Report No: 94-I-1613

USAF Aerospace Fuels Laboratory Det 35, SA-ALC/SFTLD 10 Park Ave C Bldg 1 Mukilteo WA 98275-1618

Date Reported:

1Ju194

Date Received: 30Jun94

Date Sampled:

Date Manufactured:

Origin: CART # 4

Product: Hydraulic Fluid, Petroleum Base

Specification: Mil-H-5606

GC SCAN: No Detectable Contamination

REMARKS:

Reference telefax of test report to 92 SUPS/LGSF, Accident Investigation Team on 01 JUL 94.

DAVID L. FISHER

Submitter's Sallie No: 402070

Contract No: Batch/Lot No:

NSN:

Quantity Represented:

Reason Submitted: A/C CRASH

Submitted by:

92 SUPS/LGSF FAIRCHILD AFB WA 99011-5000 Lab Report No. 94-I-1014

USAF Aerospace Fuels Laboratory Det 35, SA-ALC/SFTLD 10 Park Ave C Bldg 1 Mukilteo WA 98275-1618

Date Reported: 1Jul94
Date Received: 30Jun94

Date Received: Date Sampled:

Date Manufactured: Origin: CART # 5

Product: Hydraulic Fluid, Petroleum Base

Specification: Mil-H-5606

GC SCAN: No Detectable Contamination

REMARKS:

Reference telefax of test report to 92 SUPS/LGSF, Accident Investigation Team on 01 JUL 94.

Wurdy /

Chief, Aerospace Fuels Laboratory

Directorate of Aerospace Fuels

Submitter's Sample No: 402071

Contract No: Batch/Lot No:

NSN:

Quantity Represented:

Reason Submitted: A/C CRASH

Submitted by:

92 SUPS/LGSF

FAIRCHILD AFB WA 99011-5000

Lab Report No: 94-I-1615

USAF Aerospace Fuels Laboratory Det 35, SA-ALC/SFTLD 10 Park Ave C Bldg 1 Mukilteo WA 98275-1618

Date Reported: 1Ju194 30Jun94 Date Received:

Date Sampled:

Date Manufactured: CART #6 Origin:

Product: Hydraulic Fluid, Petroleum Base

Specification: Mil-H-5606

GC SCAN: No Detectable Contamination

REMARKS:

Reference telefax of test report to 92 SUPS/LGSF, Accident Investigation Team on 01 JUL 94.

Approved By

Submitter's St le No: 402073

Contract No: Batch/Lot No:

NSN:

Quantity Represented:

Reason Submitted: A/C CRASH

Submitted by:

92 SUPS/LGSF

FAIRCHILD AFB WA 99011-5000

Lab Report No. 94-I-1016

USAF Aerospace Fuels Laboratory Det 35, SA-ALC/SFTLD 10 Park Ave C Bldg 1 Mukilteo WA 98275-1618

Date Reported: 1Ju194
Date Received: 30Jun94

Date Received:
Date Sampled:

Date Manufactured:

Origin: HYDRAULIC RES.

Product: Hydraulic Fluid, Petroleum Base

Specification: Mil-H-5606

GC SCAN: No Detectable Contamination

REMARKS:

Reference telefax of test report to 92 SUPS/LGSF, Accident Investigation Team on 01 JUL 94.

Approved By

DAVID L. FISHER

Submitter's School 102072

Contract No: Batch/Lot No:

NSN:

Quantity Represented:

Reason Submitted: A/C CRASH

Submitted by:

92 SUPS/LGSF FAIRCHILD AFB WA 99011-5000 Lab Report N 94

USAF Aerospace Fuels Laboratory Det 35, SA-ALC/SFTLD 10 Park Ave C Bldg 1 Mukilteo WA 98275-1618

Date Reported: 1Jul94
Date Received: 30Jun94

Date Sampled:

Date Manufactured:

Origin: ENG. DRIVEN PUM

Product: Hydraulic Fluid, Petroleum Base Specification: Mil-H-5606

GC SCAN: No Detectable Contamination

REMARKS:

Reference telefax of test report to 92 SUPS/LGSF, Accident Investigation Team on 01 JUL 94.

Approved By

-DAVID L. FISHER

Submitter's Sale No: 102032

Source: LXCT 10

Last Addition Date: 06/24/94

Last Purging Date:

Contractor: -

AIRCO Industrial Gases

Vancouver WA

Reason Submitted: Crash Sample

Submitted by:

92 SUPS/LGSF

FAIRCHILD AFB WA 99011-5000

Lab Report N 94-0-1

USAF Aerospace Fuels Laboratory

Det 35, SA-ALC/SFTLD 10 Park Ave C Bldg 1 Mukilteo, WA 98275-1618

Date Reported: 30Jun94 Date Received: 30Jun94 Date Sampled: 06/24/94

Sampler No: 81A1386

Product: Oxygen, Aviator's Breathing, Liquid

Specification: TO 42B6-1-1 II

		USE I	IMITS	LAB
METHOD	TEST	MIN _	MAX	RESULTS
SPEC .	Odor		NONE	None
SPEC	Purity, % by vol		REPORT	99.8
MIL-STD-1564	Carbon Dioxide, ppm by vol		10	0
	Methane, ppm by vol		50	23
	Acetylene		0.1	0.0
	Ethylene, ppm by vol		0.4	0.0
	C2+ hydrocarbons, ppm by vol		6	1
	Nitrous Oxide, ppm by vol		4	1
	Refrigerants(freons), ppm/vol		2	0
	Halogenated Solvents, ppm/vol		0.2	0.0
	Others, ppm by vol		0.2	0.0

REMARKS:

Material represented by this sample meets TO requirements.

Reference telefax of test report to 92 SUPS/LGSF, Accident Investigation Team on 30 JUN 94.
Copy to SFTT

Approved By

DAVID L.

Submitter's Sa le No: 02028

Source: LOX 104
Last Addition Date:

Last Purging Date:

Control to the second

10/21/93

Contractor:

AIRCO Industrial Gases

Vancouver WA

Reason Submitted: Crash Sample

Submitted by:

92 SUPS/LGSF

FAIRCHILD AFB WA 99011-5000

Lab Report N 94-0-1

USAF Aerospace Fuels Laboratory

Det 35, SA-ALC/SFTLD 10 Park Ave C Bldg 1 Mukilteo, WA 98275-1618

Date Reported: 30Jun94
Date Received: 30Jun94
Date Sampled: 06/24/94

Sampler No: 81A1499

Product: Oxygen, Aviator's Breathing, Liquid

Specification: TO 42B6-1-1 II

	-	USE	LIMITS	LAB
METHOD	TEST	MIN	MAX	RESULTS
SPEC	Odor		NONE	None
SPEC	Purity, % by vol		REPORT	99.8
MIL-STD-1564	Carbon Dioxide, ppm by vol		10	0
	Methane, ppm by vol		50	15
	Acetylene		0.1	0.0
	Ethylene, ppm by vol		0.4	0.0
	C2+ hydrocarbons, ppm by vol		6	1
	Nitrous Oxide, ppm by vol		4	0
	Refrigerants(freons), ppm/vol		2	0
	Halogenated Solvents, ppm/vol		0.2	0.0
	Others, ppm by vol		0.2	0.0

REMARKS:

Material represented by this sample meets TO requirements.

Reference telefax of test report to 92 SUPS/LGSF, Accident Investigation Team on 30 JUN 94-

Copy to SFTT

Approved By

DAVID L. FISHER

Submitter's Sangle No: 402077

Contract No: Batch/Lot No:

NSN:

Quantity Represented:

Reason Submitted: A/C CRASH

Submitted by:

92 SUPS/LGSF

FAIRCHILD AFB WA 99011-5000

Lab Report No: 94-I-1620

USAF Aerospace Fuels Laboratory Det 35, SA-ALC/SFTLD

10 Park Ave C Bldg 1 Mukilteo WA 98275-1618

Date Reported: 1Jul94
Date Received: 30Jun94

Date Received:
Date Sampled:

Date Manufactured:
Origin: OIL CART #2

Product: Lubricating Oil, A/C turbine engine

Specification: Mil-L-7808

GC SCAN: No Detectable Contamination

REMARKS:

Reference telefax of test report to 92 SUPS/LGSF, Accident Investigation Team on 01 JUL 94.

Approved By

DAVID L. FISHER

Submitter's Sample No: 402076

Contract No: Batch/Lot No:

NSN:

Quantity Represented:

Reason Submitted: A/C CRASH

Submitted by:

92 SUPS/LGSF

FAIRCHILD AFB WA 99011-5000

Lab Report No. 94-I-1021

USAF Aerospace Fuels Laboratory Det 35, SA-ALC/SFTLD 10 Park Ave C Bldg 1 Mukilteo WA 98275-1618

Date Reported: 1Jul94
Date Received: 30Jun94

Date Sampled:

Date Manufactured:
Origin: OIL CART # 1

Product: Lubricating Oil, A/C turbine engine

Specification: Mil-L-7808


GC SCAN: No Detectable Contamination

REMARKS:

Reference telefax of test report to 92 SUPS/LGSF, Accident Investigation Team on 01 JUL 94.

Approved By

DAVID L. FISHER



These soil borings represent the soil composition approximately 200' south of the initial impact point. Soil conditions throughout this area are relatively consistent and gives a reasonable representation of the characteristics within the site.

Tand Main 10.00 D 38 51 B 41 11.00 IN COLUMN COLUMN TO THE REAL PROPERTY AND ADDRESS OF THE PARTY ADDRESS OF TH 1

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH AIR FORCE (ACC) DAVIS-MONTHAN AIR FORCE BASE, AZ 85707-4250

SPECIAL ORDER M-007

28 June 1994

With the concurrence of the commanders concerned, the following individuals, organization indicated, are appointed as Safety Investigation Board members to investigate the Class A Flight Mishap, 92 BW, Fairchild AFB, WA, which occurred at Fairchild AFB, 24 Jun 94, involving a B-52H aircraft tail number 61-0026. Individuals are relieved from all duties pending completion of the investigation. Authority: AFR 127-4.

COL JOHN C. MOORE, Board President

MINOT AFB, ND 58705

COL JOSEPH J. CONTIGUGLIA Flight Surgeon Member

5 MG/SGP MINOT AFB, ND 58705

LT COL JAMES A. BLACKWOOD II Pilot Member

93 BW/SE CASTLE AFB, CA 95342

LT COL MICHAEL E. MCCULLOUGH Commander's Representative

92 BW/SE FAIRCHILD AFB, WA 99011

MAJ RICHARD A. LANE

93 LSS/CC

Maintenance Member

CASTLE AFB, CA 95342

CAPT WILIAM H. STIMPSON Investigating Officer

DET 1, 2 OG,

CAPT TIMOTHY M. MCNEIL

BARKSDALE AFB, LA 71110

Life Support Member

93 OSS/OSAA

CAPT MICHAEL D. SANDERS Accident Recorder

CASTLE AFB, CA 95342

92 MSSQ/MSI

FAIRCHILD AF, WA 99011

FOR THE

APPROVING OFFICIAL


BAILES, Maj, USAF CHARLES V. Assistant Chief, Flight Safety DAVID CAPOTOSTI, Col, USAF


Chief of Safety

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





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



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
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
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






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























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
R-20





PATROL

R-23



<u>APG</u>

A-1	47 Sec Door
A-2	Lox Converter
A-3	Bomb Door
A-4	Steering Act
A-5	Lox Converter
A-6	Bomb Door
A-7	Hyd Res
A-8	Bomb Door
A-9	Main Entry Hatch
A-9	Ext Fuel Tank
A-10	Sail Boat
A-11	INBD Eng Strut
A-11	O/B Hyd Res
A-12	Lox Converter
A-13	
A-14	
A-15	
A-16	Nose Dome
A-17	
A-18	
A-19	
A-20	
A-21	
A-22	
A-23	Fwd Bomb Door Act

C1 -

BOARD ITEMS

1433-613-187D PARKER-HANNIFIN

LAMB #15099

B-1	Left Exterior Tank Part
B-2	Left Exterior Tank Part
B-3	Left Exterior Tank Part
B-4	Left Exterior Tank Access Panel
B-5	Left Exterior Tank Part
B-6	Wing Fuel Access Panel
B-7	OB Lower Wing Skin
B-8	Left Exterior Fuel Tank Part
B-9	Left Tip Gear Door
B-10	Tip Gear Door Actuator
B-11	Left Wing Tip and Flux Valve
B-12	Rear Engine Mount and Beams
B-13	Left Lower Engine Cowl
B-14	Engine Fan Duct
B-15	Engine Strut Upper Spar
B-16	Left Wing Tip
B-17	Fuel Boost Pump
B-18	Upper Boom Door
B-19	Right Inboard Flap
B-20	Valve and Duct 1433-61
D-20	PARKE
	28V DC SERIAL #22406
	LAMB
B-21	Engine Bleed Valve
B-22	Fuel Press and Dump Valve
B-23	Accy Drive and Fuel Control
B-24	EPR Transducer
B-25	ATM Motor
	- Left Tip Gear Strut Door
B-27	Engine Fuel Control
B-28	Center Wing Tank Access Door
B-29	Forward Body Boost Pump Valve Panel
B-30	Spoiler Support
B-31	Inboard Flap Track
B-32	Inboard Flap Track
B-32 B-33	Inboard Flap Drive Screw
	<u>-</u>
B-34	Spoiler #2
B-35	Outboard Flap Track Outboard Flap Track Screw Piece
B-36	Outboard Flap Track
B-37	LH Inboard Flap
B-38	
B-39 B-40	LH Spoiler LH Outboard Flap Piece
	_
B-41	Flap Track Screw
B-42	Flap Track Screw
B-43	Spoiler Activator
B-44	Inboard Flap Track
B-45	Inboard Flap Track
B-46	Outboard Flap Drive Screw
B-47	Wing Section
B-48	LH Inboard Flap Section

Wing Section

B-49



B-51 Out Flap Drive Scre	B-51	Out	Flap	Drive	Scre
--------------------------	------	-----	------	-------	------

- B-52
- B-53
- Metering Valve
 Spoiler #12
 RH Outboard Flap Section B-54
- Wing Section B-55
- Flap Track Seat B-56
- B-57 Spoiler #3
- Spoiler B-58
- B-59 Flap Track
- Spoiler #14 B-60
- B-61 Spoiler #11
- Spoiler #10 B-62
- Actuator #12 B-63
- B-64 Spoiler #12

BOMB NAV LIST

BN-1	Flir Scanner	
BN-2	IMU	
BN-3	IMU	
BN-4	RTM	Classified
BN-5	EVS Turret	
FCS-1	FCTS	
FCS-2	Antenna	
FCS-3	ECLP	
FCS-4	Gun and Mount	

COMM / NAV EQUIPMENT

1.	CNI	Sat Com power supply
2.	CN2	Sat Com SV box
3.	CN3	TACAN receiver / transmitter
4.	CN4	HF RT
5.	CN5	VOR / ILS Dynamotor
6.	CN6	Radar altimeter
7 .	CN7	Sat Com filter
8.	CN8	Kit - IC classified
9.	CN 9	DVS
10.	CN 10	Sat Com / LOS RT
11.	CN11	Sat Com modem - classified
12.	CN 12	APN 69 Beacon RT
13.	CN 13	Sat Com printer
14.	CN 14	UHF control box
15.	CN 15	Glidescope receiver
16.	CN 16	Part of modem (Sat Com - classified)
17.	CN17	IFF RT (front)
18.	CN 18	TACAN control box





ECM EQUIPMENT

1	ALT 32	Trans CSS	Conf
1. 2.	ALT 16	Amp	Conf
2. 3.	ALQ-155	HD	Conf
3. 4.	ALT-32	Pwr Sup	Not Class
	ALQ-155	HD	Not Class
5.	ALQ-173	LRV-7	Conf
6.	ALQ-172 ALR-46	Amps (2)	Conf
7.	Alt 16	Amp (2)	Conf
8.		Box	Conf
9.	ALQ-122	HD	Not Class
10.	ALQ-155	DDSP	Conf
11.	ALQ-153	ADSP	Conf
12.	ALQ-153	Trans High	Conf
13	ALT-32	RT Bd11	Conf
14.	ALQ-155		Conf
15.	ALQ-155	RT	Conf
16	ALQ-155	RT	Conf
17.	ALQ-155	RT	Conf
18.	ALQ-172	LRU 8	
19.	ALQ-172	LRU 8	Conf
20.	ALQ-153	Control Box	Conf
21.	ALQ-155	CIP (2)	Conf
22.	ALR-20	Tuner	Conf
23.	ALR-20	Tuner	Conf
24.	ALQ-155	RT	Conf
25	ALQ-155	Receiver	Conf
26	ALQ-155	Receiver	Conf
27.	ALQ-155	CIP	Conf
28.	ALR-46	Processor	Conf
29.	ALR-20	Tune	Conf
30.	ALR-20	C-9449	Conf
31.	ALQ-155	CIP	Conf
	~		

AIRCRAFT GENERAL

EE-1	CSD and Gen
EE-2	CSD and Gen
EE-3	Pre-Cooler (bleed air)
EE-4	Battery Detector
EE-5	Flow Control Sensor
EE-6	Flow Control Valve
EE-7	Catalytic Filter
EE-8	Generator
EE-9	Missile Cooling Heat Exchanger
FF-10	Voltage Regulators

FUEL COMPONENTS

F-1	Fuel Boost Pump Aux Tank
F-2	Fuel Boost Pump Main Tank
F-3	Fuel Boost Pump Main Tank
F-4	Main Refuel Valve (Close)
F-5	Fire Wall Shut Off Valve Open
F-6	Fuel Boost Pump Main Tank
F-7	
F-8	Body Tank Fuel Boost Pump
F-9	Fuel Boost Pump Main Tank
F-10	Fuel Boost Pump Main Tank
F-11	Rotary Valve Crossfeed (Open)
F-12	Rotary Valve Crossfeed Valve (Open)
F-13	
F-14	Fuel Level Control Valve
F-15	Fuel Level Control Valve
F-16	Fuel Boost Pump Main Tank/Fuel Level Control Valve
F-17	
F-18	Body Tank Fuel Pump
F-19	Fuel Boost Pump Main
F-20	Rotary Valve Crossfeed Valve #12 (Open)
F-21	Rotary Valve Crossfeed Valve #11 (Open)
F-22	Rotary Valve Cross feed Valve #15 (Close)
F-23	Fuel Boost Pump Main Tank
F-24	Fire Wall Shut Off Valve Two Each (Open)
F-25	Rotary Valve #10 Crossfeed (Open)
F-26	
F-27	Main Tank Fuel Boost Pump
F-28	Main Tank Fuel Boost Pump
F-29	Fuel Level Control Valve
F-30	Fuel Level Control Valve
F-31	Fire Wall Shut Off Valve (Open)
F-32	Fire Wall Shut Off Valve (Open)
F-33	Fuel Boost Pump Aux Tank
F-34	Fuel Boost Pump Aux Tank


INSTRUMENTS


GCS-1	C/Pilots Air Speed 430 kts
	Co-Pilots Panel
GCS-2	A/P Processor
GCS-3	G-Meter
GCS-6	Eng Inst Panel
GCS-5	Altimeter AIMS
GCS-4	AIMS Computer
GCS-7	HSI
GCS-8	ADI
GCS-9	Sextant Mount
GCS-10	CG/FLAS Display Unit
GCS-11	FDC
GCS-12	YECU
GCS-13	PECU
GCS-14	A/P Servo Trim Motor


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
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
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























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













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SEMPONE SELVICE 13

R-50


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



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
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- D AF FORM 711c AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL REPORT
- G FLIGHT AND PERSONNEL RECORDS
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USAF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT INDEX TAB FORM

COLONEL ROBERT E. WOLFFS FLIGHT RECORDS	T-1
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LIEUTENANT COLONEL KENNETH S. HUSTON'S FLIGHT RECORDS	T-4

			RECORD OF	EVALUA	TION O		
	AST- FIRST- MIDDLE IF		:				!
_ <u>\</u>	OLFF, ROBERT E	(contract of the contract of	QUALIFICATION	TYPE			QUALIFICATION
YPE NR- RAFT	TYPE OF CHECK	COMPLETED	LEVEL (COMMAND)	AIR- CRAFT	TYPE OF CHECK	DATE COMPLETED	(COMMAND)
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<u> 41 C</u>	in hal Nov	27May77	(Arc)				
ruic	initial qual	2 Jun 77	(ATC)	-			
<u>-41</u>	ANNUAL.	10 Se 77	(ATL)				_
	QUALIFICATION	16DEC 77 14Jun 78	(ATC)	<u> </u>			
711C	MISSION OUTC ACADEMIC THISTELMENT		(Me)				
-41c	Annuloud	15 Nov 78	(ATU)				
	Reassigned	to SAC.	0	 			
B52H	Requal CPT Requal FP	27 Nov 79	(SAC)				
<u>B52H</u>	Requal FP Instrument Contingency	11 Dec 79	(SĂC)	<u> </u>			
<u>B52H</u>	No Notice FP	11 Jul 80	(SAC) Q				
	Instructor CPT 1CEVG Conting	1	(SAC) Q (SAC)	 			
352H 352H	No Notice FP Initial Instructor	9 Dec 80 16 Dec 80	Q (SAC)				
B52H	P/IP CPT	26 Aug 81	Q (SAC)				
B52H		FP/IP 8 Dec 81	(SAC)				
	Requal/ Instrument	9 Jun 87	Q (SAC)				
B-520	Instructor Requal	17 Jun 87	Q (SAC)	 			_
	Assigned to	42 BMW	ο.	-			
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	Assigned 92 BV	1	1 . I	-		-	
в52Н_	Basic Qual	18 Nov 93	(ACC)	+			
	FORM			T-1	. 1		

	UERTIF		EW QUALIFI	CAII	UN			792	18 Nov 93
1.			EXAMINEE IDEN				,	<u> </u>	
NAME (Lest, First, Middle In	nkiel)				GRAD	E		SSAN	
Wolff, Robert E.					Col				
ORGANIZATION AND LOCAT	TION			İ	ACFT/	CREW POSITION	J	ELIGIBILIT	TY PERIOD
325 BS, Fairchild AFB	WA		011411510			2H/P		N/A	
<u>II.</u>	6901	ND PHASE	QUALIFICA	ATION	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		FLIGHT	BUACE	
EXAMINATION/CHEC		DATE	GRADE			MISSIO	N/CHECK	INASE	DATE
Closed Book		16 Nov 93	100(S)		BASI	C QUAL/IN	STMT		18 Nov 93
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QUALIFIED		UNQUALIFIED	Comments)		DUE D. N/A	AlES			
1			☐ YES 🛣	NO					,
EXPIRATION DATE OF QUAL	FICATION		1	- t	DATE	ADDITIONAL TI	RAINING COM	PLETED	
30 A	pril 1995					_			
Wt.			CERTIFICA	TION			·		
TYPED NAME AND GR	ADE	ORGANIZATIO		CONCUR CONCUR CHECK	REMARKS	SI	GNATURE		DATE
FLIGHT EXAMINER Arthur A. Holland, Lt Col		92 OG			×	Arete	a/he	us	19 Nav 93
REVIEWING OFFICER Jay P. Slaughenhoupt Maj	_	92 OG	· ×			Vay PS	Saughen	hosp	19 Nav 93 22 Nov 93
Final APPROVING OFFICE William E. Pellerin, Col		92 OG	×			Wul.	1 2(-	el	24 NW 93
		RTIFY that I have been		retend	the ac		n this date.		
6 DEC 1993		AND GRADE OF EXAMI Wolff, Col	NEE			SIGNATURE	4 9	116	0,011
F FORM 8, MAY 85		PREVIOUS EDITIO	N WILL BE USED.			W WOOL	<u> </u>		The same of the sa

V. Examiner's Remarks:

- A. Mission Description: Col Wolff's basic qualification/instrumentevaluation was scheduled on a pilot proficiency sortie vithin the local area at Fairchild. All required traffic pattern activity was skillfully accomplished.
 - B. Discrepancies: None



AERONAUTICAL ORDER (PA) AVIATION SERVICE

CHANGE AVIATION SERVICE CODE FROM 3A

ENTITLEMENT: CONTINUOUS ACIP TERMINATED. CONDITIONAL ACIP

AUTHORIZED. .

NAME: WOLFF ROBERT E

GRADE: COL

SSAN:

CREW POSITION: PILOT

WING: 0092 BW

ORGANIZATION: 0325 BS

OFFICE SYMBOL: CV

LOCATION: FAIRCHILD AFB

REQUIRED TO PERFORM FREQUENT AND REGULAR FLIGHTS: YES

REQUIRED TO PERFORM PARACHUTE DUTIES

: NO

OFDA: 140

ASC: 7A FAC: 3 TSC: E ASD: 11 SEP 69 OSD: 31 MAY 69

REMARKS: ASC CHANGE DUE TO MEMBER PASSING 25 YEARS OF OFFICER SERVICE. MEMBER IS ENTITLED TO CONDITIONAL ACIP, AND MUST FLY 4 HOURS A MONTH TO

QUALIFY FOR PAY. CIRCUMSTANCES PREVENTED WRITTEN ORDERS IN ADVANCE.

EFFECTIVE DATE: 31 MAY 94

TERMINATION DATE: 30 SEP 99

AUTHORITY: AFR 60-1 PARAGRAPH 2-3

REQUEST DATE: 01 JUN 94

SIGNATURE ELEMENT OF ORDERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICIAL:

FOR THE COMMANDER

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

HQ 92D BOMB WING(ACC)

FAIRCHILD AFB WA 99011-5000

JOHNNY BUTLER, JR., SMSGT, USAF

NCOIC, FLIGHT RECORDS

DISTRIBUTION: C

AERONAUTICAL ORDER NUMBER: 0217

INDIVIDUAL PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING RES

(For officers this record will be kept as a permanent part of AF Form 846, "Aircrew Standardization/Evaluation Records." For airmen this record will be kept as a permanent part of the Field Medical Record.)

<u></u>				
LAST NAME-FIRST NAME			GRADE 2d Lt	SSAN
Wolff, Rober	<u> Ե</u>		20 Lt	
TYPE OF TRAINING	PERCENT GRADE	AIR FORCE BASE	DATE	FIGNATURE OF PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING OFFICER
ORIGINAL PHASE	94	Williams, Az.	20 Oct 69	ROBERT E. SHERMAN, CAPT, USAF, BSC
PASSENGER PHASE		·		
REFRESHER PHASE	SATIS	CARSWELL AFB, TX	6 Mar 73	JAMES KEY, CAPT, USAF, BSC
REFRESHER	967.	PETERSON AFB, CO	13 Apr 77	Robert McMister Capt USA
REFRESHER	COMP	ELLSWORTH AFB	2 APR 80	PETER J. SEBERGER, MAJ, USAF
REFRESHER TTB	SATIS	ANDREWS AFB, MD	18_FEB_87	SEAN P. SCULLY CAPT USAF BSC
REF/TTB		FAIRCHILD AFB, WA	30 SEP 93	DAVID R BROWN Capt USAF 35C
TIT B	1.	ergigopiias on we	1.0 pp:	
				2 1
RAPID DECOMPRESSION		Williams, Az.	10 Oct 69	ROBERT E. SHERMAN, CAPT, USAF, BSC
EJECTION SEAT TRAINER		Williams, Az.		ROBERT E. SHERMAN, CAPT, USAF, BSC
PRESSURE SUIT TYPE:		٤		
PRESSURE SUIT REFRESHER				
PARA.SAIL		Williams, Az.	5 Nov 69	ROBERT E. SHERMAN, CAPT, USAF, BSC
NIGHT VISION		Williams, Az.	I.3 Oct 69	ROBERT E. SHERMAN, CAPT, USAF, BSC

REMARKS

Completion of <u>T-37</u> Ejection Seat Training for Jet Aircrews and Passengers in accordance with ATCR 50-24 on <u>10 Oct/69</u>.

Physiological Training Officer

Completion of <u>T-38</u> Ejection Seat Training for Jet Aircrews and Passengers in accordance with ATCR 50-24 on <u>MAR/18 1970</u>.

Physiological Training Officer

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PERSONAL DATA-PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 PACE

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PERSONAL DATA-PRIVALY ACT OF 1974

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PERSONAL DATA-PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

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MA9680: 94119

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PAGE __60 ...

PERSONAL DATA-PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

		÷	RECORD OF I	EVALUA	TION		
NAME, I	AST- FIRST- MIDDLE I	NITIAL AND SSAN					
H	OLLAND, ARTHUR			<u> </u>	TYPE		QUALIFICATION
TYPE	TYPE OF	DATE	QUALIFICATION LEVEL	AIR-	OF	DATE	LEVEL
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	- 444al Ougl		Q-1	 			P2 14 AT
2520	Initial Qual Qual/Inst	5 Mar 76	(SAC)		ARRIVED 92 BMW	, FAIRCHILD	AFB
BOZG	Quai/ Insc		Q-1		Requal/Instrum		
B52G	Flt Sim	14 May 76	(SAC)	B52H	Instructor	16 Feb 89	(SAC)
1020			Q-1	В52Н	Qualification Instrument	10 Jul 90	Q(SAC)
B52G	No-Notice	14 Jun 76	(SAC)	B32ft	<u> </u>	10 002 30	((2117)
			Q-1	B52H	SAC Stan Eval ' Qual. Instrum.	6 Sen 91	Q(SAC)
B52G	Qual/Inst	22 Dec 76	(SAC)	 	Qual/		- Q
		12 Mars 77	Q-1 (SAC)	В52Н	Instrument	14 Jan 93	(ACC)
B52H	Spot	13 May 77	Q-1	 	MSN/QUAL/		1
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		6 Aug 78	Q (SAC)				
B52H	No-Notice	6 Aug /6	Q	 			
	Initial/CPT	19 Jan 79	(SAC)	Ĭ			
BOZH	Instructor	13 041. 73	Q	<u> </u>			
B52H	Instructor	28 Feb 79	(SAC)	1		<u> </u>	
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в52Н	No-Notice	5 Jun 79	(SAC)				
			Ω				
B52H	CPT	4 Feb 80	(SAC)	 			
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B52H	Instrument	26 Mar 80	Q	1			
	Pre- Standardization	n 12 May 80					
B52H	CEVG Inst/	<u> </u>	0				
	Qualification	15 Sep 80	(SAC)				
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B-52G	CPT	20 Jun 84	(SAc)	<u></u>			
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B SX	Qual/Inst	5 Dec 84	(SAC)			<u> </u>	<u> </u>
				Т-2.	1	ANU.S. G.P.O	. 1977-241-130/10

	FICA IE	EM GNYT	JFICA	TION			25 Feb 94
1.		XAMINEE I	DENTI	ICATION			
NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)				GRADE		SSAN	
Holland, Arthur A.				Lic	Col		
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION					CFT/CREW POSITION		Y PERIOD
				7.5		, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	- 04
325 BS, Fairchild AFB WA		OUAL	FICAT		2H/IP	Jan - Ju	1 94
II.	UND PHASE	GOXE	FICATI			FLIGHT PHASE	
EXAMINATION/CHECK	DATE	GRA	DE		MISSION/CHE	CK	DATE
Closed Book	1 Feb 94	1006	(S)	MSN	QUAL/INSTMT		16 Feb 94
Open Book	1 Feb 94	100	0				
INSTMT	25 Feb 94	100	0				
CPT	14 Feb 94	1		1			-
QUALIFICATION LE	I	RESTRIC			ADD	ITIONAL TRAINING	3
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31 July 1995	·						44
til.		CERT	FICATI	ON			
TYPED NAME AND GRADE	ORGANIZATIO	on		PEMARKS	SIGNAT	TURE	DATE
FLIGHT EXAMINER 1 Jay P. Slaughenhoupt, Maj	92 OG			×	Chul Shug	herhous	75 Fev94
REVIEWING OFFICER 2 Arthur A. Holland, Lt Col	92 OG		×		Autul	(heere)	75 Fev 94 1 Mai 94
FINAL APPROVING OFFICER 3 William E. Pellerin, Col		×		Week &	Cel	14 MAR 9.9	
10	ERTIFY that I have been		under	tand the a		date.	
/= 44 QU	E AND GRADE OF EXAM	INEE	. –		SIGNATURE	G. 1/2	lled
	A. Holland, Lt Col				in war		-
AF FORM 8, MAY 85 <i>(EF)</i>	PREVIOUS EDITIO	ON WILL BE I	JSED.				



[V. Examiner's Remarks:

- A. Mission Description: Lt Col Holland's annual inflight evaluation was conducted on a conventional profile training sortic consisting of a cell departure and join-up, two on three receiver air refueling to include a boom envelope demonstration on AR-7A/B, low altitude TA/EVS flight in IR-302A, multiple low altitude weapon releases in the Saylor Creek range and concluded with all required traffic pattern activity at Fairchild.
 - B. Discrepancies: None.
 - C. Recommended Additional Training: None.
- D. Additional Comments: All instructor items were flawlessly accomplished. Noteworthy were his timely and appropriate instruction and general airmanship.

建筑型型设施

AERONAUTICAL ORDER (PA) AVIATION SERVICE

ANGE AVIATION SERVICE CODE FROM 2A

ENTITLEMENT: ACIP

IS NOT AFFECTED

ME: HOLLAND ARTHUR A

GRADE: LTC SSAN:

EW POSITION: PILOT

NG: ØØ92 BMW

ZMB 25EQ : MOITAZINABNO

OFFICE SYMBOL: 325CCE

CATION: FAIRCHILD AFB

QUIRED TO PERFORM FREQUENT AND REGULAR FLIGHTS: YES

QUIRED TO PERFORM PARACHUTE DUTIES : NO

AE :D

FAC: 3

ASD: 10 MAR 71

♦\$D: 28 JAN 71

OFDA: 174

MARKS:

FECTIVE DATE: 10 MAR 89

TERMINATION DATE: 27 JAN 96

THORITY: AFR 60-1 PARAGRAPH 2-3

REQUEST DATE: LØ MAR 87

GNATURE ELEMENT OF ORDERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICIAL:

R THE COMMANDER

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

HG JSD CZG (ZVC)

FAIRCHILD AFB WA 99011-5000

URIE F. MOFFATT MSGT, USAF '
IEF, OPS SYS MGT BRANCH

STRIBUTION: C

AERONAUTICAL ORDER NUMBER: Ø299



(For officers this record will be kept as a permanent part of AF Form 846, "Aircrew Standardisation/Evaluation Records." For airmen this record will be kept as a permanent part of the Field Medical Record.)

-MIDDLE INITIAL	_ 	GRADE	SSAN
_			AT
PERCENT GRADE	AIR FORCE BASE	DATE	FIGNATURE OF PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING OFFICER
88	Columbus Ms. (14 Apr 71	WILLIAM L. TANLOR, Capt, USAF, BSC
	Y		
SATIS	CARSWELL AFB, TX	25 Feb 74	GARY C. NISKABA, IT. USAF, BSC
97%	LITTLE ROCK AFB	1 8 JAN 1977	ROBERT J. FENTON, CAPT, USAF
Satis	Ellsworth AFB,SD		PETER J SEBERGER, MAJ, USAF
SATIS	LITTLE ROCK AFB	924. 22 Nov 82	Susan E. Richardson, 1LT, USAF, BSC
SATIS	Wiesbaden AB,Ge	19 Aug 86	JAMES E-FREEMAN MAJ, USAF, BSC
	FAIRCHILD AFB, WA	13 APR 89	Be OUTNOYE EDMONTOS, EAPT, USAF
	Fairchild AFB,WA	19 Dec 91	DAMES W. LASSWELL, 2LT, USAF, BSC
			Del 1
	Columbus Ms.	31 Mar 71	WILLIAM EN ATLOR, Capt, USAF, BSC
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	Columbus Ms.	14 Apr 71	WILLIAM L. TAKLOR, Capt, USAF, BSC
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	88 SATIS O7070 Satis SATIS	88 Columbus Ms. SATIS CARSWELL AFB, TX O7070 LITTLE ROCK AFB Satis Ellsworth AFB,SD SATIS LITTLE ROCK AFB SATIS Wiesbaden AB,Ge FAIRCHILD AFB,WA Fairchild AFB,WA Columbus Ms.	A. PERCENT GRADE AIR FORCE BASE DATE 88 Columbus Ms. 14 Apr 71 SATIS CARSWELL AFB, TX 25 Feb 74 O 707 ITTLE ROCK AFB 13 JAN 1977 Satis Ellsworth AFB,SD 19 Nov 79 SATIS LITTLE ROCK AFB 22 Nov 82 SATIS Wiesbaden AB,Ge 19 Aug 86 FAIRCHILD AFB,WA 13 APR 89 Fairchild AFB,WA 19 Dec 91 Columbus Ms. 31 Mar 71

EMARKS

29 Mar 71 T-37 Procedural Training Columbus AFB, Ms.

29 Mar 71 HBU-2B/A Indoc.

9 Aug 71 T-38 Procedural Training Columbus AFB, Ms.

				_ 	
MEDICAL RECOMMENT TIN FOR SING OR SI	PECIAL 1	OPERATIONAL DUTY IVACY ACT OF 197	/4 - Use blanket	PAS DD Form 20	05)
TO: (HOSM/UNIT Scheduling Officer) or (Cmdr/Duty Sect 92 DSS/DOTF	t) Fl	ROM: 92D MEDICAL GRO FAIRCHILD AFD N			DATE 03 AUG 93
LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDOE/SRISSOZ / - HOLLAND, ARTHUR				GRADE LTC	SSN
111111111111111111111111111111111111111		TIVE FLYING XJYES [JND	CREANIZATION 92 OP GP	÷	MAJCOM ACC
THE ABOVE INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN FOUND (Check Appropriat	te Boxes	s): _ DUTY (DNIF)			
[] <u>RATED OFFICER</u> : ILLNESS OR INJURY WI	ILL NOT	BE RESOLVED WIT	HIN 180 DAYS.	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	_
() NONRATED OFFICER OR ENLISTED PERSON	<u>nel</u> : !!	LINESS OR INJURY	NILL NOT BE RES	OLVED WITHIN 9	O DAYS.
[] MEDICALLY CLEARED FOR FLYING OR SPECIAL OPERATIO	DNAL DU	TY FOLLOWING AN	ILLNESS OR INJUR	γ.	
(X) MEDICALLY CLEARED FOR FLYING DUTY FOLLOWING:				· .	
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[] REQUIRED TO MEAR VISION CORRECTION DEVICES WHILE	PERFO	RMING FLYING OR	SPECIAL OPERATIO	NAL DUTY.	
ACTUAL DATE FOUND DNIF ESTIMATED DURATION	OF DNIS	DATE F	CUND MEDICALLY C	LEARED DA	YS DNIF THIS ILLNESS/INJURY
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ATE MEDICAL CLEARANCE EXPIRES 30 SEP 94	MEI	DICAL EXAM MAY E	E ACCOMPLISHED I	N/AFTER	>> Jul. 94
YFED OR PRINTED NAME & GRADE OF FLIGHT SURGEON	SIG	ENATURE (65		DATE 03 AUG 93
I CERTIFY that I have been not	ıfied a		<u> </u>	and recommen	dations.
: [] DO [X] DO NOT wear conta	ct lens	ses while perfor	maing flying or s	pacial operat	ional duty.
CONSTURE OF FLYER OR INDIVIOUAL CHEKUL	1,	/ chei	2	<u> </u>	DATE 03 AUG 95
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
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T38A	INSTRUMENT	28 FEB 80	Q (ATC)		-Assigned 92 BW	, Fairchild	AFB WA
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	ASSIGNED 37	BMW (SAC)	<del>-</del>	<u> </u>			
B52G	SPOT	24 FEB 81	(SAC)				
B52G	RECHECK	3 MAR 81	Q (SAC) Q				
B52G	CEVG NO-NOTICE	10 APR 81	(SAC)				
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1	FLIGHT EXAMINER Jay P. Slaughenhou Maj	pt,	92 OG					×	Jay P. Saugh	Sh-	-8 Sep 93
2	REVIEWING OFFICER  Arthur A. Holland, Lt Col 92 OG					×		(	Autura. 10	held	-8 Sep 93 10 Sep 93
HNAL APPROVING OFFICER  3 Michael G. Russell,  Lt Col 325 BS			•••		×			Hucharl D. K	ussel	13 Sep 93.	
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,	29 OCT 93 Mark G. McGeehan, Maj							177	<u> </u>		





#### FLIGHT EXAMINER REMARKS

Mission Comments - Sortie consisted of a cell departure as number two, air refueling on AR 10 SE, low level and bombing activity in the Cold Lake range in Canada, and concluded with pattern activity at Fairchild AFB. Mission planning was thorough with all aspects of the flight covered in detail. All ground operations were good. Takeoff and departure were excellent. The air refueling was with a Castle AFB CCTS crew in and out of some light clouds and turbulance. His basic air refueling was good. During the boom limits demonstration he initially had some slight problems due to the turbulance and random unannounced turns by the tanker. Once the tanker stabalized he performed all the limits very well. All low level TA/EVS and visual procedures were good, as was his bombing. His initial buffet demonstration was flawlessly performed. He did an especially good job on his required pattern activity. Only very minor airspeed deviations that did not detract from the overall flight were noted.

STORE THE

## AERONAUTICAL ORDER (PA) AVIATION SERVICE

HANGE AVIATION SERVICE CODE FROM 2J

ENTITLEMENT: ACIP

IS NOT AFFECTED

IAME: MCGEEHAN MARK C

REW POSITION: PILOT

OFFICE SYMBOL: DO

GRADE: MAJ SSAN:

VING: 0092 BW

SC: 2A

OCATION: FAIRCHILD AFB

REQUIRED TO PERFORM FREQUENT AND REGULAR FLIGHTS: YES

ASD: 06 NOV 78

ORGANIZATION: 0325 BS

REQUIRED TO PERFORM PARACHUTE DUTIES

TSC: D

OSD: 31 MAY 78 OFDA:

:EMARKS: ASC DATE BASED ON DDLDS IAW AFR 60-1.

FFECTIVE DATE: 07 APR 93

FAC: 3

TERMINATION DATE: 05 NOV 96

UTHORITY: AFR 60-1 PARAGRAPH 2-3

REQUEST DATE: 08 JUL 93

IGNATURE ELEMENT OF ORDERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICIAL:

OR THE COMMANDER

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HQ 92D SUPPORT GROUP (ACC) FAIRCHILD AFB WA 99011-5000

HIEF. OPS SYS MGT BRANCH

ISTRIBUTION: C

AERONAUTICAL ORDER NUMBER: 0228

### INDÍ 🖟 🚉 PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING 🖣

(THIS FORM IS SUBJECT TO THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974. USE BLANKET PAS - DD FORM 2005)

For aircrew members this record will be kept as a permanent part of the Individual Flight Record (IFR) or the AF Form 846, Aircrew Training/Evaluation Records. For all other personnel this record may be kept as a permanent part of the Field Medical Record. Only Physiological Training Officers may authenticate entries. This record should accompany individual when reporting for refresher training courses.

LAST NAME - FIR	ST NAME - MIDDLE INITIA	L		GRADE SSAN		
McGeehan, 1	lark C.	·		0-7		
TYPE OF TRAINING	AIR FORCE BASE	TRAINING	ES EXPIRATION	'SIGNATURE OF PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING OFFICER		
ORIGINAL	Vance AFB, OK	<del></del>		NICHOLAS D. BOLEY, CAPT, USAF, PRO		
PASSENGER	LOWERY AFB CO	23 Sep 74	30 Sep 77	JAY M. HOWARD, CAPT, USAF, BSC		
REFRESHER	WRIGHT-PATTERSON		8 1 OCT 1985	Menzie Romi		
REFRESHER TTI	OFFUTT AFB, NE	4 Aug 86	31 Aug 89	HUGO A. RAMOS, MAJ, USAF		
REFRESHER TTI	KADENA AB, JA	11 Jul 89	31 Jul 92	EDWARD A. LUEDEKLNE, Maj, USAF		
TTB REFRESHER	Columbus AFB MS	17 Dec 92	31 Dec 95	MICHELE L'. SHAFFER, Capt, USAF, BSC		
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PRESSURE SUIT ORIG: TYPE.	,					
PRESSURE SUIT REFR: TYPE-						
EJECTION SEAT TRAINER	Vance AFB. OK	22 Feb 79		MICHOLAS D. BOYET, CAST, USAS ATT		
PARA-SAIL	Vance AFB. OK	9 Apr 79		MICHORAS D. BOLEY, CAPT, USAT, PTO		

REMARKS

^{*} Annotated from AF 702

## MEDICAL RECOMMENDATION FOR FLYING OR SPECIAL OPERATIONAL DUTY (THIS FORM IS SUBJECT TO THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 - Use blanket PAS DD Form 2005)

TO: (HOSM/UNIT Scheduling Officer 92 OSS/DOTF	) or (Cmdr/Duty Sec	920 M	EDICAL GRO HILD AFB \			DATE	E 16 DEC 93
LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDOE/B MCGEEHAN, MARK C	R#5848 / -				GRADE MAJ	SSN	
RATING/FLYING OR SPECIAL OPERATION PILOT		ASC ACTIVE F 2A [X]YES		ORGANIZATION 325 BMS		MAJ	COM , ACC
THE ABOVE INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN FOU [ ] MEDICALLY RESTRICTED FROM FL [ ] RATED OFFICER:	YING OR SPECIAL OPE	RATIONAL DUTY		HIN 180 DAYS.		-	
[ ] <u>MONRATED OFFICE</u> [ ] MEDICALLY CLEARED FOR FLYING	,				•	IN 90 DAYS.	`
	OR SPECIAL OPERATION				•	IN 90 DAYS.	
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	20 de 93 to
DATE MEDICAL CLEARANCE EXPIRES 31 JAN 95	MEDICAL EXAM MAY BS ACCOMPLISHED IN/AFTER>> NOV 94
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I CERTIFY that I have been n	otified and understand the above actions and recommendations.
: [ ] DO [X] DO NOT wear con	tact lenses while performing flying or special operational duty.
ISIGNATURE OF FLYER OR INDIVIDUAL THE	DATE 1= 150 97
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PERSONAL DATA-PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

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PERSONAL DATA-PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

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AFMAY 78 942 PREVIOUS EDITION WILL BE USED

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IV	Examiner's	Remarks
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A. Mission Description. This form 8 documents completion of an ACCR 60-2 MSN/QUAL annual evaluation for a flight evaluation given on 15 Feb 94.

B. Discrepancies: None.

EDITED FOR

## AERONAUTICAL ORDER (PA) AERONAUTICAL RATING

THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUAL(S) IS/ARE AWARDED THE AERONAUTICAL RATING DESIGNATED.

NAME HUSTON KENNETH S GRADE SSAN

AWARD MASTER NAVIGATOR

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HQ 92D SUPPORT GROUP (ACC) FAIRCHILD AFB WA 99011-5000 ORGN Ø325

REMARKS: MEMBER MET REQUIREMENTS FOR ADVANCED RATING IAW AFR 60-13 PARA 2-9A,

TABLE 2-1 LINE 11.

EFFECTIVE DATE: 17 NOV 93

TERMINATION DATE: N/A

AUTHORITY: AFR 60-13 PARAGRAPH 2-9A

REQUEST DATE: 17 NOV 93

SIGNATURE ELEMENT OF ORDERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICIAL:

FOR THE COMMANDER:

AMES D. KENNEDY, MSGT, USAF

NCOIC, FLIGHT RECORDS

DISTRIBUTION: C

AERONAUTICAL ORDER NUMBER: 0063

## INDIVIDUAL PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING REPRE

(THIS FORM IS SUBJECT TO THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974. USE BLANKET PAS - DD FORM 2005)

For aircrew members this record will be kept as a permanent part of the Individual Flight Record (IFR) or the AF Form 846, Aircrew Training/Evaluation Records. For all other personnel this record may be kept as a permanent part of the Field Medical Record. Only Physiological Training Officers may authenticate entries. This record should accompany individual when reporting for refresher training courses.

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ORIGINAL	MATHER AFB CA	25 Apr 78	30 Apr 81	DOUGLASO LA CHELLING CAPT. USAF, BSC
PASSENGER				1
REFRESHER	MATHER AFB, CA	23 Feb 79	28 Feb 82	JAMES A. KEY, Major USAF, BSC
	-Kalena Aby JA	13 Jan 82	31 Jan 85	RODERT E. SHERMAN, Maj, USAF, BOC
REFRESHER	15th PTF Kadena AB, JA,	13 Jan 82		TEFFER OF SVENTEK, 1Lt. USAF BSC
REFRESHER	ELLSWORTH AFR,	1 8 OCT 1984	1 OCT 1987	NEAL BAUMGAPTNEN ILT USAF BSC.
REF/TTB	Peterson AFB,CO	21 July 87	31 July 90	JAMES W. WEISSMANN, Capt, USAF, BS
TTB REFRESHER	PETERSON AFB, CO	22 JUN 89	30 JUN 92	PATE DE PORTE USAF, BSC
REF/TTB	Fairchild AFB, WA	7 May 92	31 May 95	KRVIN W.4KOZLOWSKI, MAY, USAF
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PRESSURE SUIT REFR: TYPE-				
VERTIGON	Peterson AFB.CO	21 Jul 87	31 Jul 90	JAMES W. WEISSMANN, Capt. USAF
EJECTION SEAT TRAINER	MATHER AFB, CA	24 Apr 78		MUNITAS A DELLAMA CAPT. USAF. BSC
PARA-SAIL	MATHER AFB, CA	2 Nov 78		LOUELASOL MOUNTES CAPT. USAF, BSC
WET- DITCHING	MATHER AFB, CA	25 Apr 78		CONTLABOLISHELLING CAPT. USAF. BSC
REMARKS				7

T-37 Procedural Seat Training, Mather AFB, Ca, 20 Apr 78.

## ON FOR FLITNS OR SPECIAL OFERATIONAL DUTY (THIS FORM IS SUBJECT TO THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 - Use blanket PAS DO Form 2005) DATE FROM: TO: (HDSM/UNIT Scheduling Officer) or (Cmdr/Duty Sect) 15 SEP 93 92D MEDICAL GROUP (ACC) 92 OSS/DOTF FAIRCHILD AFB WA 99011 GRADE SSN _ast name - first name - middde/erf5f48 / MAJ HUSTON, KENNETH **DRGANIZATION** ASC ACTIVE FLYING MAJCON RATING/FLYING OR SPECIAL OPERATIONAL DUTY 325 BMS ACC NAVIGATOR ZA [X]YES [ ]NO "HE ABOVE INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN FOUND (Check Appropriate Boxes): [ ] MEDICALLY RESTRICTED FROM FLYING OR SPECIAL OPERATIONAL DUTY (DNIF) [ ] RATED OFFICER: ILLNESS DR INJURY WILL NOT BE RESOLVED WITHIN 180 DAYS. [ ] NONRATED OFFICER OR ENLISTED PERSONNEL: ILLNESS OR INJURY WILL NOT BE RESOLVED WITHIN 90 DAYS. [ ] MEDICALLY CLEARED FOR FLYING OR SPECIAL OPERATIONAL DUTY FOLLOWING AN ILLNESS OR INJURY. XI MEDICALLY CLEARED FOR FLYING DUTY FOLLOWING: MY PERIODIC MEDICAL [ ] INITIAL CLEARANCE [ ] AIRCRAFT [ ] INITIAL MEDICAL **EXAMINATION** (This Base) ( ) REQUIRED TO WEAR VISION CORRECTION DEVICES WHILE PERFORMING FLYING OR SPECIAL OPERATIONAL DUTY. ESTIMATED DURATION OF DNIF CTUAL DATE FOUND DNIF DATE FOUND MEDICALLY CLEARED DAYS DNIF THIS ILLNESS/INJURY EMARKS ATE MEDICAL CLEARANCE EXPIRES 30 NOV 94 MEDICAL EXAM MAY BE ACCOMPLISHED IN/AFTER SEP 94 PED OR PRINTED NAME & GRADE OF FLIGHT SURGEON DATE 15 SEP 93 I CERTIFY that I have been notified and understand the above actions and recommendations. wear contact lenses while performing flying or special operational duty. [ ] DO CX3 DO NOT DATE , 15 SEP 94

(FLYRED / COMPUTER GENERATED)

PREVIOUS EDITION WILL BE USED.

PREPARED 94-AUG-01			ANNUAL		
NAME:-RUSTON-KENNETH: 6	SING: 0092	PRI CRE POST R	PRI ACFT: BOSZH	6 FACT-3-0325	OFDA: 182 ASC/DATE: 2A/90-APR-12. BASE: FAIRCHILD AFB
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